
V. M. MOLOTOV


**Lessons of the
Wrecking, Diversionist and
Espionage Activities of
the Japanese-German-
Trotskyite Agents**




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
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
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LESSONS OF THE WRECKING, DIVERSIONIST
AND ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES OF THE
JAPANESE-GERMAN-TROTSKYITE AGENTS







Lessons of the
Wrecking, Diversionist and
Espionage Activities
of the Japanese-German-
Trotskyite Agents

By V. M. Molotov



MOSCOW 1937
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I. INSTANCES OF WRECKING AND THE CHARACTER OF THE WRECKERS

Last year our industry overfulfilled its program. Heavy industry overfulfilled its production plan not only last year, but also in the last three years. We further know that despite the diversionist and wrecking activities of the Trotskyite-fascist agents, heavy industry not only fulfilled its First Five-Year Plan in four and a quarter years, but is already approaching the fulfilment of its Second Five-Year Plan (in 1936 it attained 98.3 per cent of the program laid down for the last year of the Second Five-Year Plan). Nevertheless, at the present moment we must devote most serious attention to eliminating the consequences of the wrecking, diversionist and espionage work of the Japanese-German-Trotskyite agents in our industry who have caused no little damage to our national economy.

The Trotskyite and foreign espionage agents attributed great importance to wrecking and diversionist work in heavy industry and on the railways. And the reason is obvious. The enemy tried to strike at the most important and sensitive spots of our national economy and defence.

We still do not know all the facts relating to the wrecking and diversionist activities of the Trotskyite and other agents in heavy industry and in other branches of our state apparatus. But what we do know is sufficient to justify us in saying that they caused serious damage to the national economy, and to heavy industry in particular.

When speaking of the gang of wreckers in the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, we must first of all dwell on Pyatakov. Pyatakov, former Assistant People's Com-

missar of Heavy Industry, worked in heavy industry with brief intervals for over twelve years. He had quite a number of his people in the apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. He was the principal organizer of the wrecking and diversionist work of the criminal gang that operated in heavy industry.

This is what Pyatakov said in his testimony regarding this work:

"My official position—Assistant People's Commissar of Heavy Industry—afforded me many opportunities to arrange my counter-revolutionary work chiefly along the line of Trotsky's directions about wrecking activities in the national economy.

"Acting along this line, I formed personal contacts with the necessary people.

"I therefore arranged my work on the following principles:

"1) I selected people from among the Trotskyites, important business executives. I promoted them and appointed them to independent work in appropriate industrial centres or in Moscow, in high positions.

"2) I instructed these people (of course, informing them of Trotsky's directions) to select other people (not only Trotskyites) at their discretion and to pursue the line of disrupting the work in their particular sectors.

"3) I recommended my people (and so acted myself) not to diffuse their wrecking activities, but to focus attention on main industrial objects of importance to defence and to the Soviet Union as a whole.

"In this respect I acted in accordance with Trotsky's directions, namely, to deliver telling blows at the most sensitive spots."

Such was the line of conduct of the principal leader of the wrecking and diversionist work in the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. He had instructions from Trotsky to strike at socialist economy at its most sensitive spots, and he did so with the cynicism of a rank criminal who will stop at nothing. We have to admit that there is a good deal of truth in what Pyatakov said about the wide opportunities for wrecking work he enjoyed in the apparatus of heavy industry. We made a big mistake in allowing this to happen. We must draw an earnest lesson from this for the future.

Owing to the fact that they had their own man in a leading post in the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, the wreckers, diversionists and spies of the Trotskyite gang

and the foreign secret services had wide opportunities to place their people in the Chief Administrations, trusts and enterprises. We have already exposed several hundred business executives who possessed Party cards, as well as "non-Party" engineers and technicians occupying responsible posts in the institutions of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, who for a number of years carried on criminal wrecking work in these institutions. Let us hope that we shall soon completely eradicate every ramification of this criminal gang.

I shall now pass to individual branches of heavy industry. I shall begin with the chemical industry.

First let me quote once more from Pyatakov's testimony:

"The following wrecking and diversionist work was done in the chemical and coke and chemical industry:

"1) A plan for the development of the war chemical industry was drawn up, submitted and endorsed, which in practice resulted in diffusing and freezing funds and in delaying the starting of necessary enterprises.

"2) In the nitrogen industry, the construction of new enterprises was dragged out, chiefly by systematic and protracted revision of designs.

"3) In the sulphuric acid industry, the real capacities of plants were concealed by deliberately underestimating operation indexes.

"4) In the soda industry, development of capacity was retarded, with the result that there is an acute shortage of soda, although it could be produced in the U.S.S.R. in absolutely unlimited quantities. In addition, measures were taken to prevent the creation of new soda producing centres at available sources of raw material (e.g., from the waste of the potassium industry, or at the Usolsk salt deposits in Eastern Siberia).

"Such are the principal facts about the wrecking work in the chemical and coke and chemical industry performed by Rataichak on my instructions."

Of course, we must not believe that Pyatakov told all he knew about the wrecking activities in the chemical and other industries. On the contrary, we may be certain that he did not by far tell all he knew and could reveal about wrecking and diversionist work.

Let us supplement this by the testimony given by Drobnis regarding the Kemerovo Combined Chemical Works. Drobnis testified as follows:

"We did far too much wrecking and destructive work. I shall find it difficult to speak of certain details but I shall tell you about our principal line of disruptive activity and about the more important destructive acts that I can call to mind.

"The destructive work carried on by myself, Norkin, director of the Kemerovo Combined Chemical Works, and Kartsev, assistant director and technical manager of the works, from 1935 to the time of my arrest, embraced the Coke and Chemical Factory, the Nitrogen Fertilizer Factory, the Heat and Power Station and dwelling construction.

"1) In the first half of 1935 our destructive work consisted in endeavouring in every way to prevent the starting at the proper time of a number of enterprises under construction on the right bank, *i.e.*, the special chemical plants, which were important for defence purposes.

"With this object in view, we deliberately delayed the designing of the electric power station. This job, which was part of our plan, was chiefly performed by Kartsev through the designing organizations in Moscow and Leningrad.

"2) We also delayed the designing of a number of special chemical plants.

"3) The disruptive activities in connection with the special chemical plants were such that the foundations of a number of buildings, I cannot now recall their numbers, were laid in accordance with the original designs; but the designs were later rejected, and the foundations of these buildings had to be pulled up. In the case of one building even the walls had been erected and were later pulled down.

"4) From these same disruptive motives, Kartsev, with our knowledge, while in Moscow in 1935, had the designs of the main building of the Nitrogen Works rejected, but about two months later we were obliged to start building in accordance with these designs.

"5) In the second half of 1936 we organized a number of accidents. One of the most serious was the accident at the ammonium nitrate plant and the montan nitrate plant."

I shall next refer to the testimony of the wrecker Asinovsky, technical director of the Gorlovka Nitrogen Fertilizer Combined Works. He said:

"In the Gorlovka Nitrogen Fertilizer Works the counter-revolutionary organization performed the following diversionist acts:

"1) Approximately in April 1934 a section of the ammonium nitrate department was deliberately put out of operation by an explosion in the ammonia line. There were a number of victims of the explosion. The department was put out of operation for seven days as a result of the explosion. I was told by Tamm after I joined the counter-revolutionary organization that the explosion was the work of the organization.

"2) In October 1934 the organization caused the explosion of two coke compressors. The factory was at a standstill for two

hours as a result. According to Tamm, this diversionist act was performed by Khalezov acting through new members he had enrolled in the counter-revolutionary organization. Tamm did not mention the names of these persons.

"3) At the end of November 1934 the counter-revolutionary organization caused the collapse of the overhead coke-gas line. According to Tamm, this was organized by Khalezov, a member of the organization. Tamm did not mention the names of others responsible for this diversionist act.

"4) In January 1935 an explosion was caused in the mélange collector. The factory was at a standstill for three days as a result of the explosion. According to Tamm, this explosion was also organized by Khalezov.

"5) On November 11, 1935, Khalezov and Krushelnitsky caused an explosion in the ammonia department. The factory was at a standstill for three weeks as a result of the explosion. The repairs cost about 1,500,000 or 2,000,000 rubles."

Month by month, and year by year, groups of wreckers and diversionists holding important posts in our industry carried on their criminal work, growing ever more insolent because their crimes went unpunished. We must not forget that these crimes were only by way of preparation, that they were only a trial of strength in anticipation of the delivery of more severe blows, blows more dangerous to our country, in the future. On the instructions of Trotsky and Pyatakov, the wreckers, diversionists and spies of their gang prepared to deliver their main blows upon the outbreak of war. If the diversionist and wrecking gang of Japan-German-Trotskyite agents had still remained undetected on the outbreak of war, we should have encountered great difficulties in the fulfilment of a number of military and economic tasks.

Let us take another branch of industry—coal. Here too the criminal gang of wreckers were very active. This is what the notorious Shestov testified in relation to the Kuzbas:

"The destructive work aimed at:

"1) Deliberately retarding the speed of new mine construction and the reconstruction of old mines.

"2) The arrangement of the construction of new mines in such a way that highly important objects should be completed at different times with the object of delaying the starting of new mines at their full designed capacity.

"3) The introduction of systems of operating rich seams in-

volving the maximum loss of coal and designed to cause underground fires which would render certain coal deposits unworkable.

"4) Disrupting the opening of new seams and coal fields required to develop coal output in accordance with the plans.

"5) Causing artificial discrepancies between preparatory work and clearing work with the object of disrupting the plan of coal output.

"6) Causing wholesale damage to machinery with the object of disrupting coal output.

"7) Preventing the proper organization of labour and, more recently, counteracting the development of the Stakhanov movement.

"These were the principal disruptive measures adopted in the coal fields where the members of the organization had developed their destructive activities."

Shestov has been shot and can do no more damage. But when we read his testimony and see on what a broad scale he conducted his wrecking and disruptive work in the coal industry, we must not forget that these things happened only the other day, that only the other day many of our comrades, under whose very noses Shestov and his gang operated, failed to notice his crimes. Should this not serve as a serious warning to business administrators, and not to our business administrators alone?

The wreckers in the Kuzbas attributed great importance to the spread of underground fires in the coal mines. Shestov testified in this connection as follows:

"The chief and most effective disruptive measure adopted in the Prokopyevsk colliery was the wholesale introduction of the chamber-and-pillar-system irrespective of the character of the seams, without removing the pillars between the chambers and without filling in the worked-out cavities.

"This measure, apart from involving a considerable loss of coal, amounting to not less than 50 per cent compared with a permissible 15-20 per cent, caused numerous underground fires which have not been extinguished to this very day. The fires have made it impossible to work the lower levels without the risk of the fires spreading and serious explosions ensuing."

Shestov also cited an example of wrecking in the sphere of mine construction:

"Four big shafts of Pit 7/8 were sunk in 1932 after a very unsatisfactory survey of the seams. These mines might have been sunk at more reliable and richer deposits."

Shestov also testified to other forms of wrecking activity practised in the coal industry:

"Disruptive blows in the Anzherka Colliery were also directed against the operation of the mines, with the result that the colliery was in constant difficulties.

"Firstly, the machinery was exploited in such a way as to cause an exceptional number of accidents. The mine is a mechanized one and this seriously affected coal output.

"Absolutely unskilled workers were allowed to operate the machinery. No training of cadres was undertaken. If the foremen refused to accept unskilled workers they were criticized for not wanting to train cadres at the job."

I shall next dwell on the non-ferrous metal industry, which is of great importance to national defence. It is generally known that Pyatakov was very closely connected with the non-ferrous metal industry and carried on wrecking activities within it.

This is what Pyatakov testified regarding wrecking work in the copper industry in the Urals, which he himself visited several times:

"In view of the extreme importance of the Urals copper industry to the national economy and national defence, the wrecking activities were aimed in this direction.

"Firstly, copper smelting at the plants already in operation was retarded. I cannot say how this work was done in the various plants, but the fact remains that as a result of the wrecking activities of the Trotskyite group the largest of the three Urals plants—the Krassno-Uralsk—made an extremely poor showing all the time as regards efficiency. For the same reasons, the Karabash plant was in constant difficulties. At the Kirovograd plant the wrecking activities chiefly affected the concentration department, and all three works produced far less copper than they are capable of giving.

"Wrecking activities were particularly intensive at the big copper plant in the course of construction in the Urals—the Central Urals Copper Works.

"Firstly, we hindered construction work on this plant in every way. Building operations, which were started as early as 1932, were practically at a standstill at the beginning of 1935 and were in a state of utter disorder.

"Yulin had placed Trotskyites in every branch of the building work, and each of them disrupted the work in his own sphere, acting under Yulin's guidance.

"When I visited the building site at the beginning of 1935, wrecking activities were being conducted so crudely as to strike the eye even at a most superficial glance. I was extremely dis-

turbed by the fact and pointed to Zharikov that this would not do. I told him that he should make a pretense of improving building operations and conduct himself more cautiously. With this object in view, Zharikov and I then adopted more carefully masked methods of wrecking. We agreed that he should 'display energy,' improve building operations and start the construction of some units or other, but so as to ensure that there would be no copper.

"Furthermore, knowing how acute the situation was with copper ore in the Urals, we decided still more to delay work on the Degtyarinsk Mines (the ore supply for the Central Urals Copper Works). It was precisely with this object in view that in May 1935 I issued an order separating the management of the ore supply from the management of the construction of the plant by transferring it to the Urals Copper Ore Trust. The idea was that the funds assigned for the Degtyarinsk Mines would be lost in the large business carried on by the Urals Copper Ore Trust and that the Degtyarinsk Mines would act as a brake on the Central Urals Copper Works even after the latter had formally been put into operation.

"With the same purpose, assignments for the development of the ore supply were curtailed. I personally managed to have this carried through the apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry.

"Furthermore, one other serious piece of wrecking work was carried out in connection with the building of the Central Urals Copper Works.

"I am referring to the complete absence of work on the construction of the chemical section of the plant, which we deliberately postponed.

"The fact is that the works can be operated economically only in combination with the chemical plant. This was the way the Central Urals Copper Works was conceived. The Degtyarinsk ore is very poor in copper (about one per cent) and if the sulphur it contains is not utilized by the chemical plant, this (1) will increase the cost of copper inordinately, and (2) the sulphurous gases issuing from the copper works will poison the surrounding neighbourhood.

"It was for this reason that the Central Urals Copper Works was to be built as a combined enterprise. But from wrecking motives we separated the two sections. The chemical section was put under the charge of the Chief Administration of the Chemical Industry, where Rataichak stopped all progress on it. As a result, only the copper section is being built (and that in a wrecking way), while the construction of the chemical section has not even been begun."

Pyatakof's testimony on this point was supplemented by the wrecker Puchkov, former senior construction engineer of the Urals Copper Ore Trust, who stated:

"The counter-revolutionary activities of the counter-revolutionary organization in the copper industry pursued the following aims:

"Firstly, to deliberately cause underground fires in the mines.

"Secondly, to hamper the development of ore mining by deliberately retarding capital construction work (although adequate funds were assigned for the purpose) and by delaying the designs.

"Thirdly, to adopt obviously unsuitable designs."

Puchkov went on to enumerate definite cases of wrecking:

"Aristov and Berman, who frequently visited the mines, also knew that spontaneous heating (rise of temperature) was to be observed in the old workings, but deliberately refrained from taking measures to lower the temperature.

"As a result, a big underground fire broke out in the mines on June 25, 1935, owing to spontaneous combustion of copper pyrites.

"The immediate result of the fact that Berman deliberately refrained from taking precautionary measures (partitions, sealing) was that the gases caused by the combustion of copper pyrites rapidly spread to all the workings not only of the Kompaneiskaya Mine, but also of the Central and Comintern Mines, and interrupted mining operations and preparatory work in all the mines from June 25 to September 26, 1935.

"The fire involved a loss to the state of over 1,500,000 rubles and the supply of ore to the copper smelting works was over 80,000 tons short.

"The disablement of the mines so severely affected the production and economic position of the colliery management that it was unable to extinguish the fire by its own efforts. The People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry made an assignment to the Red Guard Mine of one million rubles for the purpose of extinguishing the fire.

"From the same diversionist motives, and on the direct instructions of Aristov, Berman and Gaiderov not only deliberately refrained from taking measures to prevent the fire but drew up no plan of precautionary measures against fire.

"The underground fire in the Red Guard Mine is still raging.

"Even after the outbreak of the fire, Aristov deliberately frustrated the adoption of effective measures to extinguish it. . . .

"I want to tell the investigating authorities that a number of other mines are in danger of fire, also as a result of the deliberate action of Aristov.

"I am referring to the underground fires that occurred in the N. Levinsk Mine and the Third International Mine.

"There is also a danger of fire in the Degtyarinsk Mine. . . .

"Taube deliberately secured the adoption of the design of the head-frame of the Ulkhovsky Pit (Third International Mine) for the Kushaika Pit, for which it is unsuitable.

"Some unknown person wrote on the standard design of the

Ulkhovsky Pit (while I was absent on business in Moscow): 'Accept for the Kushaika.'

"I was unable to establish who wrote this instruction, but Taube knows who it was because he endorsed the design.

"The fact that the inadequate size of the head-frame designed for the Kushaika Pit is dangerous to the lives of the workers is shown by the consequences of designing a similar head-frame for Pit No. 2 of the Livikhin Mine management.

"In April 1936 the cage rope at this pit broke precisely because the cage was raised too high when the head-frame was too low. Two workers were killed in this accident."

Is it not clear from this that in the copper industry, which we were particularly anxious to develop rapidly in the interests of national defence, we committed a serious mistake in allowing too free a hand to our enemies? Does not the case of the copper industry show that if we—and especially the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry and the Urals organizations—had paid more heed to the crying outrages that were going on in the industry, we would have disclosed the wrecking activities much earlier and have dealt with Pyatakov's criminal gang much sooner? We would then certainly have been able to develop copper production more rapidly than we have done.

Or take another example: the wrecking activities in the rubber industry. If we had only in time displayed a little more vigilance with respect to the suspicious actions of Bitker & Co., we would have prevented a number of downright provocative wrecking acts on the part of this sinister clique.

Last summer everybody was struck by the absolutely abnormal position with regard to automobile tires. Its effects were most seriously felt in the provinces. We now have Bitker's testimony, in which he states:

"As a result of the disruptive activities of the group (at the Yaroslavl Rubber and Asbestos Combined Works), about 200,000 defective tires were put out in the course of May and June 1936. This was done as follows: the group introduced its own formula and, without the usual tests being made on 1,000-2,000 tires, serial production was at once started in accordance with this formula. For the space of over two months (from May 11 to July 21) the works turned out nothing but defective tires. At the same time, the VA formula worked out by the Rubber Industry Research Institute was ignored, although when tested this formula showed

good results and provided for the use of a large proportion of synthetic rubber.

"This wrecking work in respect to the quality of tires was part of the wrecking policy I pursued with regard to the solution of such a highly important economic problem as mastering the manufacture of synthetic rubber."

You will easily understand that Bitker's wrecking gang was trying, by disrupting the production of automobile tires, to damage the harvest campaign of the collective and state farms and a number of other important measures.

Even these scraps from the testimony of the wreckers show how varied are the methods of wrecking and diversionist activity used by our enemies, and how many are the fissures in the administration of our economic organs through which our enemies creep in and do us damage. Only philistine carelessness and political short-sightedness can explain the fact that day after day many business administrators have been overlooking outrageous acts of wrecking. Even the few extracts I have quoted from the testimony of the wreckers contain numerous instructive examples which should teach us how to detect and prevent wrecking and diversionist acts.

It was natural that the wreckers should be malicious enemies of the Stakhanov movement. And they did in fact carry on a vile struggle against the Stakhanovites and the Stakhanov movement.

I shall cite two pieces of testimony in this respect.

The first is the testimony of Drobnis. This is what he says:

"Under the pretext of widely developing the Stakhanov movement we deliberately discredited it. To this end we refrained from creating the necessary conditions, deliberately lengthened the working day to ten hours, and in order to sow dissension between Stakhanovites and non-Stakhanovites, we adopted the practice at the Nitrogen Works construction job of crediting some workers with work they did not actually perform. We played this trick systematically."

Here is the other testimony—Norkin's—on the same subject:

"Another method we used to disrupt the Stakhanov movement was by making the Stakhanovites do work which subsequently had to be done all over again. Thus the workers exerted themselves on the building job, but when the work was finished it would 'turn out' that it was not in accordance with the designs, that it had not been done rightly, or not in the right place; and so what had been built was pulled down and started over again. This, for example, was the case with the laying of the foundations of the oleum plant which when finished had to be blown up, and so the work of the Stakhanovites was performed in vain."

And all this was done under the very noses not only of certain honest business executives and engineers, but also of our Party and trade union organizations, which either did not realize what was happening or else were unable to counteract it.

The wreckers tried both to disrupt the Stakhanov movement and to sow discontent among the workers. This policy was pursued by all these Pyatakovs, Pyatakov followers and other vile wreckers in many places.

Pyatakov testified on this subject as follows:

"At the building site, first Yulin and then Zharikov caused disruptions of the social and material services catering for the workers. Bad living conditions were created and the payment of wages was delayed.

"This resulted in dissatisfaction among the workers and facilitated the collapse of the Stakhanov movement."

I shall cite one more example of the lengths to which these degenerate wreckers went in their hatred for the Soviet government and the workers. Here is the testimony of Ravva, former technical director of the Rostov Agricultural Machinery Works:

"During the First of May holidays in 1936 the organization arranged and carried through a plan to asphyxiate the workers in the steel-smelting shop, as a result of which workers who were in the shop at the time and firemen who dashed to their aid, seventeen in all, were asphyxiated, six of them fatally.

"This was arranged on Glebov-Avilov's instructions. The direct performers of this diversionist act were Shlykov, assistant superintendent of the gas station, and Kozlov, mechanic in the steel-smelting shop, the latter having recruited one or two other persons for the job. . . .

"Just before May Day, Glebov-Avilov summoned me to his office and told me that I must take advantage of the fact that the works would be closed for repairs during the May holidays to

arrange to asphyxiate workers. He told me that it was intended on May 3, after the repair work was finished, to turn on the gas. 'All you have to do,' he said, 'is to leave the shutters in the gas line in one of the shops open and gas will seep into the shop.' He warned me that after the asphyxiation took place I was to attribute it to the inexperience of the brigade which repaired the gas line."

Could anything be worse? And yet the testimony of Ravva, who even got into the Party, thanks to our short-sightedness, only supplements what we learnt from the January trial and from many similar cases.

All that I have said so far relates to heavy industry. This does not mean that no wrecking and diversionist work was performed in other branches of industry. Such work was performed in light industry too.

We must not forget the fact, for instance, that large wrecking organizations were discovered in light industry in connection with the well-known case of the Industrial Party.

A large wrecking organization was discovered several years ago in the meat and canning industry. This should be seriously borne in mind by the people in the food industry. The danger of diversionist and wrecking work in the food industry must not be underrated.

It need hardly be said that there are very unsatisfactory sectors in the timber industry, where the leading personnel is seriously backward politically. It is high time the comrades in the People's Commissariat of the Timber Industry learnt the lesson from the late wrecking activities, from the exposure of the wrecking and espionage activities of the Japan-German-Trotskyite agents.

All this applies to other branches of industry too. We have already received enough lessons, it would seem, to make us realize that wreckers and diversionists try to entrench themselves in every branch of industry and in every state organization and to take advantage of the heedlessness of self-satisfied executives, of which there are so many among us, to perform their vile work.

The Assistant People's Commissar of Heavy Industry

was Pyatakov, who turned out to be a wrecker and diversionist. But as you know, the post of Assistant People's Commissar of Railways was held by the wrecker Livshitz. The Assistant People's Commissar of the Timber Industry was also a wrecker Sokolnikov, and before that, as you know, this spy was Assistant People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs. The assistant manager of the State Bank was the wrecker Arkus. The manager of the Industrial Bank was the wrecker Tumanov. In the People's Commissariat of Agriculture quite a number of big wreckers were exposed in recent years among highly-placed people. Such were Markevich, Konor, Wolf and Reingold, all of whom were once Assistant People's Commissars of Agriculture. Serebryakov, the former chief of the Central Road Transport Administration, turned out to be a wrecker. The wrecker Zov was at one time Assistant Commissar of Water Transport. And this is by no means a complete list, but enough has been said to show how serious the question is.

It is necessary to dwell further on the wrecking work in the sphere of the people's food supply. In this connection the testimony of the wrecker Yazovskikh, former director of the Perm Inter-District Foodstuffs Trading Association, is worth serious attention. He stated:

"After the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. was published in July 1936, Ginzburg (superintendent of the Foodstuffs Department of the Sverdlovsk Regional Trading Association) proposed that the members of the counter-revolutionary group should deliberately discredit the achievements recorded in the Constitution. In September 1936 he told me that we must stir up widespread discontent among the population at the time of the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets, at which the Constitution was to be ratified. Ginzburg further said that this could best be done by disrupting the bread supply and causing food lines at the baker shops. Attention, Ginzburg said, must be chiefly focussed on disorganizing the bread trade in the chief industrial centres of the Sverdlovsk Region, and he particularly stressed the necessity of disorganizing the bread trade in Sverdlovsk, Perm and Tagil.

"This wrecking work was done by our counter-revolutionary group."

Another Sverdlovsk wrecker named Voropayev, a former Communist, testified as follows:

"The difficulties that occurred in Sverdlovsk from November 25 to December 5, 1936, that is, at the time of the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., were deliberately caused by the wrecking and disorganizing work of officials of the City Trading Association and the Sverdlovsk Foodstuffs Trading Association."

The preliminary investigation established the fact that although there were adequate supplies of bread in the city of Sverdlovsk . . . on November 25, 1936, and subsequent days the wrecking group succeeded in deliberately disorganizing the bread supply and causing huge lines outside the shops. This was achieved by undersupplying bread to a large number of shops, while oversupplying bread to others. Seventeen out of 87 shops were not supplied with bread at all during these days. Is this not a disgrace to the Soviet and Party leaders under whose very eyes these outrageous wrecking acts were committed with impunity?

I would also remind you of facts relating to the activities of leading regional Soviet organs. Golovin, chairman of the Sverdlovsk Regional Executive Committee, was recently exposed as a wrecker and Trotskyite; two assistant chairmen of the Kiev Regional Executive Committee were exposed as wreckers, etc.

I shall now proceed to deal with the special features of recent wrecking work. This necessitates a comparison between recent wrecking and diversionist activities and the wrecking activities of the period of the Shakhti trial.

In the period 1928-30, the time of the disclosure of the Shakhti affair, the Industrial Party affair, the Metro-Vickers affair, the wrecking work in the food industry and von Mekk's wrecking and diversionist organization on the railways, we were confronted with wreckers who belonged to the bourgeois camp, wreckers who were bourgeois specialists. The wreckers at that time were bourgeois wreckers. These gentlemen were connected with Russian whiteguards abroad and with foreign secret service agents and spies, but they did not pretend to be our friends, and in fact stood a long way off from our Party.

The distinguishing feature of the wrecking activities recently discovered is that in the present case an active role in the diversionist and wrecking organizations was played by people who possessed Party cards and who came from the ranks of our Party. The particular danger of the present diversionist and wrecking organizations is that these wreckers, diversionists and spies pretend to be Communists and ardent supporters of the Soviet government, and frequently have rendered services of one kind or another to the Party and the Soviet state in the past. All this makes it easier for them to deceive our organs, to deceive our leaders, especially those who suffer from carelessness and political short-sightedness. Yet it has now been established that not only have the Trotskyites joined forces with bourgeois wreckers and agents of the intelligence services of fascist and other foreign states, but have become direct organizers and leaders of wrecking, diversionist and espionage work. Masquerading as Communists and pretending to be our friends, they wormed their way into important posts in the Soviet state and in Party organizations in order to facilitate their criminal and disruptive work. The Trotskyites have become a gang of wreckers and assassins who have entered the service of foreign states and are executing the commissions of fascist intelligence services in our country.

Such is the change that has taken place since the Shakhti trial. This is how the Trotskyites have degenerated into a gang of criminals who stop at nothing in the struggle against the Soviet power and against the working class of our country.

It must be stated that this road has been taken not only by the Trotskyites, but also by the Rights. All these Bukharinites, Rykovites and suchlike individuals have now been exposed in one company with the Trotskyites as wreckers, diversionists and spies.

In this connection I would cite the evidence of one of the Rights—quite a prominent worker. I am referring to V. A. Yakovlev, who at one time was secretary of the Kha-

movniki District Party Committee in Moscow under Uglanov. In his testimony the wrecker V. A. Yakovlev, former director of the Chelyabinsk Electro-Metallurgical Combined Works, stated the following:

"In conjunction with engineer Kibardin, I performed the following wrecking acts:

"1) We built a roof over the large machine shop which was designed by the State Special Metals Designing Institute in such a way as to retain all precipitation (snow and rain). Moreover, it was almost impossible to clear this roof of snow. I realized that the design was a piece of wrecking work and should have stopped erection work, but did not do so. As a result, the roof rapidly fell into disrepair and began to leak like a sieve, which damaged the valuable machinery in the large machine shop.

"This wrecking act was so obvious that it was impossible not to inform the Chief Administration of the fact, which I did in order to conceal by own part in the affair. The roof was built in 1932 under the direct supervision of Engineer Podosek, who used to carry out my instructions to retard building operations.

"2) The 3,000-ton press for heavy forgings was placed in accordance with the designs of the State Special Metals Designing Institute in such a position that its production flow was barred on three sides by shops, while access to it from the fourth side was also barred. The erection of this press was begun by Kibardin under my direct supervision. In this case too I made a fuss, summoned conferences and sent all sorts of communications, while continuing building operations for the erection of the press. The result was to reduce the capacity of the works, inasmuch as this was one of the most powerful presses, and a disproportion was created, since the interflow between the shops was disturbed.

"3) A dam for an oil reservoir with a capacity of 10,000 tons was designed under Engineer Kibardin's guidance. The joint between the dam and the concrete tunnel was calculated in a wrecking way, with the result that when oil was run into the reservoir in November 1932 it began to seep through the joints, forced a breach in the dam, and 5,000 tons of oil ran waste into the Volga."

Yakovlev testified further:

"When I came on to the construction job (1934), the sewage situation in the residential settlements and at the works was as follows: pipes had been laid in the main workers' settlement and steel ducts had also been laid on the bottom of the River Mias to carry the sewage to the sewage beds across the river. It only remained to lay approximately 200 metres of pipe on granite soil, connect the sewage system of the settlement with the river ducts and continue them to the sewage bed. Until this work is performed, all the sewage from the settlement, the hospital, cinema theatre, baths, etc., continue to this very day to pour into the

River Mias. The sewage system in the factory buildings was roughly in the same state: all the pipes had been laid and carried beyond the electrode plant; all that was required was to carry them to the river, and lay a duct to the other side of the River Mias. Since this was not done, and the sewage system beyond the steel alloy plant fell into disrepair owing to the bad way the work had been done, all the sewage emerged to the surface and flowed into a ditch, which carried it around the residential settlement of the brick kiln into the River Mias.

"Thus all the sewage from the settlement and the factory buildings flowed into the river, from which water was taken for the factories and for the residential settlements of the works and the power station. Naturally, the sewage contaminated the river and gave rise to epidemics, of which I shall speak later.

"The cost of all the work that remained to be done on the sewage system was 80,000 rubles, or 100,000 rubles at a maximum. Of course, bearing in mind that the total cost of the works was 100,000,000 rubles, such a sum could easily have been found and the whole work finished in a single season.

"I quite deliberately refrained from having this work done, because, together with the installation of the water supply, it would have led to the complete elimination of epidemics and have solved the problem of drinking water.

"I should mention that the attention of all the social organizations and the working class population of the settlements was focussed on these questions for several years, and great discontent was caused by the lack of concern for the requirements and health of the workers. Of course, this discontent was not directed against me, the person actually to blame, but against the government for 'showing no concern' for the health of the workers. As I have already stated, provoking discontent among the population against the leadership of the Party and the country was one of the component parts of the directions given by the Rights on the subject of wrecking. My wrecking work in the matter of the sewage system was one of the definite instances of fulfilment of these directions."

What this wrecking work led to is shown by the testimony of Yakovlev himself:

"I have already stated that, firstly, the population was obliged to use industrial water which was taken without purification from the River Mias, and that, secondly, all the sewage flowed into this river. The sewage flowed into the River Mias at a point above the site of the pumping station which supplied the water to the workers for domestic use. In addition to provoking constant discontent among the workers, this gave rise to a number of epidemics. The epidemics in fact occurred in the residential settlements of the works and the power station, the population of which used industrial water. There were epidemics of dysentery in the summer of 1935 and in May 1936, and of typhoid fever in December 1935, during which an average of eight and on occasions as many as eighteen persons fell sick per day. During an

outbreak of typhoid fever in February 1936 an average of five to seven persons fell sick daily. Moreover, intestinal trouble was very common, resulting in a large number of absences from work and a decline in productivity of labour."

Such are the facts. They go to show that here too we are confronted with malicious enemies of the workers, with a gang of criminals.

We mention these facts in order to draw Bolshevik conclusions from them. It is not only our business to find the guilty individuals and to punish them, but also to draw proper practical and political lessons. It is our primary duty to understand these facts and to develop the fight against wrecking activities and wreckers in a real Bolshevik way.

When speaking at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. in April 1928 on the subject of the Shakhti trial, Comrade Stalin focussed attention on the necessity of criticizing the shortcomings in our work which the wrecking acts revealed. He said that it was necessary "not to stifle self-criticism, but to expand it."

The recommendation Comrade Stalin then gave fully applies to the present day. We must prove our ability to develop Bolshevik self-criticism and to take criticism to heart, however unpleasant it might sometimes be to leaders. Only in this way can we really prove our desire to correct our mistakes, which without the development of self-criticism is worthless. It is our duty first of all to realize what defects in administration, what defects in our work facilitated the treacherous deeds of the Trotskyite and other wreckers, facilitated the undermining work of these and other agents of foreign intelligence services in our business organs, factories, mines, railways, electric power stations and state institutions.

In connection with the disclosure of very serious defects in our administrative work, we must now focus attention on the following fundamental tasks: firstly, education of cadres; secondly, selection of personnel and, thirdly, methods of administration.

If we pay serious heed to the lessons to be drawn from the wrecking activities and to the new methods of struggle employed by our enemies, we shall learn a great deal and very soon get rid of certain crying defects in the work of our leading organs. In this sense, even the few examples of the wrecking and diversionist work of the Trotskyite, Bukharinite and foreign agents mentioned above contain much that is instructive. All that is required is a real desire to learn, a real desire to rid ourselves of a certain complacency to which some of our leaders have fallen victim under the influence of the big successes achieved.

II. OUR TASKS IN COMBATING THE TROTSKYITE AND OTHER WRECKERS, DIVERSIONISTS AND SPIES

1. *Training of Cadres*

I shall begin with the first question—the training of cadres.

We were able at the time to draw the necessary conclusions from the Shakhti case. The Shakhti case showed that we were far too dependent on the old, bourgeois specialists who were alien to the Soviet system. It showed how weak we were as regards Bolshevik cadres who had mastered technique and production. We utilized the lessons of the Shakhti wrecking case to put the question of training business and technical cadres on new lines.

Beginning from 1928, the year of the Shakhti wreckers' case, we set about the complete reorganization of technical education. The Party at that time bluntly stated that we could no longer reconcile ourselves to the technical backwardness of our business cadres. The task of creating Bolshevik technical cadres and of mastering technique was made one of the most important and urgent tasks of Bolsheviks.

At the conference of business managers held at the beginning of 1931, Comrade Stalin said:

"It must be admitted to our shame that also among us, the Bolsheviks, there are not a few who direct by signing papers. And as far as going into the details of the business is concerned, learning technique, becoming the master of the business, there is not a sign of this.

"How has it happened that we Bolsheviks, who have made three revolutions, who emerged victoriously from a bitter civil war, we, who have solved the vast problem of creating an industry, who have directed the peasantry into the path of socialism, how is it that in the matter of managing production we bow to a slip of paper?

"The reason here is that it is easier to sign a paper than to manage production. And so, many managers took the line of least resistance."

Comrade Stalin went on to speak of the Shakhti case as the first important sign of the intolerable backwardness of our business managers in technical affairs:

"Life itself has given more than one signal to us that all is not well in this field. The Shakhti case was the first signal. The Shakhti case showed that the Party organizations and trade unions lacked revolutionary vigilance. It showed that our business managers were disgracefully backward in regard to technique, that some of the old engineers and technicians slip more easily into the path of wrecking activities if allowed to work without supervision, especially as they are constantly besieged by 'offers' from our enemies abroad. The second signal was the 'Industrial Party' trial."

Comrade Stalin explained the lessons to be drawn from the Shakhti wrecking case as follows:

"How did it happen that wrecking assumed such wide dimensions? Who is to blame for it? We are to blame. Had we handled business management differently, had we started to learn the technique of management, to master technology much earlier, had we more frequently and efficiently intervened in business management, the wreckers could not have done so much damage."

In this speech Comrade Stalin also formulated the new tasks that confronted us in the period of reconstruction:

"It is time we put a stop to the rotten policy of non-interference in production. It is time to adopt a new policy more in harmony with the present period—the policy of interfering in everything. If you are a factory manager, interfere in all the affairs of the factory, look into everything, let nothing escape you, learn and learn again. The Bolsheviks must master technique. It is time the Bolsheviks themselves became specialists. During the period of reconstruction technique decides everything."

The slogan of mastering technique became the central task of the Party and the working class and yielded extremely favourable results. Without intending it, the Shakhti wreckers expedited the creation of cadres of Red specialists, expedited the reorganization of our technical education.

I will cite a few figures relating to heavy industry. Let us compare the state of affairs in the enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry in 1930 and 1936.

In 1930 there were 20 engineers to every thousand workers in the enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry; in 1936 the corresponding figure was already 33. If we take engineers, technicians and foremen together, the increase is from 68 to 105 per thousand workers. In the coal industry during this period the number of engineers rose from 4 to 9, and in the chemical industry from 33 to 52 per thousand workers engaged in production.

That the new technical cadres in industry to a large extent consisted of Communists is shown by the following facts.

During the three years 1933 to 1936 the ratio of Communists to the total number of chief engineers in mines for which returns are available increased from 9 per cent to 24 per cent. In the chemical industry the ratio of Communists to the total number of chief engineers of enterprises increased in the same period from 20 per cent to 28 per cent.

In 1928 about 9,000 students in all graduated from industrial universities. In 1936 the number of students graduating from industrial universities rose to 36,000, a fourfold increase. The total number of students in the technical colleges of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry rose from 57,500 in 1930 to 108,600 in 1936, roughly a twofold increase in the space of six years. During the same period the number of students attending the

professional schools of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry increased from 42,700 to 80,000.

In recent years the technical education of workers engaged in production has widely spread. From two-thirds to three-quarters of the workers engaged in heavy industry are undergoing technical education at various schools and courses. Technical education is steadily spreading in other branches of industry as well.

All this goes to show that tremendous progress has been made in recent years in respect to the training of business and technical cadres and the creation of skilled industrial cadres in general.

We are now not so weak technically as we were at the time of the Shakhti case and at the time of the "Industrial Party." We have done a great deal to give practical effect to the slogan of mastering technique and production. We now have our own, Soviet, business and technical cadres who have in the main mastered their jobs. There are quite a number of them now, and they stand firmly on their feet.

However, it must be confessed that in many cases the mastering of technique proceeded in a one-sided fashion, to the detriment of the Bolshevik training of cadres. While they have mastered technique, many of our people in their political development have fallen behind the demands of modern and more complex political tasks.

A narrow business spirit, a horizon restricted to narrow business considerations, a divorcement from Party political tasks and the political blindness arising from all this have become characteristic of many of our executives on the business front. Instead of enhancing Bolshevik vigilance, many industrial and transport executives are politically lagging and have succumbed to a philistine equanimity and political carelessness. It must be confessed that many of our comrades among the business executives, and not only among the business executives, have been carried away by success and the overfulfilment of plans and have

given way too much to placidity and smugness, which are such alien qualities in a Bolshevik.

The Party issued the slogan, "Bolsheviks must master technique!" It would seem clear that this meant the mastery of technique by Bolsheviks, that the Party was calling upon business executives to master technique as Bolsheviks should. But in practice it frequently happened that while mastering technique, our comrades forgot their Bolshevik obligations and politically retrogressed instead of advancing. This was taken advantage of by the enemy not only to mock at the political blindness of some of our comrades, even highly placed ones, but also to cause no little harm to the state. It frequently happened that the mastering of technique was accompanied by a relaxation of Bolshevik qualities. But what is required of us is the mastery of technique in the full sense of the word accompanied by the further enhancement of the Bolshevik qualities of our cadres.

It is clear from this what demands we must make of our business cadres. I shall dwell upon this in greater detail.

It is obvious, firstly, that one of these demands is *knowledge of one's job*, in other words, a complete mastery of technique, of production and of the whole job with which one has been entrusted, as is required of a real administrator. There can be no relaxation of this demand in respect to our leading cadres. On the contrary, the lessons of the wrecking, diversionist and espionage activities of the Trotskyite and foreign agents, who frequently led our business executives by the nose, emphasize the need to continue stubbornly to strive to master technique. Whoever does not yet know the job entrusted to him as he should must study it, go into every detail and learn to work. He must learn not only from friends but also from enemies, not only at home but also abroad, from everybody he can, so as to master his job properly in the full sense of the term. A man who does not really know his job cannot now be a real administrator in any branch of work.

The second demand made of our cadres is *a capacity for self-criticism*, and the development of this capacity, and this must be emphatically stressed in connection with the lessons to be drawn from the wrecking activities of the Trotskyites. Unless our cadres develop this capacity, unless they engage in real self-criticism, they can make no real progress. Unless we develop the capacity for self-criticism, we cannot even dream of achieving the aim of overtaking and outstripping the technically foremost capitalist countries. We are engaged in the technical reconstruction of our whole national economy; we want to introduce, and are introducing, new technique, the most advanced methods of production and the highest modern standards of output. We are making progress in this sphere, but in many respects we are still behind the technically foremost capitalist countries. In order the more rapidly to master all the achievements of modern technology, we must carefully check our work, our achievements and successes and subject them to strict criticism. We must not rest content with successes already achieved and must seek and discover the reasons why we are in many respects still far behind the foremost foreign countries in technology and production, still far below the level of productivity of labour and the standards of output and quality of output they have achieved.

Without self-criticism, without developing the capacity for real self-criticism, we can make no progress. This is particularly important under our conditions. Under our conditions there is a rapid growth of new technical cadres, there are quite a number of people who are able and anxious to assist by their initiative, practical experience and knowledge. We must inculcate in our people a spirit of responsiveness and the ability to pay heed to signals coming from below, from the rank-and-file workers and technicians. We must see to it that administrators do not adopt an attitude of bureaucratic indifference or aristocratic arrogance towards such signals. We must be heedful even when the signal comes from circles hostile

to us and is given from hostile motives. If we develop this capacity, the capacity of paying heed to such signals in Bolshevik fashion, of verifying every detail in our work, even details which at times seem to have been already thoroughly verified, we shall the more rapidly correct our defects and be able to thwart the machinations of many wreckers and diversionists. On the other hand, relaxation of self-criticism and inability to develop self-criticism lead to bureaucracy and inertia, which may be easily utilized by our enemies for their anti-Soviet ends, for wrecking, diversionist and espionage purposes. The more we develop our ability to discern the defects in our work, our ability to distinguish what is useful and creative from what is formal and bureaucratic, the more rapidly will our cadres grow to be real Bolshevik organizers, and the more rapidly will our national economy overtake and outstrip the foremost modern standards in technology, production and other spheres. If we combine such qualities as knowledge of one's job and the capacity for self-criticism, we shall thoroughly clear our path of wreckers and ensure the attainment of every modern standard in technique and output.

Another quality we must do everything to inculcate and foster in our business and technical cadres is *honesty towards the state*. In our country, where all the chief economic and cultural values belong to the state, which is carrying out the wishes of the working people, and where, on the other hand, many administrators display a spirit of carelessness in combating thieves and robbers of the treasury, and where petty-bourgeois, or, in other words, predatory and anarchistic habits are still so prevalent among government officials, there is nothing shameful in recalling the necessity to inculcate in our cadres a really conscientious and honest attitude to the state. Yet one is obliged to return to this question again and again, since there are many attempts to deceive the government, attempts which, be it said to our shame, are sometimes encouraged by administrators, and even by leading Party

workers. Just think of the cases in the Donbas where credit has been taken for an unreal coal output! How often have we condemned this, how many people have we brought to trial for this! Yet even to this day the fraudulent practice of taking credit for an unreal coal output has not been eliminated in the mines of the Donbas and other coal fields. Are there not people among our administrators who connive at the practice of taking credit for an unreal coal output, who, in order to curry favour with higher bodies, will sign untrue reports of the completion of a construction job or of the fulfilment of production plans before they have actually been fulfilled? Sometimes people who are not bad business organizers will commit a fraud and deceive the government in order to secure early promotion and to curry favour, if only momentarily. And around such careerist administrators you are sure to find a pack of toadies and flunkies, behind whose backs vile wreckers of all kinds find it so convenient to shelter. Under our conditions, relaxation of labour discipline in enterprises and institutions only plays into the hands of the worst enemies of the working people. Under our conditions connivance at deceit practised on the government by administrators of institutions and enterprises, even if only to report and brag about "successes," or if only from moral flaccidity, provides a crack through which diversionists, wreckers and spies can insert their treacherous paws, for they need the "good favour" of our administrators to enable them to damage the state. Unless serious and constant effort is made to inculcate in our cadres a spirit of honesty to the state, we cannot guarantee success in the performance of the great tasks of socialism, and we cannot rid the minds of people of predatory and petty-bourgeois survivals.

We must see to it that our business, engineering and technical personnel learn their job better, improve their capacity for self-criticism and display greater honesty towards the state. We must develop all these qualities in our people.

But most of all we must enhance *vigilance towards the enemy*, get rid of political short-sightedness and foster in our administrators a truly Bolshevik understanding of their duties.

Unless this quality is enhanced there can be no serious training of Soviet cadres. When the Party issued the slogan, "Bolsheviks must master technique!" it was demanding that Bolsheviks should master one more instrument, the instrument of advanced technique. But how was this slogan applied in practice? In practice, many comrades, while progressing in the sphere of technology, were careless of their political duties, divorced themselves from politics and succumbed to a disgraceful attitude of carelessness towards the enemy. Of course, it is no easy matter to cope simultaneously with both tasks—to progress both in the mastery of technique and in the mastery of Bolshevism. But if you are a Bolshevik, you must not replace the one task by the other; at any rate, you must make good the noticed default. The lessons of which we are now speaking are sufficiently instructive to make us admit that in many instances this was not the case. These lessons demand that we should correct this grave fault, that we should not separate mastering technique from mastering Bolshevism, but see to it that in addition to mastering technique our cadres improve their consciousness as Bolsheviks.

The resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. states:

"The Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. cannot overlook the undesirable fact that a number of industrial and transport organs were passive in the matter of the detection and exposure of the Trotskyite diversionists, after the diversionist activities of the Trotskyites had become obvious. It was usually the organs of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and individual Party members—volunteers—that exposed the Trotskyites. The industrial organs, and to a certain extent the transport organs, themselves did not display any activity in this respect, let alone initiative. More than that, certain industrial organs even hampered this work."

Is this statement true or not? Is it true that our business executives did not assist the exposure of wrecking activities, and sometimes even hampered it? Yes, it is true. That is incontestable.

We have achieved big successes in economic and cultural development, but our political tasks are also growing. We have also to reckon with the fact that our class enemy is resorting to new, more artful and more skilfully masked methods of struggle. What is demanded is that our executives should be able to detect and expose these new manoeuvres of the enemy. This necessitates broadening the political outlook of our cadres, accustoming them to keep a sharp lookout for the enemy, no matter how he masks himself. Only then, and only if they possess these Bolshevik qualities, will our business executives and other workers be worthy of the name of real leaders.

The numerous exposures of wrecking, diversionist and espionage activities on the part of the Japanese-German-Trotskyite agents go to show that in many cases our business and technical cadres at present lack these necessary Bolshevik qualities. That is why wreckers, diversionists and spies have multiplied in our midst. That is why our people are so bad in detecting Trotskyites and other double-dealers. It is time to set about correcting this disgraceful state of affairs.

I shall quote a few examples showing how we managed in certain cases to frustrate the designs of Trotskyite wreckers. I shall take the example of the chemical industry, where, thanks to Comrade Orjonikidze's interference, a number of big wrecking plans were thwarted.

In the sulphuric acid industry the Trotskyite wreckers made every effort to lower the productive capacity of the factories. They strongly insisted that the capacity of these plants could not ensure the fulfilment of the projected plan of output of sulphuric acid. It was found on investigation that, by intensifying the production process, with the existing equipment, 60 per cent more sulphuric acid could be produced than was planned. Thanks to this, it

proved possible already in 1937 to draw up a production plan for the sulphuric acid plants considerably in excess of what was formerly called the "productive capacity of the plants," although the work of intensification has not yet been completed. We must continue our efforts to expose the wrecking activities in this branch of industry and we shall achieve even bigger successes.

Take a second example. In another branch of industry the Chief Chemical Administration of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry demanded a capital investment of no more and no less than 1,300,000,000 rubles to double the production capacity of the industry. And here, too, the task set by Comrade Orjonikidze of intensifying production at the plants made it possible to solve the problem in a different way. The work already done at these plants has enabled us to establish that in order to double capacity we require not 1,300,000,000 rubles, but 350,000,000 rubles—and probably even less. Here too the plans of the wreckers, with their unscrupulous and voracious demands on the government, were exposed.

The examples taken from the sulphuric acid and other branches of industry of great importance to national defence are sufficiently instructive. They show how the insolent wreckers were rebuffed by the leadership of the People's Commissariat. But even here we did not succeed in exposing the wrecking activities and the wreckers in good time. The wrecking plans in this case were defeated, but the wreckers' organization, headed by Rataichak and others, remained unexposed until quite recently.

Everybody is acquainted with the fight waged against the so-called "limit" theory in the People's Commissariat of Railways. The Trotskyite wreckers in the People's Commissariat of Railways endeavoured to mask their anti-state activities by scientific and technical arguments purporting to prove that it was impossible to achieve any further increase in freight traffic on the railways without big new investments of capital. The plans of the "limit" wreckers, as you know, were frustrated. Comrade Kaga-

novich started a successful fight against the "limitists" in the People's Commissariat of Railways, and this as you know produced very good results. The pseudo-scientific and pseudo-technical objections of the "limit" wreckers were refuted by the practical successes achieved on the railways. This was a good thing for the state. But the trouble is that the wreckers in the People's Commissariat of Railways were entrenched not only in the planning departments which propagated the "theory of limits." The Trotskyite wrecking organization in the People's Commissariat of Railways continued to exist even after the defeat of the "limitists" and to carry on their treacherous work, particularly distinguishing themselves in the organization of accidents and train wrecks. This is one more reminder of the necessity of developing the struggle against wrecking and wreckers to the full.

Of course, it is chiefly the business of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs to detect the wreckers. But the whole responsibility for detecting wreckers cannot be laid on the shoulders of the organs of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. After all, executives of organizations do hold their posts for some purpose, and they do receive signals from the people in their apparatus, and they should sometimes at least sense the danger created by the enemy when he is carrying on his undermining work!

Have our business executives now understood their Bolshevik duties in combating wreckers, diversionists and spies? That is the main question. And it still has to be proved that they have. It must be proved by every executive at his post, in his work. Without this it will be impossible to improve the political training of cadres, to increase vigilance and the ability to combat the enemy. Executives must at least now, when many facts have already been exposed, explain to their workers where they were mistaken, who was to blame for these lapses, and why such things could have happened. How can you get people to ponder over their shortcomings, how can you get them to

broaden their political outlook, if we do not teach them to do so in concrete cases, in connection with concrete mistakes and shortcomings in work.

There are people who think that if they admit "certain defects" in "certain branches" that is enough. But such talk is not worth a farthing. An administrator in whose organization grave defects, dangerous wreckers and serious instances of political carelessness have been discovered, must honestly, citing concrete examples, explain to his workers, to his *active*, the reasons for these facts. Only in this way can new mistakes and the new machinations of the enemies be averted. Unless this is done, we cannot speak of the Bolshevik training of cadres; unless this is done, an administrator is not an administrator, but a bureaucrat, an official, anything you please, and not a Bolshevik representative in a responsible post.

We shall have to do a lot of practical work to put an end to wrecking. How successfully we shall cope with this will depend on whether we are able to tackle this important matter in a Bolshevik way. There is a great danger that some of our executives have still not taken the lessons of the wrecking properly to heart, that they have still not overcome their political carelessness and still display a superficial and frivolous attitude to this question.

I shall now cite a couple of examples to show that the detection of wrecking activities is no easy matter.

The tin situation may be considered typical in this respect. For a long time many of our good intentions were completely thwarted by the wreckers in the tin industry. We need tin, we spend large sums of money on the import of tin. It would therefore appear that the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry should have seen to the proper organization of this industry and have put a stop to the shameful assertions of all kinds of wreckers and flabby people to the effect that there are no tin deposits in the U.S.S.R. But, be it said to our shame, we have not succeeded in this yet. About three years ago it was found necessary, against the wishes of the Chief Administration,

to commit for trial the executives of the trust concerned and certain other people who were obviously thwarting this matter. But the appointment of new personnel in the tin industry led to no substantial improvement. Pyatakov managed to place Yazykov, a wrecker with a Party card in his pocket, at the head of the Chief Nickel and Tin Administration, which has charge of the tin industry, and to this day the production of tin in our country is wretchedly low. Yet there is not the slightest doubt that, having taken measures to rid the tin industry of wreckers and having learnt the recent lesson, we shall make rapid progress in this field.

Another instance in which wrecking was not exposed to the full is the construction of the Urals Car Works. This is a huge car works which in the near future is to supply the greater proportion of our modern-type railway cars. For several years the construction of this plant was under the charge of a very active wrecker, Maryasin; furthermore, Shaliko-Okudzhava, secretary of the Party Committee on the building site of the Urals Car Works, was also a Trotskyite wrecker. Several months have elapsed since these wreckers were exposed. It would seem that the proper lessons should have been drawn from this. How far we have been able to do so may be seen from the following fact.

Last February, on the instructions of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, a special commission of authoritative persons was sent to investigate the wrecking activities at the building site of the Urals Car Works. The commission was headed by such important people as Comrade Ginzburg, the head of the Chief Administration of the Building Industry, and Comrade Pavlunovsky, an alternate member of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. What conclusions did the commission arrive at? The commission formulated its general conclusions regarding the Urals Car Works as follows: "Investigation of the Urals Car Works has led us to the firm conviction that the

wrecking activities of Pyatakov and Maryasin at the building site were not developed on a large scale."

It thus appears that wrecking activities in the building of the Urals Car Works "were not developed on a large scale." The commission endeavoured to justify its conclusions by reducing the defects at the building site to certain over-expenditures and to the backward state of construction work on the subsidiary services. But the political short-sightedness of the commission is only too obvious. Even the earlier testimony given by the wrecker Maryasin was sufficient to make it clear that the commission headed by Ginzburg and Pavlunovsky had glossed over the real state of affairs at the building site. It is enough to mention that this commission did not cite a single instance of wrecking at the building site. It would seem as though the master-wrecker, Maryasin, and the other wrecker, Okudzhava, had blackened their own characters. But as a matter of fact, while the commission was still in the Urals, Maryasin gave new testimony in which he stated far more specifically what his wrecking activities on the building job consisted of. He mentioned a number of wrecking actions committed on the building of the Urals Car Works which were overlooked by the worthy commission. After this, dear comrades from the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, must it not be admitted that the wrecking activities of these various Maryasins must be investigated much more seriously and that certain investigation commissions are inclined to regard their duties too superficially?

The case of the commission which investigated the Urals Car Works shows that in spite of all the lessons we have received, we are still adjusting ourselves very slowly, continue to suffer from an inability to detect the enemy, and even now display excessive political short-sightedness.

We must assume that the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry will investigate this matter more seriously; but the important thing now is to draw the lesson from the work of this commission so as to eliminate the conse-

quences of wrecking activities in general. The work of this commission showed how unsatisfactory the political education of business executives was organized, even in the case of highly-placed representatives of heavy industry. Even when such important workers as Pavlunovsky and Ginzburg investigated the work of the wreckers on the spot, they considered it superfluous to mention even a single instance of wrecking. Even they reduced the whole thing to trifling defects and failed to notice what wrecking had been done. And, after all, this sets the tone, a bad tone, for other people in industry.

Apparently, even in the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, not to mention the People's Commissariat of Light Industry, the People's Commissariat of the Food Industry, the People's Commissariat of the Timber Industry and other People's Commissariats, the situation with regard to the political understanding of the exposed cases of wrecking is far from satisfactory. The facts show that it is still too early to assert that there is political vigilance with regard to the enemy. Our practical workers are in many cases so backward politically, their political horizon has become so restricted that they find it hard to understand even obvious political facts. We must apply to all our work the lesson to be drawn from the commission of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, namely, that *we are still not vigilant enough with regard to the enemy and that we must improve the education of cadres in Bolshevism.*

We have relaxed attention to the political education of business executives. We must now enhance their political vigilance, broaden their outlook, inculcate and foster Bolshevik qualities in them. The task of improving the political education of business cadres is an urgent question of the day.

Increased Bolshevik vigilance is a most important condition for accelerating the whole development of socialist construction.

2. *Selecting Personnel*

The second question, the importance of which cannot be exaggerated in connection with the lessons to be drawn from the wrecking, is the selection of personnel. Here too there have been revealed grave defects in our work which must be seriously borne in mind.

I shall begin with the attitude to be adopted towards former Trotskyites. We may now expect a swing from one extreme to the other in some cases, a swing from an attitude of carelessness towards the Trotskyite wreckers to a wholesale campaign against the former Trotskyites. This must not be allowed. We now often hear the question asked: "Does this mean that we must have nothing to do with former Trotskyites? Does this mean that all former Trotskyites must be removed from their posts?" Here too, of course, such a wholesale course is wrong. We cannot regard every appointment of a former Trotskyite to a responsible post as a mistake. We cannot refuse to utilize a former Trotskyite on responsible work merely for the reason that once upon a time he opposed the Party line. We must examine the case, and examine it very carefully, before refusing to utilize him for any particular work at the present time. By helping such comrades to finally overcome their past mistakes, by testing them at the job under the control of the Party organization, we are performing a work of importance to the Party. But under no circumstances can we approve of a situation in which, having appointed a former Trotskyite, or anybody else for that matter, we are unable to institute proper control over his work. After all, it is our fault, the fault of the administrators, if we are unable in practice to check, to exercise due control over the work of former Trotskyites and other people.

But some of our people argue quite wrongly in this respect. They are prepared to regard the whole past struggle of the Trotskyites against the Party as unimportant at the present moment. They are prepared to utilize all former

Trotskyites without exception, for, you see, we cannot get along without them. This is just ridiculous. You must agree that this betrays an absolutely un-Bolshevik attitude, that it is a philistine and non-political attitude, one that is fundamentally alien to Bolshevism. We cannot but regard it as an attempt to ignore one of the most important duties of an administrator—the duty of seriously concerning himself with the placing and selection of workers. This, of course, is not as easy as it seems to the comrades who entrust this work to any casual member of their staff. We must know our workers, we must keep an eye on their work, check them on the job, criticize those who lag behind and replace those who are incapable or have become bureaucrats; we must pick out new people, people who are developing, and actively assist their advancement.

The Bolshevik approach to the matter demands an ability to test workers as regards both their business and political qualifications. You cannot test workers simply by questionnaires on their former activities. This is not a real test. We must not be guided by casual recollections and information regarding their earlier work. You may easily spoil things this way. It is impermissible to decide on the fitness of a worker by personal attachment and sympathies. Otherwise there will be no escape from sycophancy. Nor is it right to judge workers by the reports they make, even though they be reports of overfulfilment of plans. The criterion in the selection of personnel must be both business and political qualifications, which the administrator must know, and know not from hearsay and not from documents, but thoroughly, by daily observing the work of these people and by keeping a constant check on their work. Only this way of selecting workers can be regarded as the Bolshevik way.

In this way we shall put a stop to cases which cannot be regarded otherwise than as disgraceful. I shall cite an example.

Yezhov, former chief engineer of the Osinovsky Mines

in the Kuzbas, a wrecker, testified to the work of the wrecker Stroilov, chief engineer of the Kuzbas Coal Trust at that time, as follows:

“Stroilov enjoys undivided sway in determining the technical policy of the Kuzbas Coal Trust, and it is he too who places the chief engineering cadres. He forces out the Soviet specialists and surrounds himself with engineers of the old type, who obey him implicitly.”

It cannot be said that these facts are to the credit of the business administrators who are responsible for the Kuzbas Coal Trust. Yet this is only one of very many instances which show how dangerous it is for an administrator to allow the selection of personnel to pass out of his hands and how dangerous it is to behave like a bureaucrat and ignore this job.

It is high time we realized that an administrator is responsible for the selection of his workers. However high the qualifications and rank of a man may be, if he is incapable of detecting wreckers operating under his very nose, and does not even want to go into such questions, he is not an administrator but an armchair bureaucrat. There is no guarantee against anybody being imposed upon by an enemy or a direct traitor masked in one way or another. Mistakes, of course, may happen. But if you allow nothing but rot around you, if you surround yourself with all sorts of alien and suspicious persons, if you yourself display no initiative in combating such surroundings, how do you expect not to be held responsible for carelessness, lack of discrimination and political shortsightedness? It is not so easy to detect an enemy and double-dealer who shelters under a guise of loyalty and sometimes of past services. But we must understand that an administrator must develop in himself the qualities required for the detection of the enemy. If an administrator is not concerned to develop these qualities, if he does not develop in himself the ability to detect every trick of the enemy, including the tricks of traitors who are extremely skilful in adaptation and duplicity he is

ignoring one of the fundamental duties of a Bolshevik.

Who does not know that it is sometimes necessary to employ people who are hostile to the Soviet power? We cannot refuse to do even this. There are bourgeois specialists who, under proper supervision and if due vigilance is exercised by the administrators, can be, and often are, very useful to the state. In order to prevent possible mistakes in this respect, the administrators must go into the practical details of their work, pay heed to signals given about their work, verify the real character of their work by every possible means and devise new methods of verification if the old methods are not effective.

I would remind you of the remarkable words of Lenin on this subject. Lenin specially taught Communists to do this in his article, "Better Fewer, But Better." There he was referring directly to the people in the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, but his remarks essentially apply to all of us, to all administrators. Lenin said:

"... It will be necessary to prepare for work which I would not hesitate to call training to catch—I will not say rogues, but something like that—and inventing special devices to muffle one's footsteps, conceal one's approach, etc.

"If such proposals were made in West European institutions they would rouse frightful resentment, a sense of moral indignation, etc.; but I hope that we have not become so bureaucratized as to be capable of that. . . . Our Soviet Republic is of such recent construction, and there are such heaps of lumber lying around, that it would hardly occur to anyone to be offended at the thought that these piles may be delved into by means of cunning devices, by means of investigation sometimes directed to rather remote sources, or by devious routes. And even if it did occur to anyone to be offended by this we may be sure that such a person would become a laughing-stock."

Lenin further said:

"When I said above that we must study and study hard in the higher institutes for the organization of labour, etc., I did not mean to imply 'studying' in the schoolroom way, or that I confined myself to the idea of studying only in the schoolroom way. I hope that not a single genuine revolutionary will suspect me of refusing, in this case, to understand 'studies' to mean resorting to some semi-humorous trick, some cunning device, some piece of

trickery, or something of that sort. I know that in the staid and serious states of Western Europe such an idea would horrify people, and that not a single decent official would even entertain it. I hope, however, that we have not yet become sufficiently bureaucratic to be affected in the same way, and that the discussion of this idea will only give rise to amusement among us.

"Indeed, why not combine what is pleasant with what is useful? Why not resort to some humorous or semi-humorous trick to expose something ridiculous, something harmful, something semi-ridiculous and semi-harmful, etc.?"

This is how Lenin taught us to test people when the protection of the interests of the state, the protection of the interests of the working people is involved. Lenin advised us to resort to "cunning devices," to "investigations," to "tricks," and to "trickery" in order to expose the enemy or semi-enemy, to expose the "harmful" or "semi-harmful." If we had paid serious heed in our work to Lenin's advice, we would have exposed many wreckers sooner and would not have allowed the commission of a number of diversionist, destructive and espionage acts in factories and mines and on the railways. At any rate, we must bear Lenin's advice in mind in future, as befits Bolsheviks.

We frequently hear responsible comrades saying that workers are sent to them by the Party, by a Party organization. They mean by this that a so-called "responsible worker" is not answerable for the selection of the people on his staff, that if these people are bad workers, or prove to be outright enemies, the responsibility lies not with the administrator concerned, but with the Party organization which sent the worker. Such talk might be understandable perhaps coming from such non-Party people to whom the Party is something alien. Communists cannot talk in this way: the Party organization, of course, is responsible for a Communist and for those whom it sends to any particular job, but this does not mean that anybody, whoever it may be, has the right to besmirch the name of the Party.

On the contrary, it is our prime duty, the duty of ad-

ministrators, to test people sent by a Party organization on the job. When a Party organization sends a person it expects him to be properly utilized, it expects his capacities to be verified on the job and control to be exercised over his work. It is the duty of an administrator promptly to draw the attention of the Party organization to the defects, and all the more to the crimes, of those who work under his direct charge. But somehow we do not find that, say, a Party organization will protect a wrecker when a business administrator has exposed him. In fact, the reverse is usually the case: even after a wrecker has been exposed, and in spite of the legitimate demand of the Party organization that he be replaced by an honest person, administrators frequently act as defenders of alien people and at times display a philistine indiscrimination and political blindness. That is so, is it not?

We frequently confer honours on business executives and glorify their achievements. And we shall continue to do so in future. But there are people who are only too willing to take the credit for all the achievements of an enterprise or a whole branch of industry, but consider themselves exempt from responsibility for gross political mistakes in their work and for carelessness and blindness towards wreckers. We must therefore not only remind our administrators of their moral and legal responsibility for manifestations of political short-sightedness, but must plainly tell such people that they put themselves in a position in which Trotskyite and other wreckers mock at their impotence behind their backs and jeer at their political short-sightedness. May the malicious laughter of the enemy bring those administrators who have become blind in their carelessness to their senses and induce them to exercise stricter control over the important sectors of their work, and greater vigilance in respect to the work of their apparatus!

The lesson to be drawn from the exposure of the wrecking and diversionist activities of the Trotskyite-fascist gang is that we must promote to administrative posts people

who have been politically tested and are honest in their attitude to the state. Wherever our cadres are weak we must resolutely promote politically tested people, people who, although not sufficiently trained, are capable and anxious to learn. There are plenty of people of this kind. We can and must teach them how to work and improve their business qualifications.

An administrator must be able to select his principal workers, test them on the job, help them to correct the defects in their work and assist their political development. An administrator who pays no attention to the selection of his principal workers, or who is incapable of doing so in a Bolshevik way, is not an administrator but a sheer bureaucrat and windbag. The reason why there are so many defects in the selection of our personnel is that many administrators scorn this work, forgetting their political responsibility and forgetting that the *verification, especially the political verification, and placing of workers in accordance not only with their business qualifications, but also with their political qualifications, is a highly important duty of every Bolshevik administrator.*

An administrator is responsible for his staff. An administrator must be tested primarily by his ability to place his people, by his ability to select personnel in accordance with both their business qualifications and their political qualifications. We shall not draw the proper lessons from the exposure of the diversionist, espionage and wrecking activities of the Trotskyite gang, if we do not achieve a serious improvement in the selection of workers in our business organs and enterprises and if our administrators do not realize how serious their responsibility for this is. If, however, we improve the organization of this matter, we shall advance still more rapidly in all spheres of socialist construction.

And so, another important conclusion that we must draw from the lessons of the wrecking activities is the necessity of increasing the responsibility of administrators for the selection of personnel.

3. *Methods of Leadership*

The third and final question concerns methods of leadership.

The Party has devoted exceptional attention to this question in recent years. I would remind you, in the first place, of the resolutions adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. in the summer of 1933, entitled "On the Work of the Donbas Coal Industry" and "On the Work of the Railways."

In the resolution on the Donbas, which was then in a very bad way, the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. stated that:

"... The chief reason for this disgraceful retrogression is the absolutely discredited and still uneradicated bureaucratic method of administration in the coal industry, beginning with the pits and ending with the Chief Fuel Administration of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry."

In the resolution on the railways, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. stated that:

"... The chief reason for the utterly unsatisfactory work of the railways is defects of administration, defects of an organizational character, the still uneradicated and utterly discredited bureaucratic method of administration on the railways, beginning with the districts and directorates and ending with the Central Administrations of the People's Commissariat of Railways."

These decisions of the Party and the government were chiefly directed against the bureaucratic methods of work of business organs. The Party considered that the principal way to improve the work of industry and transport was to eliminate bureaucracy from their apparatuses. Experience has completely corroborated this. Every important step taken to eliminate bureaucracy from our business organizations has resulted in important achievements. The coal industry and the railways are not the only instances of this.

The chief factor in improving the method of business administration in recent years was the fight against what is known as "functionalism."

There was a time when our business organs went too far in building their apparatuses on functional lines. Attempts were made to compensate for insufficient practical experience and knowledge by the creation of numerous functional organs not welded one with another. The result frequently was the creation of a highly complex bureaucratic apparatus, the mutual relations between the parts of which were entangled, and the numerous organs of which worked on parallel lines and got into each other's way. Such an apparatus is bound to give rise to bureaucratic irresponsibility and a super-abundance of bureaucratic perversions. "Functionalism" caused us much harm not only in institutions, but also in industrial enterprises.

For instance, several years ago an attempt was made in the cotton textile industry to abolish such professions as weaving and to replace the weavers by unskilled workers performing separate and simple production functions into which the work of weaving was divided. Some of our comrades were highly pleased with this "innovation" in the textile industry. The introduction of this measure gave rise to a peculiar alliance of wreckers and blockheads. It is a good thing that we soon put a stop to this absurdity.

The Party started a vigorous attack on the exaggerated functional system in all branches, and it was unquestionably right in doing so.

The exposure of the diversionist, espionage and wrecking activities of the Trotskyites and other elements helped to disclose many defects in our business apparatus.

For example, it is now clear that the Trotskyite wreckers, diversionists and spies made good use for their criminal ends of the bureaucratic perversions of the principle of one-man management prevailing in our business organs. The resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. states in this connection:

"The bureaucratic perversions of the principle of one-man management, which consist in the fact that many business administrators consider themselves, on the basis of one-man management, completely exempt from the control of the public opinion of the masses and rank-and-file workers, pay no heed to the voice of the business and production *active*, consider it unnecessary to rely on this *active*, become divorced from the *active*, and thus deprive themselves of the support of the *active* in the matter of detecting and eliminating defects and mistakes, which are utilized by the enemies in their diversionist activities."

This is a very important statement. There can be no question of combating bureaucratic methods if such perversions of the principle of one-man management are ignored.

With the object of radically improving business administration, the Party points to the production and business *actives* as a most important support for the administrators. Business administration has become so complex and the duties of business executives have become so extensive that they cannot be coped with without the assistance and support of the *active*. Good administrators know this already and regard their *actives* as a reliable support.

We are in favour of the firm application of the principle of one-man management, but we cannot reconcile ourselves to this principle being interpreted in such a way that an administrator sets himself up against his staff, considers himself exempt from the public control of the masses and the rank-and-file administrative workers, holds aloof from and scorns the *active*, instead of regarding the *active* as his main support. One of the most important methods of improving our business work and one of the surest guarantees of further big successes is to enhance the importance of the *actives* in business organs and enterprises and to enlist in them not only Party people but also active non-Party people. Any administrator who fails to understand this Bolshevik position will find himself dragging in the tail of events and under the sway of backward and bureaucratic elements. The business and production *actives* will help us to advance more rapidly in all our work, they will disclose many shortcomings and help to expose and

eliminate Trotskyite and other wreckers. These *actives* will be doing the right thing if they do not spare certain pompous authorities, and if they advance many new people capable of furthering matters in a Bolshevik way. Smashing the Trotskyites and other wreckers and advancing new and capable workers devoted to the Soviet power are but two sides of one and the same task.

Our executives will be able to cope with this task if they bear in mind Comrade Stalin's indications as to what is required to place management on new lines. Among the indications given by Comrade Stalin at the conference of business managers in the summer of 1931, he stressed the following:

"Further, the chairmen and their deputies must pay more frequent visits to the factories, stay and work there for longer periods, acquaint themselves more closely with the workers in the factories, and not only teach the men on the spot, but also learn from them. To think that you can now manage by sitting in an office, far from the factories, is a grievous mistake. In order to manage the factories you must come into more frequent contact with the workers of the factories and maintain live contact with them."

It is time to realize that unless self-criticism and criticism are developed we shall achieve no important results in combating bureaucratic perversions. We have enough means of counteracting abuses in this sphere. But the development of criticism by the masses and the rank-and-file administrative workers has not yet succeeded in achieving any new and substantial successes, yet some of our comrades are prepared to call a retreat.

Just before the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. a letter was addressed to Comrade Orjonikidze by Comrade Birman, director of the Dniepropetrovsk Iron and Steel Works. This is how Comrade Birman's letter begins:

"The situation that has arisen here in Dniepropetrovsk, particularly in recent days, induces me to apply to you, as to a senior comrade and member of the Political Bureau, for advice and assistance.

"It seems to me that the directions of the higher Party bodies regarding the maximum development of criticism and self-criticism are in certain respects being incorrectly interpreted here in Dniepropetrovsk. The foreign word 'criticism' is here often confused with the Russian word 'trepat'sya'—giving full rein to one's tongue. As I understand it, the directions of the Party aim at disclosing real enemies, disclosing real defects by means of conscientious criticism. Many people here, however, understand it to mean at all costs slinging mud at each other, and especially at a definite category of administrative workers.

"This definite category of administrative workers consists first and foremost of the executives, the directors of large factories, who, as though by the wave of a magic wand, have become the central target for this part of self-criticism. It has been established that one of the principal reasons for all that has happened is the fact that Party organizations had forgotten about Party work. However, what one got from the speeches made by quite a number of Party workers at the recent three-day session of the Regional Party *active* was not real self-criticism, but the view that the business executives are the cause of all the trouble."

Comrade Birman cannot be denied the right to defend himself against unfair criticism. It would seem that he has certain grounds to criticize the utterances of some Party workers.

It appears from the letter that certain Party workers in Dniepropetrovsk are trying to direct criticism one-sidedly—against the factory administrators, against the executives. This we cannot agree to at all. But Comrade Birman is guilty of one-sidedness of another kind: he considers it wrong to throw the blame for all defects on to the executive workers, but, unfortunately, he himself is not anxious to speak of defects among executives and can only see defects among Party workers. That is a wrong attitude, not our attitude. It is a one-sided, departmental attitude, which we cannot countenance.

We are in favour of helping the work of our business executives in every way and of not blaming them for the faults of others; but we are not in favour of glossing over their own defects. It would seem that now, after the exposure of so many wreckers, diversionists and spies in the business apparatus, whom we failed to detect, it is quite timely to criticize our business executives in order to raise

the standard of their work and to improve the methods of their work. But this does not mean that we must ignore the defects, blunders and mistakes of Party workers, Party leaders. Both must be criticized and their mistakes corrected. The lancing of the ulcer in our apparatus, where Trotskyite and other foreign intelligence agents found shelter, is sufficient to show that there are numerous defects in the work of both the business executives and the Party workers. We must all improve our work, both business and Party, yes, and trade union work too, of which little is being said, but not because everything is well with it.

Now as to verifying fulfilment. It must be bluntly said that it would be better to issue less orders, to "operate" less on paper, and pay more attention to verifying the fulfilment of adopted decisions and orders. Yet the organization of verification of fulfilment betrays many faults.

We recently had an instructive example of this in the case of the People's Commissariat of the Timber Industry.

Last autumn the Central Committee called a conference of executives in the lumber industry with the object of improving matters there. It happened to coincide with the appointment of Comrade Ivanov to the post of People's Commissar of the Timber Industry. A number of defects were revealed at the conference. One was a very striking one. It appeared that important workers in the People's Commissariat of the Timber Industry did not know about, or forgot—I don't know which is better—important decisions of the Party and the government relating to their work. For example, there was a long discussion at the conference over the question of concluding contracts with collective farms for the supply of labour power for lumbering work. The lumber executives timidly spoke of the necessity of entering into contracts not with the collective farms as such, as was usually done, but with collective farmers separately. Only towards the end of the conference was it ascertained that this question, the expediency of entering into contracts with the separate collective farm-

ers, had already been decided in the affirmative by the Party and the government at the beginning of last year. It appeared that our comrades in the lumber industry had forgotten this decision, although it was of prime importance in passing from the old, primitive methods of lumbering through the services of the collective farms to industrial methods based on permanent staffs of skilled workers. Can any serious improvement be expected in the work of the lumber executives if they "forget" something that is of decisive importance to their work? But if important decisions are "forgotten" so rapidly, how can we talk of verifying fulfilment? Yet this is only one of the many indications of carelessness and irresponsibility on the part of business executives.

Let us further consider the state of affairs in the People's Commissariat of State Farms. A letter was recently received by the Council of People's Commissars and the Commission of Soviet Control from Comrade Soms, Assistant People's Commissar and Chief of the Political Administration of the People's Commissariat of State Farms. Assistant People's Commissar Soms wrote as follows:

"In the Central Planning and Finance Department of the People's Commissariat of State Farms, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs has arrested for implication in counter-revolutionary Trotskyite activities Preobrazhensky, assistant to the superintendent of the C.P.F.D., Comrade Maistrov, and at the same time chief of the Combined Planning Sector; the Party group organizer of the C.P.F.D., Barmin, and Pushchin (non-Party), chief of the State Grain Farms Group."

This is not written quite grammatically and it is not particularly comprehensible, but Comrade Soms goes on to draw the following conclusion:

"It is to be assumed that during the period of work of the above-mentioned anti-soviet persons wrecking activities were carried on in the C.P.F.D. of the People's Commissariat of State Farms with the object of causing financial difficulties in the state farms."

And he goes on to say:

"I request you to appoint a special investigation of the state of the work and affairs of the C.P.F.D. of the People's Commis-

sariat of State Farms in order to ascertain possible wrecking activities in the sphere of the finances of the People's Commissariat of State Farms on the part of Preobrazhensky, Barmin, Pushchin and others."

Instead of the Assistant People's Commissar himself, together with the People's Commissar, setting about cleansing his apparatus, Comrade Soms wants to throw this work on others. Such an attitude to one's duties is redolent of irresponsibility. Incomprehensible also is the unconcern shown by Comrade Kalmanovich, the People's Commissar, who generally keeps mum in such cases. Is it not time the People's Commissar and his assistants themselves set about cleaning their apparatus? What are they there for?

It is high time Communist administrators understood that they are responsible for their personnel and for the ability to test it and direct work along the right lines. Responsibility for keeping a check on one's apparatus cannot be thrown on to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, or on to the Commission of Soviet Control, or on to any other body. Only irresponsible bureaucrats can behave like this, and not Bolsheviks who have their work at heart, who do not shirk work and maintain contact with their *active*.

Another recommendation of great importance in improving methods of business administration made by the Plenum of the Central Committee is the one that speaks of the necessity of drawing up technical rules and instructions for the guidance of enterprises.

In recent years our mills and factories have been extensively re-equipped and new mills and factories have been built. We can no longer work in the old way. There must be strict order in production life, there must be technical rules and instructions in the shops, these rules and instructions must be made known to the people concerned, who should be instructed in their daily work by the engineers, and a check on all this must be kept by the director and his assistants. Our enterprises have many new lathes, machines, technical equipment, etc. This new equipment can-

not be operated without a knowledge of the proper rules and instructions, without the workers being daily and actively instructed how to apply these rules and instructions and without this being properly organized. Only an uncultured attitude towards production can explain neglect of this matter.

We must also remember that our enemies—the Trotskyite and other wreckers—take advantage of every irregularity to hinder production and do damage to the working class. And here too we must remember the indications given by Lenin on how to combat saboteurs and wreckers. As far back as 1919, in his "Letter to the Workers and Peasants on the Victory Over Kolchak," Lenin spoke about saboteurs and other enemies of the Soviet power as follows:

"We must be ruthless towards these enemies of the toilers—the landlords, capitalists, saboteurs and Whites.

"And in order to be able to catch them we must be skilful, cautious and conscientious, we must most attentively watch every irregularity and every slightest departure from the scrupulous observance of the laws of the Soviet power. The landlords and capitalists are strong not only because of their knowledge and experience, not only because of the help they receive from the richest countries in the world, but also because of the force of habit and the unenlightenment of the broad masses, who want to live 'as of old' and do not understand the necessity for the strict and scrupulous observance of the laws of the Soviet power.

"The slightest illegality, the slightest violation of Soviet order is an *aperture*, which is taken immediate advantage of by the enemies of the toilers. . . ."

We see from this how useful it is to bear in mind Lenin's recommendations on how to work.

When we are capable of properly relying on the *actives* in enterprises and institutions, our leadership will attain a new and higher level and the work will proceed far more successfully. Much now depends on improving methods of administration. We must reckon with the fact that there are big defects, big bureaucratic survivals in our work of business administration. But we have a powerful instrument for improving business administration, an instrument which no other country and no other govern-

ment but the Soviet government possesses or can possess. We must *eliminate the bureaucratic perversions in administrative work, intensify our efforts in this direction by setting about organizing business and production actives in Bolshevik fashion.*

* * *

And so we must learn from the lessons of the wrecking, diversionist and espionage activities of the Trotskyite and foreign agents how to eliminate the serious defects which have been revealed in the training of personnel, in the selection of cadres and in methods of business administration. Unless we persistently work to improve the Bolshevik education of the business and technical cadres, unless we achieve real improvement in this respect, we shall be unable to cope with the new tasks and shall be unable completely to eradicate the Trotskyite and other enemies of the people. Unless we vigorously combat the philistine and unprincipled attitude to the selection of personnel, unless this matter is raised to a higher political level, our administrators cannot regard themselves as Bolshevik administrators who are equal to the tasks of the day. Unless there is severe criticism of bureaucratic irresponsibility and red-tape methods of work, however much it might hurt the feelings of certain pompous authorities, we cannot make the progress a socialist country should make, the progress Bolsheviks should make. Improving the Bolshevik qualifications of our administrators and ensuring a Bolshevik attitude to the training of our cadres must be regarded as important conditions for our success. This must be realized by our business executives, and not by our business executives alone.

One now frequently meets with the following argument: all the talk about wrecking is greatly exaggerated, it is said; if the wrecking activities had really reached serious dimensions, we should not have achieved the successes on which we pride ourselves; the achievements of our industry go to show that the extent of the wrecking has been exaggerated.

Such an argument is, of course, a gross mistake, a mistake arising out of political short-sightedness. The facts point the other way. Wrecking has caused us a great deal of harm, and it is frivolous and foolish to gloss over this unpleasant fact.

If we are to draw the lessons from the wrecking activities, we must rebuff this kind of argument too. Philistine-minded administrators sometimes argue as follows: wrecking work is being discovered in our place, yet we are fulfilling our plans. And it is true that we have whole branches of industry which for years were headed by Trotskyite wreckers and yet the factories fulfilled their production plans. Even the Chemical Administration of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, which was headed by Rataichak, overfulfilled its plans in 1935 and 1936. Does this mean that Rataichak was not Rataichak, that the wreckers were not wreckers, the Trotskyites not Trotskyites? Of course, not. It means that even a wrecker cannot engage in wrecking alone, otherwise he would not last very long. It means, further, that in practice the fulfilment of our plans depends upon the whole body of workers, employees and engineers, who, of course, cannot be said to be working hand-in-hand with the wreckers. Finally, it means that many of our plans are underestimated. When we completely eradicate the Trotskyite wrecking groups in industry, we shall most certainly progress more rapidly than ever. That means that the false argument about the overfulfilment of plans, which is advanced in order to gloss over the wrecking activities, must not be defended but exposed, like every other falsehood.

On the other hand, many administrators will now attempt to lay the whole blame for their faults on the wreckers. Whenever anything goes wrong they will say that the wreckers are to blame. This may appear to incompetent people to be a very convenient argument. There will be bureaucrats who will endeavour in this way to avert the blow from their own heads. But this cannot be tolerated. Such attempts must be countered by a serious in-

vestigation of facts and the ability absolutely to distinguish errors from wrecking. Only then shall we be able to put the bureaucrats in their places and cleanse our organizations of wreckers and diversionists of all types.

There are also pseudo-administrators who were unable to detect the wreckers in good time and are now displaying an inability to understand what are their duties with regard to the elimination of the consequences of wrecking activities now that they have been exposed. How else are we to understand the comrades who are now prepared to reduce the whole fight for the elimination of the consequences of wrecking to talk about the development of the Stakhanov movement? It is perfectly true that further progress in our industry is inconceivable without the Stakhanovites. But you must not throw the blame for your political and business sins on the Stakhanovites, you must not hide behind their backs. It is better honestly to admit your blunders and shortcomings, and to correct them and thoroughly eliminate them like a Bolshevik. Everybody knows that the Stakhanovites are fine fellows and are doing their job well. But it is also true that many administrators failed to detect the wreckers owing to their political carelessness and are now trying to pass it off by saying nice things about the Stakhanovites. We cannot pass over this mistake in silence, if only for the reason that it may cause severe damage to the Stakhanov movement itself. It must not be forgotten that the success of the Stakhanov movement to a large extent depends on the work of the superintendents of shops, factories and higher bodies. In order to ensure the further success of the Stakhanov movement, we must take practical steps to improve the methods of work of our administrators and to eradicate the defects in business administration. Without this no improvement can be expected.

Take the Donbas, where the Stakhanov movement was initiated. Is it not clear that the responsibility for the present failure of the Donbas coal industry lies not with the Stakhanovites, who are prepared to do their share no worse

than before, but with the administrators who are now letting us down in respect to the fulfilment of the production program? Deplorable as it may be to have to say so, but in January and February 1937 less coal was produced in the Donbas than in January and February 1936. Are the Stakhanovites to blame for this? Will anybody allege that the Stakhanovite workers have become extinct in the Donbas? That is out of the question. But it is clear and incontestable that our business executives in the Donbas have been unequal to their task, that they were unable properly to organize production and the Stakhanov movement, that they were unable to utilize the Stakhanov movement for a further advance, and have even retrogressed. The business administrators cannot therefore shelter behind the backs of the Stakhanovites; they should rather disclose the defects of administration more boldly and correct them more rapidly.

The achievements of socialist construction would have been much bigger if we had made greater efforts to eliminate the defects in administrative work, if we had trained our cadres better, if we had better organized the selection of personnel and had more vigorously eradicated red-tape and bureaucratic elements in administrative work.

The Party renegades—the Trotskyites and Rights—have gone over to the camp of the bourgeois wreckers, diversionists and spies. But they are nothing more than rotting garbage of bourgeois society. Our ranks are being swelled by thousands and thousands of highly skilled specialists who are devoted to the Soviet government. The increase in the army of Stakhanovites is a reflection of the progress of the whole working class.

How much our achievements depend upon ourselves, upon our desire to improve our work, is shown by many examples. One of the most striking is the progress made by the iron and steel industry in recent years. Thanks to the exceptional attention paid to it by Comrade Orjonikidze, the iron and steel industry has not only fulfilled

the Second Five-Year Plan in four years, but has attained technical standards in the operation of blast furnaces and open-hearth furnaces which exceed those laid down in the Five-Year Plan. Since the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan period the efficiency of our blast furnaces has increased by 70 per cent. In the same period the yield of steel from the open-hearth furnaces per square metre of hearth has increased by 56 per cent.

In every branch of industry productivity of labour is now increasing more rapidly than in past years; new technique is being mastered at a faster rate—and therein lies our guarantee for new and greater achievements.

But it must be remembered that we have not yet accomplished the aim of overtaking and outstripping the technically advanced capitalist countries. Under no circumstances must we grow conceited. Much work still remains to be done before this aim is achieved. One of the most important conditions for accelerating this is the elimination of wreckers, diversionists, spies and other scoundrels from industry and the entire state apparatus.

The wrecking, diversionist and espionage activities of the Trotskyites and their allies show that they can no longer, on account of their weakness, wage an open struggle against the Soviet power. They follow the shady paths of duplicity not because they do not want to attack socialism and its builders openly, but because the forces of the socialist system are immeasurably greater than those they can set against them. They fear the light, and therefore live like double-dealers, masquerading under a cloak of loyalty and even of devotion to the Soviet power.

But the fact that they were able for a number of years to pursue their treacherous and destructive work in highly responsible posts in industry and in many other bodies undetected, shows how strong the dangerous spirit of complacency and political carelessness is in our midst. We cannot reconcile ourselves to such political short-sightedness, to such dangerous carelessness, especially on the part of those who have been appointed to positions of leader-

ship. In such cases, fear of criticism and incapacity for self-criticism are crimes. As long as there is a single double-dealing wrecker in our midst, this danger must not be forgotten and we must not give way to complacency and console ourselves by the fact that the masses are with us. We would forfeit the right to call ourselves Bolsheviks if we did not draw these conclusions from the new methods of struggle of the double-dealers, methods that are fraught with such danger.

The exposure of the wrecking, diversionist and espionage activities of the Japanese-German-Trotskyite agents, serves to emphasize the acuteness and seriousness of the struggle between capitalism and socialism in our day. The enemy is resorting to every means of combating socialism. Yesterday's vacillations of unstable Communists have already passed into acts of wrecking, diversion and espionage in concert with the fascists and for their benefit. We must answer blow for blow and smash these detachments of skirmishers and sappers from the fascist camp every time we meet them in our path. We know that this is in conformity with the interests and wishes not only of the working people of our country, but of the workers of the whole world. Until recently we did not admit the thought that our opponents, former Communists, would go the utmost limit, that they would be ready to commit any act of treachery and treason towards their fatherland. Now, after so many exposures, we know their true character. The acuteness of the forms of struggle they have resorted to indicates the hopelessness of the cause of our enemies and their desperation; but it also indicates that we must still further increase our revolutionary vigilance, our socialist organization and our Bolshevik consciousness. Then the exposure of the vile work of the Trotskyite, Bukharinite and other groups will help still further to strengthen our system and ensure even greater victories for socialism in our country.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that some of those who were once our fellow-travellers have deserted

to the camp of the enemy, have become fascist agents, and counter-revolutionary bandits. We are still the only socialist country and are encircled by capitalist powers. Our successes are great, but for this very reason they enrage our class enemy still more, because in them he discerns his approaching end. The bourgeoisie, which dominates in every country but the U.S.S.R., is by no means prepared to surrender its position voluntarily and turn over the power to the workers.

It still finds many ways of keeping people, who are infected with bourgeois prejudice and scepticism of the revolutionary strength of the toilers, in subjection and in fear of its might. And there are many such people, especially among the petty-bourgeoisie.

Cases of desertion from the revolutionary camp to the enemy have long been known to the workers. There have been many instances of them in the history of the struggle for socialism. The approach of new and great revolutionary events, of which the success of socialism in the U.S.S.R. is a bulwark, is in all countries rousing the spirit of the workers, who long for their emancipation; but it is also inspiring panic in people who are a prey to bourgeois prejudices and scepticism of the strength of the working class. And this is shown by the desertions of the Trotskyites and Bukharinites to the camp of the bourgeoisie and their conversion into a gang of wreckers, diversionists, assassins and spies.

We have been deserted by those who are incapable of fighting the bourgeoisie and who prefer to link their fate with capitalism rather than with the working class. We should rejoice at the fact that we exposed the enemy at a time when preparations are being made for new battles, and before these battles have begun. We must hasten to complete this work, not postponing it and not betraying the slightest hesitation.

The Soviet Union is competing with the capitalist system. The struggle is assuming ever larger dimensions. Its acuteness is shown by the many measures adopted by the cap-

italist countries in preparation for new wars. The wrecking gangs of all these Trotskyites and others form one of the most active detachments in these preparations. To forget this and to give way to carelessness would be to forget one's primary duty to the people, to the working population.

In order to win this competition, we must steadily advance, we must measure our successes not by the criterion of pre-war Russia but by the criteria of the present day. While there is still time, we must utilize every moment to strengthen our weak sectors, to achieve the productivity of labour and the standards of output of the most developed capitalist countries. We must more vigorously than ever enlist in our work the broad masses of the toiling people, the rank-and-file workers, the *actives*. We must improve the Bolshevik education of cadres and place the selection of personnel in all our organizations on Bolshevik lines. We must reckon with the fact that the enemy is now prepared to resort to any method, to utilize any means of struggle and to creep in through every fissure; the enemy even makes use of our Party card to deceive us and to worm his way into places to which he has no other means of access. The enemy adopts a Communist guise in order to worm his way into responsible posts, for he sees that the administrative posts in all branches are in the hands of Communists. The guarantee of further success lies in exposing the enemy, expelling him from the active army of builders of socialism, reinforcing our army and increasing its strength.

Everyone of us, therefore, must remember that it is the sacred duty of a Communist to enhance his Bolshevik vigilance and to increase the Bolshevik consciousness of our cadres. Everything now depends chiefly on us—the Bolsheviks. The better we Bolsheviks realize our duties and draw the necessary conclusions, Bolshevik conclusions, the more rapid will our progress be.

