

THE MENSHEVIK TRIAL


The text
of the Indictment of the
Counter - Revolutionary
Menshevik Organisation

The Trial of the All-Union Bureau of
the Central Committee of the
Counter-Revolutionary
Menshevik
Party



They are planning War!

WORKERS' LIBRARY PUBLISHERS
35E, 125th ST., NEW YORK CITY



THE
MENSHEVIK
TRIAL


The Text
of the Indictment of the
Counter—Revolutionary
Menshevik Organisation



WORKERS' LIBRARY PUBLISHERS
35E, 125th STREET
NEW YORK CITY

Printed by B. Weinberg (T.U.)
138 Brick Lane
London
E. 1

PRINTED IN ENGLAND



CONTENTS



	PAGE
Introduction	5
I. The Formation of the Central Bourgeois Counter- Revolutionary Organisation of the Social Democrats (Mensheviks)	7
II. Composition, Organisational Structure and Directive Counter-Revolutionary Activity of the "All-Union Bureau"	20
III Political Bloc with the other Counter-Revolutionary Organisations	30
IV. Sabotage Activity	47
V. The Financing of the "All-Union Bureau" ...	64
VI. Concerning the Connection between the "All-Union Bureau" of the Mensheviks with the Members of the Foreign Delegation of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1928 to 1930	69

CONTENTS

iii

Introduction 1

Chapter I. The Problem of the Social Sciences 15

Chapter II. The Methodology of the Social Sciences 35

Chapter III. The Social Sciences and the Human Sciences 55

Chapter IV. The Social Sciences and the Natural Sciences 75

Chapter V. The Social Sciences and the Arts 95

Chapter VI. The Social Sciences and the Law 115

Chapter VII. The Social Sciences and the Economics 135

Chapter VIII. The Social Sciences and the History 155

Chapter IX. The Social Sciences and the Philosophy 175

Chapter X. The Social Sciences and the Future 195

INDICTMENT INTRODUCTION.

THE trial of the Industrial Party revealed to the whole world the actual danger of intervention threatening the Soviet Union and the working class of the whole world. The trial of the Industrial Party exposed at the same time the connections between this counter-revolutionary organisation and other similar counter-revolutionary organisations and the imperialist bourgeoisie in the European countries who have set themselves this same aim of an armed intervention. The Social-Revolutionary group around Chayanov-Kondratiev, representing the class interests of the kulaks, was one of these organisations. Without hanging out any Socialist sign, both these counter-revolutionary groups—the Ramzin and Chayanov-Kondratiev groups—set themselves the task of restoring capitalism by means of a victorious armed attack to be made on the Soviet Union by foreign imperialist armies.

The same aim has been pursued by a third counter-revolutionary organisation, the group of the Russian Social-Democratic Mensheviks, under the leadership of the so-called "All Union Bureau" of the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Mensheviks). This counter-revolutionary organisation, consisting of the remnants of one-time Menshevist organisations and of individual Mensheviks taking up political activities again, was finally organised at the beginning of 1928. It renewed the old connections with the Menshevist centre, which had emigrated abroad (the group of Dan, Abramovitch and Garvy), and entered into a similar politico-organisational and material (acceptance of money) bloc with the Industrial Party as did the Chayanov group, but with the difference that it continued to cloak itself with Socialist phrases, and pretended to hold hypocritically aloof from intervention.

The common platform of these three counter-revolutionary groups was the following:—

- (a) Restoration of capitalist conditions in the Soviet Union as the common aim of the counter-revolutionary conspiracy;
- (b) Acceptance of intervention as the sole and most rapidly effectual means of overthrowing the Soviet power;
- (c) Sabotage as the chief method of counter-revolutionary work in the Soviet Union; disruptive work in the army;
- (d) Receipt of material means, in part from one and the same source, the Trade and Industrial Committee;

(e) Organisational connections with the ruling circles of the Western bourgeoisie, especially with the Mensheviks and the leading circles of the Second International.

This fact of the actual ideological and organisational bloc of the Social Democratic Mensheviks with the counter-revolutionary organisations of the industrial bourgeoisie (Industrial Party) and with the Social Revolutionary kulak group (Kondratiev-Chayanov), and the fact of their readiness to call in the aid of the armed forces of international imperialism to shatter the first proletarian State of the world and to suppress the Socialist revolution, clearly express the completely bourgeois character of Social Democracy to-day, which continues to pursue in words a hypocritical policy pretending to reject the idea of intervention, whilst in reality it is joining in the preparations being made abroad by the imperialist bourgeoisie for intervention and is taking direct part in these preparations in the Soviet Union through its agents.

The Public Prosecutor of the R.S.F.S.R., acting on the decision passed by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union on February 15th, 1931, placed the case of the bourgeois counter-revolutionary central organisation of the Russian Mensheviks, the so-called "All Union Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party," in the hands of the special session of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Soviet Union.

Indictment I.



I.
THE FORMATION OF THE CENTRAL BOURGEOIS
COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ORGANISATION
OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS (MENSHEVIKS).

THE party of the Russian Mensheviks—after being defeated in the open political struggle which it carried on against the Soviet power during the first years of the civil war, and after having finally arrived at the denial in principle of any possibility of Socialist construction in the Soviet Union, and at a programme of the restoration of capitalism—formulated in 1924 its tactical and programmatic line as follows in the “Platform of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party” :—

Taking as a starting point that “the conditions of production in Russia are being re-shaped more and more on a capitalist basis by the course of objective developments and that, in consequence of Bolshevist economics, both Russian and foreign capital will inevitably conquer one position after another” (page 52 of the “Platform”), that in general “the real Socialist re-organisation of society for the proletariat is possible only within the confines of a consistently democratic state system” (page 47), the Menshevik platform demanded :—

(a) In the sphere of inner politics, a republican-democratic order based on “free” re-elections of the Soviets, the Soviet system being only permissible as a transition stage;

(b) In the sphere of industry, the State to retain only the undertakings of a monopolist character and the great undertakings of the most important branches of production, with the reservation “in so far as the State is able to conduct these undertaking,” whilst the remainder of the undertakings are to be restored to their former owners;

(c) In the sphere of agriculture, the actual de-nationalisation of the land on the basis of “granting the individual owners the right to dispose freely of their land,” whilst “the local organs of self-administration are only to have the right to dispose of the sold land”;

(d) The de-nationalisation of trade on the basis of free private inland trade; the foreign trade monopoly to be simultaneously abolished and replaced by State regulation and a system of protective duties.

This open programme of restoration of capitalist conditions was proposed by the Menshevik Social Democracy (cloaked by the assertion of the allegedly objective impossibility of Socialist construction in the Soviet Union). The programme was to be carried out on the one hand by means of the "agreement of all groups, parties, and their sections which are capable of remaining firmly on the platform of the revolution during the course of development" (page 50 of the "Platform"), and on the other hand, by means of agitation and propaganda among the workers, in order "to gather together the leading elements of the working class under their own flag and to aid the political formation of the elementary movement of the workers, as also their support of the above 'immediate demands,' by every effort" (page 49).

This was the programme and tactics of the Menshevik Social Democracy in 1924.

Life itself has confuted this whole position. As a result of the building up of Socialism, the economic development of the Soviet Union has proceeded in a direction diametrically opposed to that prophesied by the Mensheviks. With the growth of the gross production of socialised industry, out-distancing double the pre-war production at the close of the second year of the Five Year Plan, with the erection of new giants of industry, with the plan of tripling production as compared with pre-war in the one year 1931, with the supplanting of private capital, both Russian and foreign, and its relegation to an entirely insignificant position in the balance sheet of the national economy of the Soviet Union—with these achievements the working class of the Soviet Union replied to the prophecies made by the bourgeois Mensheviks with regard to our industry.

The magnificent advance of collective farming, the gigantic growth of Soviet farms, the industrialisation of agriculture with the aid of machine and tractor stations, the collectivisation of the overwhelming majority of the peasant farms in the most important grain districts, and the political liquidation of the kulaks as a class on the basis of this collectivisation—this has been the reply of the masses of the poor and middle peasantry to the bourgeois prophecies of the Mensheviks regarding agriculture.

Under these circumstances there were left to the Menshevik Social Democrats only two alternatives: either to admit the political erroneousness of their standpoint and to abandon the struggle against the Soviet power, or to join hands with the imperialist bourgeoisie and to acknowledge the necessity of military intervention against the Soviet Union.

The evolution from the "peaceful" attitude of 1924 to an attitude supporting armed insurrection in the country itself

and armed intervention from outside forms the history of the development of Menshevist Social Democracy in the period between 1924-1930.

The organisation of the above mentioned "All Union Bureau" of the Central Committee of the Mensheviks, which went over from methods of political agitation to methods of sabotage and preparations for foreign intervention, was the turning point of this evolution.

Ikov, a member of the Social Democratic Party since 1901, who never broke with the party of the Mensheviks, who maintained immediate contact with the Menshevist centre abroad (Dan, Abramovitch and Garvy) and with the "All-Union Bureau," who has been an active functionary of the counter-revolutionary organisation and is one of the defendants in the trial of the Mensheviks—makes the following statement with regard to the leading factors determining this evolution, and to the basic forms and methods of counter-revolutionary Menshevist activities during this period :—

"I spent the years 1924-1928 in banishment in the Urals and at Tula; at the beginning of 1928 the amnesty enabled me to return to Moscow. I renewed the connections and acquaintances lost during my four years of absence and speedily ascertained that during all these years in Moscow, in spite of all arrests and discoveries, an illegal party group had been working, headed by T. N. Kusnietzova, who, for instance, in 1925 had been the agent or 'confidant' of the group abroad of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. This group received the 'Socialist Messenger,' maintained communication with foreign countries, kept up correspondence with abroad, and received from abroad money for the needs of the party, the 'Red Cross,' etc."

The defendant Ikov found at the same time that new forms of organisation had been adopted :—

"In 1929 I saw clearly from the information received from the persons named and from the "Socialist Messenger," which we received regularly in Moscow, that a more or less close contact existed between the 'underground organisation' in the strictest sense of the word, and those Mensheviks who were working in a number of economic and planning institutions, and who frequently occupied extremely responsible positions. . . ."

The connection between these legal and illegal Mensheviks was, however, by no means so harmless as might appear at first.

"I thought at first," Ikov states further, "that the connection between the 'illegal' Mensheviks and the Mensheviks working as Soviet specialists was a relation between

an illegal organisation and an incompletely formed broad 'legal cloak,' which rendered the illegal organisation a certain not inconsiderable service. As I became better acquainted with life in Moscow and got to know the position, I realised that this 'legal cloak' played a much greater and more important part, that its sphere of activity was immeasurably greater, its aims more profound and far-reaching than those of the 'illegal' elements, and that its path diverged most decidedly from that of the latter. The penetration into Soviet institutions involved the task of controlling important economic centres in the country and of influencing their activities in the direction of the plans of this 'legal cloak.'

"With respect to the leading personages, Gromann, Ginsburg, Stern, Sokolovsky, Sukhanov these were surrounded by whole groups of persons sharing their standpoint, groups not actually members of the organisation, but whose work and political attitude were such that they were under the influence of these persons and carried out their directions. . . ."

(Ikov's statement, February 18th, 1931.)

At this time, this group of legal Soviet workers, adherents of the Mensheviks maintained direct contact with the centre abroad.

With reference to this, Ikov states:—

"The return to Moscow from exile of F. A. Cherevanin in the spring of 1929 (Cherevanin being in close sympathy with the Gromann-Sukhanov group), and especially the consultations and meetings with the representatives of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., Braunstein-Valerianov, coming from abroad for the party work, brought about an exact and direct connection between 'Abroad,' the illegal organisation of the Mensheviks, and the 'All Union Bureau.' I am, however, unable to say exactly when and where this centre, which was given the name of the 'All Union Bureau,' was formed, as I did not know the precise composition of this bureau (and saw no special necessity to do so) and never took part in its sessions. Oral directives received from Berlin through the agency of Duker suggested that those who did not join the 'All Union Bureau' personally should at least maintain close contact with it." (Ikov's statement, February 18th, 1931.)

This alteration in the external form of organisation was accompanied by a fundamental alteration of the former tactics. Entirely different methods were now employed in place of political propaganda and agitation.

On this point Ikov states :—

“ The political line of the All Union Bureau, as expressed in its activities during all these years, was directed towards the disorganisation of the national economic life of the country, the destruction and undermining of Socialist reconstruction, and particularly the retardation of the tempo of reconstruction. The other side of these tactics was the orientation towards intervention as the sole possible path to be taken under the existing inner and outer political conditions and, in consideration of the comparative strength of social forces, the orientation towards intervention, which, freeing the country from the dictatorship of the Communist Party, would create simultaneously the possibility and the pre-requisites for the development of the energies of Russian democracy in its struggle for political liberty and for Socialism.” (Ikov’s statement, February 18th, 1931.)

The depositions made by the other defendants reveal step by step the separate factors of this development, the various organisational stages passed through by the Menshevik counter-revolutionary groups before reaching its final form, the methods and concrete forms of sabotage adopted, the forms taken by the political bloc with the counter-revolutionary groups of the bourgeoisie, and the rôle played in this process of development by the directions issued by the Menshevik bureau abroad, which maintained contact with the Second International, which, on its part, invariably took united and unanimous action with the Mensheviks against the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Communist Party.

The former member of the Board of the State Bank, Boris Markovich Berlatsky, involved in the Menshevik case, makes the following statement as to these first stages of the organisational development of the Menshevik organisation :—

“ From 1928 onwards, the leading centre of the Social Democrats began to adopt the name of the ‘ All Union Bureau.’ . . .

“ The ‘ All Union Bureau ’ appointed its Presidium, of which Sher, Gromann, Ginsburg, Stern and Sukhanov were members, as also a number of commissions : an organisational commission, a finance commission, and a programme commission. It is possible that further commissions were formed, of which I had no knowledge. . . .” (Statement made February 19th, 1931.)

Another of the defendants in this case, Sher, an old Menshevik and leading organiser of the Menshevik group in the U.S.S.R., relates in even greater detail the history of the pre-

liminary period of the development of the Menshevik organisation from 1925 till 1928, that is up to the time of the formation of the "All Union Bureau."

V. V. Sher states:—

"I entered the Civil Service and was employed in the head forestry management until the beginning of NEP.* The group of A. I. Tarassov (Morosov) and Rumiyanzev proposed that I should take part in the management of the Union Timber Co-operative then being organised as a new form of production co-operative. It was known to me that those initiating this enterprise were Mensheviks, and that this group was headed by A. I. Tarassov, who was living under a false name and whose real name was Nikolai Gavriellovich Morosov. . . . My taking up this work marked the actual beginning of my return to Menshevik party work. The connecting link between our nuclei and others was N. G. Morosov, from whom I received information on the existing party nuclei and also on those in the instructions department of Centrosoyus. At this time I did not know anyone else. . . ."

"Outside of the Union Timber Co-operative, party work during this period consisted of the endeavour to build up Menshevik nuclei again among the printers. . . ."

On the whole, this work for the organisation of Menshevik workers' nuclei was unsuccessful.

"After taking up work at the State Bank," continued Sher, "I continued my party activities. I must, however, admit that my success in this work at the bank was extremely small. . . ."

"Nevertheless, I laid the foundation of the Menshevik party nucleus in the State Bank, especially after Berlatsky joined the management of the bank. On the other hand, I took measures for making use of all those connections with other institutions which the State Bank furnished for the purpose of organising corresponding nuclei in these undertakings. . . . The following persons are known to me as members of nuclei formed in other institutions with my collaboration: In Centrosoyus—Petunin, Gladyshev, Schweizer; in the People's Commissariat for Trade—Salkind, Yakubovich (here I know of no others); in the Supreme Economic Council—Ginsburg, Sokolovsky (again these are all I know here). So far as I can remember, I negotiated with Ginsburg in 1925 on the formation of this last nucleus.

* NEP.—New Economic Policy.

"The nucleus in the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. was led by V. G. Gromann, with whom I was in communication. I was not informed as to the size and membership of this nucleus.

"The following Menshevik organisations existed in the machinery of the State Bank in the provinces: With my collaboration a nucleus was formed in the State Bank in Nizhniy-Novgorod, led by the old Menshevik, P. V. Belyayevsky, who had maintained communication with me since my former work among the printers. I believe that the bookkeeper, Dobryny, joined this nucleus. The names of its other members are not known to me. The nucleus did not have more than ten members.

"There was a small nucleus of three to five persons in the branch of the State Bank at Astrakhan.

"I received information from Berlatsky on the Menshevik nuclei organised in the Bank apparatus at Leningrad and Chita. These Bank districts lay in Berlatsky's field of work. . . ." (Statement made November 30th, 1930.)

Sher describes in much greater detail the developments taking place in the consolidation of the connections with the centre abroad. (Statement made November 30th, 1930.)

"Up to 1926, communication was maintained with the Centre abroad by means of letters, use being made of the addresses of various bank offices given to me by the Central Committee.

"As this method of communication did not guarantee regular correspondence, the question arose of organising a body representing the Central Committee in Russia. I requested B. M. Berlatsky to discuss this question with Dan and Abramovich, taking the opportunity of his journey to America in the first half of 1926. On his return he informed me that he had met Dan and Abramovich in Berlin and that they had asked him to tell me that I was commissioned to represent the Central Committee in Russia. Besides this, he informed me that the Central Committee approved of our co-operation with the groups of the agricultural co-operatives, that it was extremely dissatisfied with the tempo of party work, and that it regarded as necessary the transition to direct disorganising activities in the various branches of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. where we possessed nuclei in the leading circles or among the authorities. I was much surprised at this reply, for up to that time disorganising work had not formed part of the programme of work of our party. . . . I resolved to obtain further confirmation of the

correctness of this information, and utilised K. G. Petunin's journey abroad for this purpose. I gave him the password for a meeting with Dan: 'Peter Petrovich is well and everything is going on favourably.' I asked at the same time for information on his (party) work in Centrosoyus. When Petunin returned from abroad, he reported that he had met Dan in a café and that at this meeting he had been helped by Shurygin, who was employed in the Centrosoyus agency in Berlin. The reply which Dan sent me through Petunin was equally definite in advocating disorganising work, and Dan left the matter of practical information in my hands. After this, which must have been about the end of 1927, I, too, adopted this standpoint, and began to issue directions accordingly and to carry out these directions myself in my work in the State Bank. . . ."

The final organisation of the centre of the Menshevik organisation in the Soviet Union, according to Sher's statements, took place, however, somewhat later, in 1928, after another journey abroad, undertaken by a member of the Working Peasants' Party, Yurovsky, who brought back with him both oral and written approval of the formation of such a centre.

Sher states:—

"This Central Committee was formed by selection and co-option from the leading Moscow nuclei—the Gosplan, Supreme Economic Council, People's Commissariat for Labour in the Soviet Union, State Bank. . . . Finally the Central Committee consisted of the following persons: V. G. Gromann, Ginsburg, M. P. Yakubovich, L. B. Salkind, A. Y. Finn-Yunotayevsky, A. L. Sokolovsky and myself, Sher. My functions as representative of the Central Committee abroad ended with the formation of this Central Committee, the leaders of which were Gromann, myself (Sher), and at first Ginsburg, later replaced by Salkind." (Statement made November 30th, 1930.)

Questioned on this point, Yurovsky made the following statement:—

"When travelling from Moscow to Paris, I spent a few days in Berlin, where I met Professor V. V. Leontiev. In the course of conversation with him I learnt that he had been living in Berlin since 1926 or the beginning of 1927, and that he was meeting White emigrés, especially the Mensheviks—Abramovitch, Dalin, and, it appeared, Dan. . . . On the eve of my leaving Berlin, Leontiev asked me if I would not carry a letter to Moscow for Sher, as this could not be sent by post and there was no suitable opportunity of sending it at the moment. I agreed to do

this, and on the day of my departure he gave me a letter in an envelope without an address, saying that it was from 'political friends of Sher and Gromann.' I assumed that the letter was from the foreign centre of the Mensheviks. I made a pencilled note on the edge of the envelope, 'V.V.-V.G.,' took it with me to Moscow, and gave it soon after my return to Sher, in the Finance Commissariat, I think" (Statement, December 5th, 1930.)

Petunin's statement on this point, finally, is as follows :—

"Before the 'All-Union Bureau' was founded and connections abroad established, I knew of the existence of Menshevik organisations in Centrosoyus, originating in the State Bank in 1925; I heard of these last from Sher at the end of 1926. Besides this, an initiatory group was formed around Sher, Gromann and Ginsburg in 1926. Petunin, Gladyshev, and Schweitzer were members of the Menshevik organisation in Centrosoyus, the basis of the association being formed by the reading of the 'Socialist Messenger,' which Gladyshev obtained. At this time the organisation did not do any other work, nothing of an active nature. . . ."

"It was not until later that I heard of the existence of Menshevik nuclei in the State Planning Commission, in the Supreme Economic Council, and in the Commissariat for Trade.

"Communication was established with the organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. abroad in 1925 through the agency of Berlatsky, who conveyed to Sher the commission to act as the representative in the Soviet Union of the Menshevik organisation abroad. . . . Contact with this organisation was consolidated further by my journey to Germany in 1927. When undertaking this journey I was commissioned by Sher to meet Dan; I fulfilled this commission and at the end of 1927 I conveyed to Sher the directions sent him, in his capacity of representative, by the organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., with respect to two definite questions: 1. The giving of support to the Trotskyists in their struggle against the C.P.S.U., and 2, the organisation of sabotage work in the economic life of the country and the formation of sabotage organisations with the participation of the members of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. At the same time, Dan commissioned me to inform Sher that both party and sabotage work would be financed by the organisation abroad." (Statement made February 19th, 1931.)

Petunin confirms fully and clearly the information given by Sher, Berlatsky, Ikov, etc., *inter alia*, in the matter of organising the "All-Union Bureau."

" . . . At the beginning of 1928 the 'All-Union Bureau' of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. was founded; the leading rôle in the formation of this Committee was played by an initiatory group composed of three persons—Gromann, Sher, and Ginsburg. The members of the Committee were all persons co-opted into this initiatory group by the triumvirate: Salkind, Petunin, Yakubovich, Stern, and Sokolovsky, the triumvirate themselves, and further Volkov and Finn-Yenotayevsky, newly recruited. The Committee thus consisted at first of ten persons in all; in 1929 Sukhanov was admitted as a member of the Committee; in 1930 the Committee lost a member, Stern, by death." (Statement made February 19th, 1931.)

The leading personages in the "All-Union Bureau," Ginsburg and Gromann, give further full confirmation of this information in their statements.

Ginsburg states:

" . . . As early as 1925, Sher was authorised by the organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. abroad to act as its representative in the Soviet Union, and utilised this authority in his initiative towards the restoration of the party organisation. Subsequently, the organisation abroad established connection with the 'All-Union Bureau' through the agency of Gromann, Stern, myself, and Petunin, and by sending members of the foreign organisation to the Soviet Union. . . ."

" . . . The initiatory group, after receiving aid from the foreign group of the R.S.D.L.P., and after adding a number of new members (Stern, Sokolovsky, Salkind, Petunin), arranged a consultation in the spring of 1928 of the persons enumerated below, at which it was resolved to found the 'All-Union Bureau' of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., its members to be those present: Gromann, Sher, Ginsburg, Stern, Sokolovsky, Volkov, Finn-Yenotayevsky, Salkind, Yakubovich, and Petunin. In January, 1929, Sukhanov joined the Committee, at the end of April Stern died. . . ."

Gromann finally states:

" . . . I may place the beginning of my counter-revolutionary activities at the beginning of 1929, when Sher informed me that he had been empowered by the organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. abroad (the authorisation having

been brought by Berlatsky) to organise a Menshevik party centre in the Soviet Union. I accepted the proposal made to me by Sher that I should take part in this organisational work. Through Sher's intermediation I was able to interview Ginsburg in the State Planning Commission where Ginsburg was attending a session of the Economic Situation Council.

"I informed him of Sher's proposal, adding that it proceeded from the organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. abroad which had authorised Sher to organise a party centre. (Berlatsky, who brought the authority for Sher, had consulted Dan in Berlin with respect to this proposal.) Ginsburg, after meeting Sher, expressed the wish to take part in this organisational work. This was the origin of the initiatory group of three: Sher, Gromann, and Ginsburg, which later grew into the 'All-Union Bureau' by the addition of fresh members." (Statement made February 19th, 1931.)

These descriptions of the real aspect of the formation of a central organisation of the Menshevik group in the form of the "All-Union Bureau," are supplemented by the defendants by statements on the fresh tactical aims determining the activities of the newly-organised counter-revolutionary centre.

As may be seen from the statements made by all the defendants and from the documentary evidence, entirely different tendencies from those of the "platform" of 1924 speedily gained the upper hand, both with respect to tactics and to organisation, and were due to a certain extent to the direct leadership of the foreign organisations.

Gromann made an extremely important statement on this point on December 25th, 1930.

"... The earlier tactics of international Social Democracy in the struggle against the Soviet Union, denying as they did the permissibility of an intervention and abstaining from sabotage as a fighting method, were based on the conviction that (a) the attempt to build up Socialism in the Soviet Union would be a failure; (b) that rationalised and organised capitalism would grow rapidly, enabling the Soviet Union to be peacefully assimilated, first economically and then social-politically ('not with the whip, but with the rouble,' as Lloyd George justified the transition from intervention to trade agreement at that time)." (Statement made December 25th, 1930.)

These tactics were now abruptly changed.

"... It was to be seen from Braunstein's words that Garvy is the immediate inspirer of the latest and

obviously aggressive utterances made by Kautsky against the Soviet Union, showing the latter to be an actual advocate of intervention. I was told by Braunstein that this standpoint of Kautsky's has of late won a great number of adherents among the leading circles of the IIInd International and of the party heading it—the German Social-Democratic Party, which is encountering ever-increasing difficulties in its struggle against the German Communist Party and the Communist International. . . .”

“ . . . In the same year, 1927, when I met the Menshevik Denick in Berlin, I learnt from him that he maintained active connections with the German Social Democrats and was inclined to the extreme Right. . . .”

“ . . . He suggested Hilferding as a person actively supporting the interventionist trend. . . .”

“ . . . Seen in the light of these facts, I am no longer surprised at Petunin's statement regarding his consultation with Dan in Berlin at the end of 1927, a statement which he made to the ' All-Union Bureau ' of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. In this statement, Petunin mentioned Dan's directives with regard to the adoption of fresh tactics in the struggle against the C.P.S.U. in connection with the active support of the Trotskyist opposition, tactics to embrace all means, even intervention and sabotage. . . .” Finally, in 1928, states Gromann :

“ . . . Abramovitch, in the course of consultations with me and other members of the ' All-Union Bureau ' of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks), substantiated and developed the detailed alteration of the fighting tactics. Here he raised the questions of sabotage and intervention with extreme energy and determination, speaking as a delegate of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. At the same time, Abramovitch gave me to understand clearly that this change of tactics was approved both by German Social Democracy and the IIInd International. He pointed out that before he left for the Soviet Union he had attended in Berlin a confidential consultation participated in by Dan, Dalin, Hilferding, and Braunstein, at which the questions of the new tactics had been decided in a positive direction and a decision had been reached with regard to the giving of financial support and organisational aid in the carrying out of the new tactical course. . . .” (Statements made December 24th—25th, 1930.)

Sukhanov, too, has made a statement on this point. His statement of February 19th, 1931, contains the following :

“ To me, the standpoint of the foreign Centre of the R.S.D.L.P. on the intervention question is perfectly clear; both the Centre and the IIInd International represent an unequivocally interventionist standpoint, and I have arrived at this conclusion as a result both of the immediate directions received by the ‘All-Union Bureau’ from the foreign Centre of the R.S.D.L.P., and of the whole history of the IIInd International, especially since the Congress in Marseilles in 1925. . . .” (Statement made February 19th, 1931.)

Sukhanov states further :

“ Doubtless varying shades of opinion on the question of intervention exist among the Mensheviks living abroad. The Right group (Potressov, Tseretelli, Garvy) has always actively supported the idea of intervention. The centre group officially leading the foreign organisation, Dan, Abramovitch, Yugov, did not officially endorse active appeals for intervention until very recently, but indubitably their policy is directed in actual practice towards intervention.” (Statement of February 20th, 1931.)

In this manner, under the direct pressure of the Menshevik Centre abroad and of the IIInd International, the counter-revolutionary Menshevik organisation in the Soviet Union, finally crystallised in the “All-Union Bureau” at the beginning of 1928, took up its political standpoint aiming at intervention.



II. COMPOSITION, ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DIRECTIVE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY OF THE ALL-UNION BUREAU.

THE All-Union Bureau of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Mensheviks) was finally constituted at the beginning of 1928. According to the statements of the accused it was constituted in February, 1928. Its composition was the final result of all the preliminary preparatory work, and its members were: Gromann, Sher, Stern, Ginsburg, Sokolovsky, Volkov, Petunin, Yakubovich, Salkind and Finn-Yenotayevsky.

At the beginning of 1929, Gromann co-opted Sukhanov into the Bureau. In April, 1930, Stern died.

This was the composition of the All-Union Bureau. A considerable number of persons attended the sessions of the Bureau who were not actually members, but who were informed about its activities and who supported it in one form or the other. Rubin and Bassarov were amongst these persons. In order to deal with the current work of the Bureau a committee of five was formed consisting of Gromann, Sukhanov, Ginsburg, Sher and Stern. The Bureau also formed an organisational committee for the maintenance of connections with the more distant organisations. Stern, Volkov, Petunin and Salkind were members of this committee. Sher acted as secretary to the All-Union Bureau. And finally a programme committee was formed in order to discuss and work out a programme for the party. Bassarov was the chairman of this programme committee and its members were Gromann, Sukhanov, Ginsburg and Rubin. Financial questions were dealt with by Gromann, Stern and Sher. The purely technical work was carried on by Stern, and later on by Yakubovitch. (Statement made on February 12th, 1930.)

Gromann gave evidence that Sokolovsky was also a member of the organisational committee, and that in addition military work was performed. Sher, with Yakubovitch as his assistant, was given charge of this side of the work. (Statement made on February 19th, 1931.)

This organisational structure of the All-Union Bureau was confirmed by all the accused.

According to the evidence of Sher, three plenary sessions of the All-Union Bureau took place in all: in 1928, in 1929 and the last in 1930.

The first plenary session took place in the spring of 1928, probably in March or April. The session took place in the home of Stern. The following points were on the agenda:

1. The question of the attitude of the All-Union Bureau to the Five Year Plan (Gromann delivered a speech on this point);

2. The question of the attitude of the All-Union Bureau to the other counter-revolutionary organisations at work in the Soviet Union (Gromann delivered the main speech on this point, and was followed by Sher, who dealt with the question of the peasant movement against the Soviet power);

3. The question of the disorganising work (as the Mensheviks politely termed their sabotage activities).

Resolutions of a practical nature were worked out and adopted on all these points. For instance, on the first point on the agenda a resolution was adopted which began with a general description of the Five Year Plan as an extremely important means of consolidating the Soviet power. This resolution recommended the Mensheviks to hinder as far as possible during the preparatory discussions of the problem the beginning of the practical work, and further, "to stress all the difficulties attached to the carrying out of the plan and not to hesitate at making a tendencious choice of the facts in question, and at presenting these facts in a tendencious light. (Statement of Sher on February 19th, 1931.)

The resolution adopted on the second point recommended the more distant organisations to follow carefully the development of the peasant movement in the provinces and to establish connections with the representatives of the "Party of the Working Peasants." The resolution adopted on the third point of the agenda was of a similar nature. The plenary session gave general instructions for the work of disorganisation and empowered the leading committee of the All-Union Bureau to make a beginning with the work of sabotage.

The second plenary session took place in the autumn of 1929, probably in September. This session was held in the home of Gromann. Three questions were dealt with at this session: 1. The collective agricultural movement and its prospects; 2, the internal differences of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the question of exploiting the Right-wing deviation in the interests of the R.S.D.L.P.; and 3, the attitude of the R.S.D.L.P. on the question of foreign intervention.

Sher delivered a speech on the first point, whilst Gromann dealt with the third point. Sher does not state who delivered

the speech on the second point. The resolutions which were adopted on these points may be summed up as follows: A recommendation was made for the strengthening of connections with the Social-Revolutionary Kulak group of Kondratiev-Chayanov (Party of the Working Peasants), in particular with regard to the practical work, in order, as Sher declared,

“to give this party every possible support in the organisation of peasant insurrection.” (Statement of February 19th.)

With regard to the second point, a recommendation was adopted to exploit the Right-wing deviation in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as far as possible and to adopt the tactic of playing off the Communists against each other. And finally, a resolution was adopted on the third point describing foreign intervention as

“the inevitable result of the foreign and home policy of the Soviet power, whereby intervention must be regarded as an objective phenomenon, independent of the subjective will of the interventionists, and deserving of the support of the R.S.D.L.P. whereby the latter must utilise intervention as far as possible. Sukhanov delivered a co-speech on this point of the agenda and took up the same attitude as Gromann.”

The third plenary session took place in April, 1930, in the home of I. Shelutkov near Petrovsky Park. The agenda of this session was:

1. The victory of the general line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union over all deviations, and the further prospects of the work of the R.S.D.L.P.;
2. The question of the exploitation of the difficulties in the carrying out of the Five Year Plan;
3. The working agreement with the Industrial Party in view of the coming intervention;
4. The question of changing the name of the R.S.D.L.P. into “Workers’ Party.”

Sukhanov delivered the speech on the first point of the agenda. The resolution which was adopted on this point stressed the necessity of “strengthening the fighting methods of the R.S.D.L.P. (disorganisational work and preparation for an intervention)” in view of the victory of the general policy of the Communist Party. The resolution which was adopted on the second point of the agenda, on which Ginsburg spoke, was essentially the same. The resolution adopted on the third point, on which Gromann spoke, confirmed the bloc with the Industrial Party in view of the attitude of the R.S.D.L.P. towards intervention. The proposal to change the name of the party, which was made by the foreign delegation, did not meet

with unanimous support. The question was shelved by agreeing that it was too early to consider such a step.

The content of the resolutions mentioned leaves no doubt as to the active counter-revolutionary character of the activity of the All-Union Bureau of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Menshevik).

According to the evidence of Sher, the leading decisions, "which were adopted by the All-Union Bureau and handed over to the committee of five to be put into action, were handed on to the local nuclei and the more distant organisations of the Mensheviks as follows: Circulars were drawn up and duplicated by those persons in charge of the technical work. The organisational committee then took charge of the dispatch. Or the resolutions themselves were sent out. . . ."

With regard to the attempts to organise Menshevik nuclei in the Soviet institutions, and in particular the attempt to penetrate into the factory councils and the trade union commissions in the factories, the accused declared that the chances of forming strong Menshevist groups were as good as non-existent, and that therefore, as Gromann admitted,

"the actual composition of the party was made up exclusively of groups of so-called responsible workers, and this determined to a considerable extent the tactics adopted in the work of the party. . . ."

". . . the social basis of the Menshevist organisations proved to be very narrow and permitted only the formation of numerically small groups of persons who, thanks to their special knowledge, and also in part thanks to their connections with members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during the illegal work under Tsarism, were now responsible workers in the Soviet apparatus. . . ." (Statement of December 15th, 1930.)

The Menshevist organisations did not even attempt to penetrate into the masses of the peasantry.

According to the statement of Gromann, the All-Union Bureau adopted a resolution declaring:

"in view of the almost complete absence of kulak undertakings exploiting the peasants, the struggle against the kulaks is actually directed against the middle-peasants whose farms are in a good condition; the collectivisation is being carried out by violence and collective undertakings are being formed which have no vitality. Under these circumstances it is necessary to support all the protests of the agricultural population, to support their resistance and their insurrections, and to utilise the same for the struggle

against the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviet power."

However, in practice, the Menshevist organisation decided :

"Not to announce its real position and not to work in the name of the Menshevist organisation. This is the explanation of the fact that Sukhanov published his proclamation in the name of an anonymous group," declared Gromann.

The recognition of their weakness and their total lack of any connection with the masses did not prevent the Mensheviks from concentrating the main weight of their counter-revolutionary activity on the sabotage work which seemed to them to be the most suitable method of work, as they themselves have frankly admitted.

Gromann declared :

"As these groups consisted of responsible Soviet workers, as previously described, they were to develop their tactics and fighting methods on this social basis. The methods which developed were : (a) tendencious representations of the economic situation, whereby the negative factors were specially stressed; (b) the 'playing off' of individual Communists against each other; (c) the support and amendment of all proposals made by the Right-wing opposition in the C.P.S.U.; (d) the direct carrying out of all measures receiving the support of those forces hostile to Communism: the support of private undertakings (by communism: the support of private undertakings (by credit and occasionally by manipulating the law); the support of kulak farms by disorganising the grain provisioning, by granting credit facilities to the kulak farms for the purchase of industrial goods, by assisting them to avoid the payment of taxes, or by granting them tax facilities, in other words a policy of distorting the class line of the C.P.; (e) the frustration and the disorganisation of the constructive plans for production, throttling credit and supply, reducing or concealing resources, deliberate distortion of the obvious plan results without taking into consideration the necessarily complicating factors, exaggeration of the difficulties and representing them as demanding deviations from the plans, etc. In short, everything which can be termed disorganisation and sabotage. . . ." (Statement of December 15th, 1930.)

All this explains how easy it was for the All-Union Bureau to adopt the new attitude of the foreign delegation of the Mensheviks in favour of intervention.

This can be seen from Gromann's evidence :

“ When it became known from the letter of the foreign delegation that the latter had altered its attitude towards intervention and now considered the latter necessary, and that, further, there was a chance of a comparatively near intervention (by France and Poland), then the All-Union Bureau also recognised that intervention was a necessary weapon in the struggle against the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviet power, despite the cordon which was actually closing around the Soviet Union. . . .”

The accused Salkind makes a no less important statement on the organisational questions which were dealt with previously by the first plenary session of the All-Union Bureau. It is interesting to note that he refers in this connection to Sher, who in his statement concerning the questions discussed by the plenary session makes no mention of his own report.

Salkind declares :

“ Sher made a speech on the second organisational question. As on this question a letter (in one copy) from the foreign delegation was placed before the plenary session in which this organisation informed all members of the R.S.D.L.P. of the organisation of the All-Union Bureau, laid down the tasks of this Bureau, and appealed for the formation of local organisations of the R.S.D.L.P.

“ The main theses of Sher’s speech and the subsequent debate may be summed up as follows : The first question concerned the social basis with which the R.S.D.L.P. could reckon at the moment, because only after settling this question was it possible to go on to decide which form of organisation should be adopted. In discussing this question two views were put forward. . . . The first view, which was held by the majority, was that at the moment it was not possible to reckon that even a part of the membership of the R.S.D.L.P. could consist of workers. The working masses were so completely under the influence and subject to the authority of the C.P.S.U. that there was no room for any hopes in this connection. The second view was that in the working masses there was a section which was not proletarian although the members of this section occupied the position of workers.

“ This section was composed of the village bourgeoisie, the urban tradesmen, in some cases also commercial employees who in their search for employment were compelled to go into the factories as workers. The R.S.D.L.P. could reckon on these elements. Finally the plenary session came to the conclusion that the main social basis on which the R.S.D.L.P. could reckon at the moment was composed of the declassed petty-bourgeoisie, and above

all those employees of the Soviet, State and co-operative apparatus whose roots were fixed in the past and who were quickly being replaced by the new pro-Soviet forces.

“The progressive cleansing of the Soviet apparatus had put these elements into such a situation that they represented extremely favourable material for recruiting for the R.S.D.L.P. Similarly favourable material was represented by the urban trading petty-bourgeoisie. In connection with these prospects, the question was raised at the plenary session whether it would not be advisable to alter the name of the party and to exclude the word ‘labour.’ However, the question of the name of the party was left open, chiefly in view of the connections of the organisation with the international movement under the Second (Labour and Socialist) International. . . .” (Statement of December 4th, 1930.)

In this connection, the plenary session gave concrete instructions concerning the nature of the work to be carried out. Salkind declared :

“Every party group was to strive to carry out sabotage in one form or another, apart from the normal party work. To this end, the subordinate party groups were to be formed according to institutions. The next step which resulted from this organisational form was the necessity for the establishment of close connections with the clubs, groups, etc., of the sabotage organisations. The question of sabotage activity was to be regarded as of such first rate importance in the work of the groups that, if necessary, they could be given the right to draw specialists into the group for the discussion and preparation of the sabotage work. The connection between the various groups was not to be territorial, but according to the principle of co-operation in the sabotage work. . . .

“The organisation and re-organisation of the party groups on this basis in Moscow was handed over to Gromann for the State Planning Commission, to Sokolovsky for the Supreme Economic Council, to Salkind for the People’s Commissariat for Trade, to Petunin for Centrosoyus (Central Co-operative Association), to Sher for the State Bank of the S.U., and to Minz for the People’s Commissariat for Labour. This committee of five, or Presidium, was instructed to take energetic measures for the formation of district committees, whereby it was to send special representatives to the various districts and to utilise the old connections. . . .”

According to his evidence, Sukhanov took part in from twenty to twenty-two sessions, and at no less than ten of these sessions the tactical attitude and the practical instructions for sabotage work in connection with the approaching intervention were discussed.

Sukhanov gave the following example for the way in which the concrete forms and methods of the sabotage work were dealt with :

“ The grain difficulties in the spring of 1929 were the occasion for raising the question of the balance for the future grain purchase campaign, with a view to lowering as far as possible the grain purchase plans for the coming year (1929-30). The instructions in question were forwarded to the State Central Administration to be carried out. Gromann undertook to carry them out in connection with persons, some of whom were members of the R.S.D.L.P. and some of whom were not, but who were in agreement with the organisation in this question (Kondratiev, Oganovsky and Selinger).”

Sukhanov declared further :

“ This measure brought no desirable results. In August, 1929, the sabotage activity in this question was exposed. The Committee of Experts of the State Central Administration was dissolved and a new committee formed. The grain purchase plans were increased by about a third and carried out successfully on time. . . .” (Statement of January 22nd, 1931.)

From all this it can be seen that the practical sabotage activity of the All-Union Bureau as the leading organ was carried out systematically and on a wide scale, and that its rôle as a sabotage centre which had penetrated fairly deeply into the leading planning organs of the Soviet Union may be compared with the corresponding centre of the Industrial Party for sabotage to undermine the planned constructive work in the various branches of industry. Sukhanov also gives an extremely important piece of evidence concerning the question of the rôle played by the foreign delegation in the sabotage work and the preparation for an intervention. He reveals the direct and leading rôle of the foreign delegation in this question. He declares :

“ In one of the first discussions I drew attention to a document which was lying before Sher, and which looked like a normal letter written in close writing on paper of large format. The letter began, ‘ Dear Comrades, ’ and had, if I remember rightly, no signature. In one corner of the paper was written ‘ Foreign Delegation ’ in blue

pencil. It is possible that this was not the original, but only the decoded copy.

“ In the session in question this document was not put forward for discussion, but I glanced through it. Briefly, its contents were as follows: The hope of a liquidation of the Bolshevik dictatorship in the course of natural development, and as the result of the internal breaking up of the C.P.S.U., has not been fulfilled and is becoming more and more slender. In the meantime, Bolshevism has returned to the path of war Communism, and as a result new misery has been caused in the country, economic chaos and an increase of the terror. Under these new conditions the foreign delegation raises the question to discuss once again the tactics of the party, whereby tendencies, although not strong tendencies, but perhaps decisive tendencies, speak in favour of an abandonment of the peaceful methods of struggle against the Bolshevik régime which have been used by the Russian Mensheviks up to the present.

“ For a long time now the opinion has been growing and strengthening inside the Second International that the liquidation of Bolshevism with the armed forces of the democratic States is inevitable, and, in the last resort, this method would be historically better in view of the misery and the sacrifices than the abolition of Bolshevism by the internal forces of the country. Up to the present, Social Democracy has opposed such a solution. To-day, however, the time has come, in view of the position of the brother parties of the Second International, to revise this tactic. New tactics of the struggle of Social Democracy against the Soviet power must result from this. In connection with what has already been said, the delegation has discussed recently the question of tactics and the attitude of the intelligentsia and of the Soviet employees under the influence of Social Democracy, or who could be made the objects of this influence. The resistance against the recent destructive experiments of the Bolsheviks is becoming a vital necessity. The protection of those economic forms which the Bolsheviks are violently destroying in the name of their utopian plans is becoming a practical task in the interests of the future re-birth of the country.

“ On the other hand, the weakening of the connection between the Bolshevik State and economic apparatus plays not a negative but a positive rôle in view of the coming armed conflict with Western Europe. From this develops the task of Social Democracy of organising the intellectual

cadres for a systematic counter-action in the State and economic institutions against the destructive plans and measures of the Bolshevist rulers. This must be the return to the original tactic of organised sabotage, and further, the transition to an active attempt to disorganise the system of war Communism re-introduced by the Bolsheviks. An argument against such a tactical change is represented by the danger of confusion with the self-seeking sort of sabotage as seen in the Shakhty trial. In favour of this tactic are the real interests of the country and the necessity of adopting a tactic which will enable us to bring about a solution of the crisis entailing the smallest sacrifices." (Statement of January 22nd, 1931.)

This document referred to by Sukhanov was the document on the basis of which he and the All-Union Bureau worked, taking the directions contained therein for their activities in the years 1929 and 1930. Sukhanov, himself, stresses this categorically :

"Actually this was the instruction for the relative adoption of the tactic of sabotage and the support of intervention. In reply to my question, I was told that the document was fairly old, and that its contents, or at least its basic principles, were discussed at the plenary session of the All-Union Bureau in 1928 in the presence of foreign representatives, and that these principles were to-day the basis of the tactic of the All-Union Bureau." (Statement of January 22nd, 1931.)

Such was the organisational structure, the working forms and the content of the criminal activity of the All-Union Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Mensheviks).



III. POLITICAL BLOC WITH THE OTHER COUNTER- REVOLUTIONARY ORGANISATIONS.

THE sabotage and military work, as well as the question of finance, were closely bound up with the co-ordinated activities of the Menshevist counter-revolutionary organisation and with the same work being carried on by the other counter-revolutionary organisations—the “Industrial Party” and the Social-Revolutionary kulak Kondratiev group, the so-called “Working Peasants’ Party.”

The defendants have made exhaustive statements on the bloc with the other counter-revolutionary organisations, and these are fully confirmed by both the counter-revolutionary conspirators and by the “leaders” of the “Industrial Party” and the Kondratiev group.

On January 16th, 1931, Gromann made the following statement :

“After the ‘All-Union Bureau’ of the Central Committee of the Menshevist Party of Russia had adopted the standpoint of preparing for the overthrow, and had accepted the tactics proposed by the foreign delegation to that end, that is intervention and ‘disorganising work’ or sabotage, it sought allies in the other political groups and organisations. Personal acquaintances served as the technical medium for establishing political connections, and positions in institutions, offices, etc., were exploited for the same purpose.

“ . . . Intercourse took the form of political ‘consultations,’ in the course of which information was exchanged, the inner and international economic and political situation discussed, prospects ascertained, and agreement arrived at regarding the degree of stability of the Soviet régime, the situation in the C.P.S.U., and the means and methods of the struggle against the Soviet power. The whole of the questions, including the organisation of the struggle, were discussed by a committee of three—Sukhanov, Kondratiev, and myself. . . .

“Gradually, Sukhanov and I became aware that the Kondratiev group represented a widely ramified organisation possessing points of support in the central and local

organs of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, and in part in the Finance Commissariat, and extending its influence into every department of the co-operative system, especially the agricultural and credit co-operatives.

" In the sphere of politics we were united by our hostile attitude towards the dictatorship of the proletariat and by our strivings for a bourgeois-democratic republic, which the Kondratiev group envisaged with a parliament, with Zemstvos (provincial diets), municipal Dumas and municipal offices; whilst the members of the 'All-Union Bureau' entertained the idea of a republic with at least a few presumably free 'democratic' Soviets. With respect to the transition stage, it was agreed that a provisional government should be formed of representatives of the 'All-Union Bureau' of the Central Committee of the Menshevist party, of the Kondratiev group, and, if possible, of the Engineers' and Industrial Committee (later the 'Industrial Party'); some also held the opinion that the members of the Right opposition splitting off from the C.P.S.U. should also take part in this government. The names of those members of the 'All-Union Bureau' of the Central Committee of the Menshevist party who were proposed were—Sukhanov, Bassarov, and myself; of the members of the Kondratiev group—Kondratiev, Makarov, Yurovsky, Sadyrin, and Chalnov; of the Engineers and Industrial organisation—Ramzin and Osadchy.

" Some of us imagined the establishment of the provisional government as the result of a 'people's' movement aroused by the policy of the Socialist offensive and by the economic crisis, intensified by sabotage work and accompanied by insurrections to be organised by the counter-revolutionary parties; this movement to be supported from outside by armed intervention. Others set their hopes chiefly on intervention, which was to be aided from within by the movement of the discontented elements in the Union and by sabotage work." (Statement made January 16th, 1931.)

With respect to connections with the "Industrial Party," Gromann states:

" The intercourse between the 'All-Union Bureau' of the Central Committee of the Menshevist Party and the Engineers and Industrial Centre, known later as the 'Industrial Party' consisted of the following. At the end of 1928 I received an invitation from Kondratiev, and at this meeting I met Makarov and besides him two representatives of the engineers' organisation, one of whom was Ramzin.

“Kondratiev, who conducted the meeting, declared that he had called this meeting of the representatives of the three groups for the purpose of an exchange of ideas on possible joint action in the struggle against the Soviet power. Kondratiev gave a brief outline and general formulation of the standpoint of his group, described the connections and nuclei existing in the central and provincial organisations of the People's Commissariat, pointed out that, thanks to these circumstances, the possibility existed of exerting influence in the desired direction (i.e., in the direction of sabotage) on the drawing up and execution of the plans and measures relating to agriculture, and at the same time referred to the contact with the population which the tens of thousands of agricultural experimental stations ensured. He went on to stress the necessity of joining forces with those groups possessing influence over the industries and over the whole planning service. As a programmatic task he referred to the freedom of economic relations, compensation of the 'injured' capitalists, and the bourgeois-democratic republic, and expressly emphasised the possibility and probability of aid from outside in the form of an intervention. The representatives of the engineers' organisation pointed out that they too possessed an organisation built up according to branches of industry, giving them the possibility of influencing the drawing up and carrying out of plans, and that they were thoroughly informed on the intervention question and accorded it the leading place in the struggle against the Soviet régime. Therefore they regarded a lengthy period of military dictatorship as necessary, but had no objection to its being accompanied by a ministerial council participated in by other anti-Soviet parties and groups. In the sphere of economics, they must, however, insist upon the immediate restoration of property to the capitalists. Without making any definite statement, I observed that this last standpoint, as also that of the military dictatorship, was not shared by one of the groups, and that I was of the opinion that at the present all that was desirable were informatory connections. This ended the consultation.” (Statement made January 16th, 1931.)

Subsequent meetings adopted a more practical viewpoint on the questions of sabotage and financing.

According to Sukhanov's statement, the question of reciprocal relations and of an understanding with the “Industrial Party”—

“ . . . was raised in the spring of 1929. It was at this time, after I had come too late to a consultation of the

members of the 'All-Union Bureau,' that I raised the question of the 'Industrial Party.' We were told that this party sought connections and contact with the organisations of the Menshevik Party in the Soviet Union. We were further informed that the 'Industrial Party' had great sums of money at its disposal, enabling it to subsidise the 'All-Union Bureau.' When I arrived at the meeting a lively debate was already going on, in which I took part. On the one hand, the opinion was expressed that contact and collaboration with the bourgeoisie had always been characteristic of Social Democracy, that the illegal parties representing the working class had always made use of the financial aid of the capitalists, that Social Democracy had co-operated not only with Kerensky and Kornilov, but with adherents of the Romanov monarchy, with General Krasnov, in so far as the definite aims and tactical methods of the parties coincided. On the other hand, it was maintained that Social Democracy should it come to an understanding with the 'Industrial Party,' and accept financial aid from it, would become its actual agency, and we should have to become the paid servants of White Guard, Fascist, perhaps even monarchist or espionage organisations, and to place our party at their service. The discussion lasted for a considerable time. The question was solved by deciding to maintain contact and negotiations. Gromann and I were entrusted with the negotiations, as we had already brought about the bloc with the Kondratiev group.

"I was called upon to appear at the next members' meeting of the 'All-Union Bureau,' at an agreed place and time, in order to take up negotiations in this matter. This was at the end of March or the beginning of April. The meeting place agreed upon was the apartments of the manager of the Thermo-Technical Institute, Ramzin. I found Ramzin alone. We waited for Gromann for half an hour, but he did not appear. The reason given was that he was suffering from angina pectoris, but it is possible that other reasons played a part. We two discussed matters alone. We both deemed it superfluous to raise any questions with respect to the programmatic standpoints of our parties. We did not touch upon these questions. Our discussion dealt with the tactics for the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Ramzin was interested in the tactical measures and practical work of the Social Democratic organisations, especially the work in the offices of the authorities and of the planning and operative organs. It was only natural that this work should be of interest to

him, from the standpoint of the disorganisation of the apparatus and the frustration of plans in the various spheres of economics. I described to Ramzin the present tactical principles of Social Democracy and the nature of the sabotage work which we were carrying out in the authoritative bodies, and gave him an idea of the extent of our connections and the degree of our influence among the economists and other experts in the state apparatus.

"During the second part of our conversation, Ramzin pointed out that his organisation had considerable financial resources at its disposal, which would enable the 'Industrial Party' to subsidise the 'All-Union Bureau' with respect to the sabotage work common to both organisations. The sources of these means were clear to me without explanation. Ramzin informed me that 50,000 roubles had been allotted for subsidising the 'All-Union Bureau.' I replied that I should inform my organisation of all this and that when I applied for another meeting with Ramzin, it would be for the actual payment over of this money. Ramzin agreed to this, and added that since the connection had been actuated by my intermediation, he wished it to be maintained by me only, in the interests of strict secrecy. This was agreed upon. I was given Ramzin's official telephone number. . . . A few days later I rang up Ramzin and arranged to meet him at his rooms in two days. Our meeting was very brief. I received 20,000 roubles from Ramzin, in an envelope, and instructions that the remainder of the money could not be remitted until notice was given by telephone call. I signed a receipt for the money received. . . . In October, 1929, I received 15,000 roubles from Ramzin, after previous arrangement by telephone, and the remaining 15,000 roubles in March, 1930." (Statement made January 26th, 1931.)

With respect to the Kondratiev group, Sukhanov makes the following statements:

"During the whole of 1929, constant political discussions were held by Kondratiev, Gromann, and myself, resulting in a unanimous standpoint. After the question had been decided in the 'All-Union Bureau,' these consultations tended gradually toward the formulation of a uniform platform for our groups. From the programmatic standpoint, this platform officially included the establishment of a democratic régime (assuming subsequent bourgeois restoration), though on the formal basis of freely elected Soviets. From the tactical standpoint, the platform was based on the inevitability of intervention, and on the necessity of easing the labour pains of history by

promoting even such a liquidation of Bolshevism as might conjure up the danger of the greatest suffering for the people and the dismemberment of the country. From this standpoint there resulted the general attitude towards the sabotage work.

"This was also the platform of agreement approved by the central organs of the two groups. . . . At the autumn Plenum of the 'All Union Bureau,' Gromann reported on the agreement with the Kondratiev group. The resolution passed approved the steps taken and the results achieved. . . ."

Yakubovitch's statements are of importance inasmuch as they show the actual division of work among the three counter-revolutionary organisations. Yakubovitch states :

" In order to co-ordinate the political work, the representatives of the three parties agreed in each case to undertake the organisation of propaganda and agitation among those social strata upon which they chiefly relied, and in which they possessed the most widely ramified connections. In accordance with this arrangement, the 'Industrial Party' undertook the task of awakening the political consciousness of the technical intelligentsia and of those social groups tending towards it : physicians, lawyers, professors, commanders of the Red Workers' and Peasants' Army, etc.

"The Kondratiev group set itself the same aims with regard to the peasantry, to the Red Army, to the rural intelligentsia, to the tutors in the agricultural colleges, etc. To the Menshevist Party fell the work among the proletariat and among the cadres of civil servants, proletarian and petty bourgeois students, lower technical staffs, etc., open to Menshevist ideology. With respect to the other forms of political work employed as preparation for the counter-revolutionary subversion, the work falling to the individual members of the bloc, as agreed among themselves, was divided as follows : the 'Industrial Party' undertook, through the intermediation of the emigré centres of the Russian bourgeoisie, to conduct preliminary negotiations with the governments and general staffs of those countries which were expected to participate directly in the armed intervention, or to act behind the scenes the rôle of intellectual instigator ; the formation of flying fighting squads of engineers for diversion and terrorist action ; the organisation of military conspiracies taken part in by individuals belonging to the commanding staff of the Red Workers' and Peasants' Army, persons possessing either anti-Soviet views or capable of being drawn in to the

counter-revolutionary organisations by bribes. The Kondratiev group undertook the organisation of peasants' risings and unrest, intending to exploit for this purpose the influence of the kulak elements and the vacillation of a certain section of the middle peasantry in their attitude towards the collectivisation of agriculture; the supplying of the insurgents with weapons and munitions and the transport service for the districts in which the rebellions were to take place; the work of demoralising sections of the Red Army, especially of the troops to be sent for the suppression of unrest in the rural districts. The Menshevik Party undertook to prepare in the towns for the organisation of a citizens' guard which might serve as a weapon and medium for the occupation of Governmental institutions, on the outbreak of the counter-revolutionary activities, and which might afford initial support to the new counter-revolutionary Government and form a basis for a municipal militia for the new régime. Besides this, the Menshevik Party was to utilise its foreign centres, and the organisations of the Socialist International for the purpose of taking measures for creating a moral and political atmosphere favourable to an intervention among the working class, and among the strata of the petty bourgeoisie close to the working class in the West European and overseas bourgeois capitalist countries. In conclusion, the co-ordination of the counter-revolutionary activities of the three parties included to a very great extent the work of disorganising national economy, which played an extremely important rôle in the life of this party. . . ."

These were the obligations undertaken by the parties. And what were the immediate organisational possibilities of the counter-revolutionary Menshevik organisation for the fulfilment of these obligations at the periphery, and what was actually undertaken towards their fulfilment? In complete harmony with the above-mentioned peculiarities of the social basis, peripheral nuclei were organised for the most part in the institutions and among the employees belonging to the stratum of the intellectuals. On this subject, Salkind states:

"The party periphery extended in two directions: (1) Central nuclei in the People's Commissariat: (2) local party nuclei. The nuclei in the People's Commissariat were led and given organisational aid by the corresponding members of the 'All-Union Bureau' representing the given nuclei in this Bureau. I know of the following central nuclei in Moscow: In the State Planning Commission (leader Gromann), in the Supreme Economic Council of the Union (Ginsburg, Sokolovsky, Stern), in the Trade

Commissariat (Salkind, Yakubovitch), in the Central Co-operative Federation (Petunin), in the State Bank (Sher), in the People's Commissariat for Labour and in the Central Council of the Trade Unions of the Soviet Union (Rashin and Minz), who were not members of the 'All-Union Bureau.'

"In the provinces, party nuclei were organised for the most part only in the district centres, and were built up on the same principle as that of the central nuclei, that is, according to institutions, the whole leadership being in the hands of the confidence man of the district concerned. These confidence men undertook to maintain contact with the centre by means of organisation groups of the 'All-Union Bureau.'" (Statement made February 20th, 1931.)

Petunin's statement contains definite data on the organisation of the nucleus in the Central Co-operative Federation :

" I obtained the collaboration of the representatives of the District Co-operative Societies in Moscow; of the representative of North Caucasia, Nikolayevsky; of the North-West district, Frenkel; and of the Ural, Belitsky, for the organisation of the Menshevik party in the Central Federation of the Co-operatives. These two last were to continue the work in their district centres, and thus establish contact between the periphery of each district or tract of country and the centre in Moscow.

" I was besides this aware that other members of the Bureau, too, maintained communication with functionaries in the outlying districts. I was informed of this in conversation with members of the Bureau. Hence I knew that Sher maintained two or three contacts, Yakubovitch one or two, Volkov one or two. I learnt from Volkov that Ginsburg had one or two connections. I do not recollect the names or residences of the persons thus connected with the different members of the Bureau." (Statement made 26th January, 1931.)

Berlatsky makes the following statement on the organisation in the network of the State Bank :

"We commenced to supplement the connections possessed by Sher in the banks under his superintendence by connections in the districts under me. For this purpose I opened up connections with the Social Democrat E. T. Löwenson (Chabarovsk, Far East Bank; died 1928), with Faitelson in Kharkov, and with confidence men in Kharkov and in Novosibirsk; unfortunately I cannot remember the name of the last." (Statement made 26th January, 1931.)

“ Sher visited some places personally (if I remember rightly, Orel and Archangel. Leshnev was sent to some places (Vologda, Lower Volga). Everyone taking such a journey took with him two or three numbers of the ‘ Sozjalistichesky Vestnik ’ (‘ Socialist Messenger ’), and had wherever possible to leave behind him an organiser in every place which he visited. This organiser had to establish contact with the local party committee. Where none such existed, the organiser had to form a town organisation where possible and a small bureau or committee. He was commissioned to obtain collaborators in other economic organisations. It was recommended that at the present stage more attention be paid to quality than to quantity, that is to say, that collaborators occupying responsible positions should be sought.” (Statement made 31st December, 1930.)

Sher, too, has made definite statements regarding the district nuclei :

“ With regard to connections with the periphery, I have to make the following statement. The outlying periphery nuclei known to me are the following : Nucleus in Nizhni-Novgorod, organised with my support at the end of 1927 and the beginning of 1928 ; among its members were B. V. Belyayevsky and Dobrynin ; nucleus in Orel, managed by the deputy head of the branch of the State Bank, Richter ; nucleus in Tula, conducted by the head of the branch of the State Bank, Chabrov or Shablov ; nucleus in Archangel, whose members were not known to me, and with which I maintained contact through Nenastyev. These nuclei were organised with my collaboration. Besides this I was informed regarding the nuclei in Kharkov, Rostov-on-Don, and Saratov”
In another place Sher supplements this statement :

“ The connection with the periphery was first placed by the Central Committee (by the ‘ All-Union Bureau ’) in the hands of Ginsburg, and was afterwards undertaken, at the end of 1928, by Abramovich, when he arrived in the Soviet Union. Salkind was entrusted with this work.

“ I was personally aware of the existence of organisations of the Menshevik party in the following places :

“ 1. Upper and Lower Volga, under the leadership of Belyayevsky or Yeshov ;

“ 2. Kharkov (Ukrainian Organisation) ;

“ 3. North Caucasian Organisation at Rostov on the Don. I do not remember the names of the leaders, who were the intermediaries of the Central Committee.

“ 4. North-West or Leningrad Organisation, conducted by Finn-Yenotayevsky.”

(Statement made 30th November, 1930.)

Contact with the workers was a very different matter. Here the statements of almost all the defendants coincide. Volkov declares :

“ So far as I am aware, the ‘ All-Union Bureau ’ did not carry out any mass work. The chief work was carried on among the former Menshevist cadres present for the most part in various institutions. As a rule there are no old Mensheviks in the works and factories, and at the period in question the feeling among the workers was not calculated to awaken any hopes of favourable results of work among them or of their participation in the organisation and according sympathy to the Menshevist movement.” (Statement made 20th February, 1931.)

Sokolovsky confirms this statement :

“ The mass work of the ‘ All-Union Bureau ’ was thus infinitesimal, or rather entirely lacking. There was no attempt to organise and lead any such work, due doubtless on the one hand to the social basis upon which the new Menshevism was built up, and on the other to the complete absorption in disorganisation work, pressing all other militant methods into the background. When the disorganisation work was combined with intervention, the ‘ All-Union Bureau ’ was less able than ever to devote attention to mass work, for it was well aware that an open advocacy of intervention was not calculated to create an atmosphere favourable for Menshevism, especially among the workers. . . .” (Statement made 22nd February, 1931.)

Attempts were, however, made at agitation and propaganda by means of the circulation of literature. Some of this was of foreign origin and some was prepared in the Soviet Union by the “ All-Union Bureau.” This literature was of two kinds, documents containing directives, and agitation material. Sher’s statement of 27th January, 1931, contains the following on this subject :

“ So far as I can remember, the material issued by the ‘ All-Union Bureau ’ consisted of the following :

“ In 1928 :

“ 1. Appeal ‘ to the members of the organisation of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Mensheviks), laying down the tasks of the organisation and the perspectives of the struggle in view of the liquidation of N.E.P.’ If I am not mistaken, this appeal was duplicated. I received a copy from A. L. Sokolovsky.

" 2. Circulars once a month and cyclostyled once every two months. These communications contained the most important decisions of the 'All-Union Bureau' and of the Plenary Conferences and were intended for the leaders of the organisations. In 1928, 6 to 7 numbers of such letters appeared. I received a copy of each from Sokolovsky, and kept them.

" In 1929 :

" 1. Circulars of the same nature, about 10 numbers in all. I received these from Sokolovsky and kept them.

" 2. Resolutions of the Plenary Conferences of 1928 and 1929, typewritten. I received these from Sokolovsky and passed them on, if I remember rightly, to Gromann and I. I. Rubin.

" In 1930 :

" Circulars of the same nature, five numbers. I received a copy of each from Sokolovsky and kept them. The documents which I had kept I burned a fortnight before my arrest, which I feared, as after my arrival in Moscow I had heard of the arrests of members of the 'All-Union Bureau.' I do not know what became of the other documents." (Statement made 7th January, 1931.)

With reference to the documents issued by the "All-Union Bureau," Gromann stated on 11th January, 1931 :

" I remember the following circulars :

" 1. Spring, 1928—on the extraordinary measures for procuring grain ;

" 2. Autumn, 1928—on the Five Year Plan and the Right opposition ;

" 3. Spring, 1929—on the difficulties of the food supply service and the Right opposition (two-year plan) ;

" 4. Autumn, 1929—on mass collectivisation and the beginning of the liquidation of the kulak class, and on the capitulation of the Rights ;

" 5. Spring, 1930—on the situation in connection with Comrade J. V. Stalin's letter), 'Many are being made dizzy by success.'

" The authors of these letters were : Of the first, Sukhanov and I ; of the second, Sukhanov, Basarov, Stern, and myself ; of the third, Sukhanov with the collaboration of Salkind and Yakubovitch ; of the fourth, Sukhanov and myself ; of the fifth, Sukhanov.

" The letters were edited by a committee of five : Sher, Gromann, Basarov, Sukhanov, and Ginsburg. They were signed 'All-Union Bureau' of the C.C. of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Mensheviks). It was intended that the letters should pass from hand to

hand, and be destroyed by the last recipient. They were duplicated on the typewriter, and only seldom on duplicating machines." (Statement made 11th January, 1931.) Sukhanov also makes a statement on this same work :

" In accordance with the instructions received, I submitted to the next session of the ' All-Union Bureau ' the draft of an appeal which I had drawn up on the causes of the difficulties in the food supplies, on the wrong and terrorist policy of the C.P.S.U., and on the view that this policy was not the way to Socialism, but to reaction. I cannot remember whether the draft was discussed. I gave it to Sher and Yakubovitch. During the debate, I also gave them the manuscripts of two or three leaflets which I had written. These were duplicated, and distributed in the course of the year 1929 and at the beginning of October, 1930." (Statement made 22nd January, 1931.) On this subject Petunin states :

" During the whole time of my membership of the organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) I saw 10 to 12 documents. The first I received were in 1928, from V. V. Sher, four documents : The resolution of the Plenum of the ' All-Union Bureau ' of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks), which had been held that year. A typewritten carbon copy was made of each document. I received these documents from Sher, from whom I had requested them after hearing from him of the convention of the Plenum and of the content of the decisions made. The resolutions dealt with the following questions :

" 1. Standpoint of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) towards the Trotskyists ;

" 2. Measures of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) for the disorganisation of economic life ;

" 3. Utilisation of the Soviet press for accomplishing the tasks of the S.D.L.P.R. ;

" 4. Organisational matters.

" I have already given the content of the resolutions when speaking of the work of the Plenum of the ' All-Union Bureau ' of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P." (Statement made 6th January, 1931.)

Regarding 1929, this same Petunin states :

" I had to deal with the resolutions of the Plenum of the ' All-Union Bureau ' of the C.C. in 1929. I received these from Gromann, whom I asked for them. There were four resolutions in all, as follows :

" 1. The differences of opinion within the C.P.S.U. (Right deviation) ;

" 2. The collectivisation of agriculture and the exploitation of the discontent and unrest among the peasantry in this connection;

" 3. The attitude to be adopted towards other political groups;

" 4. On the intervention.

" The resolutions were carbon copies made on the typewriter. At this time, or shortly after, I received agreements or assurances of co-operation in the R.S.D.L.P. from three representatives of the Moscow District Federation of Co-operatives (Nikolayevsky, Frenkel, and Belitsky). In each case I had eight copies made of the resolutions received. I gave two each, six in all, to the persons named. I retained two copies in order to be able to inform the members of the organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. in the Co-operative Central Federation. I gave two copies each to Nikolayevsky, Frenkel, and Belitsky, assuming that these would be useful to them when they opened up their intended connections in the provinces. Each of the above mentioned persons was instructed to destroy the documents immediately after use. The copies which I had retained in the manner definitely arranged were sent to Gladyshev to be destroyed after being used for informatory purposes.

" I have stated the content of the resolution of the Plenum of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. in my statement on the work of the Plenum" (Statement made 6th January, 1931.)

Besides this make-shift duplication and distribution of literature, the organisation possessed a special technical apparatus. Sher states :

" I was instructed by the C.C. to have our literature printed, and attempted to so do, as instructed, by applying to the printing offices existing in Moscow, where I looked up the old workers with whom I had been formerly connected.

" But I was not well received. All help was refused, and the great danger of such a measure pointed out, since the nuclei of the C.P.S.U. would at once discover any illegal printing work carried on in their offices. I reported to the C.C. on my lack of success. It was then decided to abandon this plan and to arrange an illegal printing office of our own, the material to be circulated being very small.

" Circulars were copied on the duplicating machine. As a rule this work was undertaken by Petunin, sometimes by Gromann. These same persons undertook at the same

time the work of duplicating copies of the theses." (Statement made 30th December, 1930.)

Approximately the same methods were employed for circulating the documents received from abroad. It suffices to enumerate the documents passing through the hands of the defendants. Sher states :

" The documents known to me relating to the activities of the ' All-Union Bureau ' were as follows :

" In 1925 I received through Berlatsky a typewritten manuscript signed by Dan, containing an authorisation to represent the foreign C.C., and indicating that Berlatsky would give further oral instructions. I gave this letter to Gromann, Ginsburg and Stern to read, and it was then returned to me. In 1928 I received a letter from the foreign organisation, supplementing Petunin's verbal message, and sanctioning the founding of the ' All-Union Bureau.' This letter was typewritten, and was without signature or stamp. I received it from Gromann. After the other members of the Bureau had taken cognisance of it, it was given back to me to keep.

" 1928—The theses drawn up by the organisation abroad on the Five Year Plan. These typewritten theses I received from Gromann and passed on to Ginsburg. They were not returned to me. Gromann made use of them for his report.

" 1928—the theses drawn up by the organisation abroad on the question of the attitude to be adopted towards the bourgeoisie and to the petty bourgeoisie. I received these from Gromann, and returned them to him. They were typewritten.

" 1928—a letter from the foreign organisation dealing with the decisions of the first Plenum, replying, as I remember, to a hand-written letter from the ' All-Union Bureau.' This letter was handed to me directly by Gromann, or by Ginsburg, and I think it was passed on to Salkind. It was returned to me.

" 1928—a printed appeal ' To the Workers,' dealing, so far as I can remember, with the general tasks of the organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. in view of the situation in the Soviet Union. I received this from A. I. Leshnev, to whom I sent for this appeal. I cannot recollect whether the two copies which Leshnev brought remained in my hands.

" 1929—an appeal on thin paper, signed by the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., and devoted to collective farming developments. I was given one or two copies by

Leshnev, who received the appeal and brought it to the bank. I kept one copy of this appeal.

" 1928—the theses drawn up by the foreign organisation on collective farming development and the decay of the village. Received from Gromann and kept by me. Typewritten.

" 1928 again—theses on the significance of the inner disputes in the C.P.S.U. (Right deviations and Trotskyism). Received from Gromann and passed on to Ginsburg after reading. Was returned to me and kept by me. Typewritten.

" In this same year a letter was written by hand in reply to the report of the 'All-Union Bureau' on the decisions of its second Plenum. Without signature. Received from Gromann, and returned to him so far as I remember.

" In the same year a letter was received from the organisation abroad answering a reply with regard to co-operation with the Kondratiev group in support of the peasants' unrest. Received from Gromann, passed on for the information of other members of the 'All-Union Bureau.' Was returned to me and preserved by me.

" 1930—theses on the results of the realisation of the Five Year Plan. Theses on the reciprocal relations between Social Democracy and the bourgeois parties. Theses on the inner currents in the C.P.S.U. and on the Stalin dictatorship. Draft of a resolution on the re-naming of the R.S.D.L.P. as Labour Party. All this material, which I received from Gromann and returned to him, was utilised by him and the other members of the 'All-Union Bureau' for the Plenum. This material was not returned to me.

" In the same year a letter was received in reply to the report on the Plenum, pointing out the necessity of a bloc with the 'Industrial Party' and of lending support to the interventionists. This letter was written by hand, and was, I believe, unsigned. Gromann gave it to me and other members of the 'All-Union Bureau' to read. I was given the letter to keep.

" In this same year a letter on the same subject, describing the views of leading circles of German Social Democracy and of the IInd International on the question of intervention. Typewritten, unsigned, referring to the last communication and to the report of the 'All-Union Bureau.' It was kept by me."

Sher declares that he has destroyed all the documents placed in his care, but this statement is not in accordance with the facts.

According to statements made by Rubin, who has made a complete confession of his participation in the counter-revolutionary Menshevist organisation, the matter is different. After stating on February 21st, 1931, that he was aware of the correspondence between the Menshevist centre abroad and the "All-Union Bureau," and of the contents of the documents containing directives, he continues :

"With respect to the preservation of the documents, I can state the following: At the end of 1930 Stern and Sher asked me to take charge of some party documents which were required at times for the current party work. At that time I was working in the Marx-Engels Institute as head of the department for political economy. Sher, too, was employed there at that time (in the archives). After I had expressed my agreement, Sher brought me six documents, including three from the foreign centre (on intervention, on the coalition with bourgeois parties, and on the Kondratiev group), and three letters containing the theses and resolutions of the 'All-Union Bureau' (theses on the victory of the Stalin line, resolution on the inner situation in the C.P.S.U., and the draft of a resolution on the re-naming of the R.S.D.L.P. as Labour Party). It was easy for me to keep the documents in my room, and here they were easily accessible. I kept them until 11th December. On this date I left the Institute for good, and I fetched the documents from their place of concealment, destroyed the Russian ones at my home and placed those from the foreign centre in an envelope, which I closed and gave to D. B. Ryazanov, telling him that here there were some documents of interest for the history of the Social Democratic Party, and I should like him to keep them in the Institute for a time. D. B. Ryazanov took charge of the envelope with the documents. After leaving the Institute on 14th December, I did not see Ryazanov again. The foreign documents were written on thin paper, and began: Dear Comrades." (Statement made on 21st February, 1931.)

Sher makes the following statement on the preparation and circulation of the literature from the centre abroad :

"The literature retained in Moscow was distributed and was organised by Finn-Yenotayevsky. I do not know, however, how this was organised. As a rule the literature was sent to Moscow as express goods. In some cases the packages were conveyed by Finn-Yenotayevsky person-

ally, or by persons commissioned by him. On arriving in Moscow, the packages were fetched from the station and taken to a meeting-place. One such meeting-place is known to me: This was in Petrovsky Park, in the Petrov Lane, where the packages were opened and the contents divided for the most important Moscow nuclei, and for the needs of the C.C. (the 'All-Union Bureau') and of the outlying districts.

"Further distribution to the outlying periphery was arranged by Salkind. I believe that the literature was sent in envelopes bearing the name of State institutions and addressed to State institutions and also given the name of a certain Menshevik. Petunin, who made use of his connections with co-operative organisations and of the frequent visits of co-operative representatives to Moscow, did excellent service in the distribution of this literature.

"The literature retained in Moscow was distributed among the nuclei which I have mentioned above. The literature for the State Bank was sent to me, and after I left it, to Berlatsky. The literature intended for the State Bank nucleus was distributed by me and Berlatsky among the members of the nucleus, or was given by us to other persons for distribution, most frequently to A. I. Leshnev. After I left the State Bank I sometimes gave the literature directly to Leshnev.

"The literature left over after distribution was kept in the same dwelling for some time." (Statement made 30th November, 1930.)

The connections with foreign countries were maintained much more intensively by means of the circulation and publication of matter in the "Socialist Messenger." Almost all the defendants admit having contributed to this paper.

The most important work, however, was sabotage.



IV. SABOTAGE ACTIVITY.

SABOTAGE activity also went through a number of stages. In the beginning, the sabotage activity of the All-Union Bureau was regarded as an independent weapon in the struggle against the Soviet Government. Later, however, it came to be regarded from the point of view of assisting the coming intervention and as an unavoidable preliminary condition for the successful carrying out of intervention.

The first plenary session of the All-Union Bureau which took place in 1928 gave general instructions for the carrying out of sabotage, whilst the plenary session which took place in 1930 indissolubly connected up this work, according to Sukhanov's report, with the preparation of intervention.

In his statement concerning the development of sabotage activity, the accused Yakubovitch describes the various phases of this disorganisational activity and its aim as follows :

"Sabotage work was carried on by the All-Union Bureau with a view to producing an economic crisis and a commodity shortage in severe forms in order that the broadest sections of the population, and above all the working class, should be hit, and that discontent should result.

"The All-Union Bureau was of the opinion that when sabotage hit the working class this must be considered as an unavoidable surgical operation which, even if it were painful for a short period, would accelerate that process which was connected with the further carrying out of the policy of the Soviet power. Up to the year 1928 this sabotage work was carried out with a view to influencing the government and forcing it to return to the lines of the first years of the New Economic Policy.

"From the beginning of 1928, sabotage work entered on a new phase. It was carried out on a broader scale and no longer aimed at influencing the government to alter its policy, but at producing counter-revolutionary tendencies amongst the workers and preparing the way for a counter-revolutionary insurrection. At the beginning of 1929, sabotage work entered its third phase: it then had as its aim the preparation of foreign intervention."

The concrete sabotage activity in the various Soviet institutions presented the following picture :

IN CENTROSOYUS.

One of the organisers of sabotage work in Centrosoyus (the Central Co-operative Association), Petunin, described the development and activity of the sabotage group in Centrosoyus as follows :

"In carrying out the sabotage directions of the R.S.D.L.P. in Centrosoyus, I utilised my position as a member of the Board of Directors. Under the conditions which existed in the apparatus, this offered great possibilities of work

"The organisation of the group took place at a session at the end of 1927 or the beginning of 1928 (probably the latter) in the home of Nekrassov on the first floor of the corner house of Deneshny and Glasgovsky streets. The session took place in the evening, approximately between 8 and 11 o'clock. . . . I told those who were present of my meeting with Dan and the character of his conversation with me. Nekrassov then began to speak of the necessity of furthering in every possible fashion the development of market conditions on the basis of which private enterprise could develop. He declared that this was possible and that already certain organisational work in this respect had been done in other economic institutions and that we must now make a start with the work in this direction in Centrosoyus. In my opinion the chief task in attaining this aim was the hindering of the development of the co-operative system, as this would lead to the desired results by leaving open the field for private enterprise and by causing, finally, a general strengthening of the position of the capitalist sector. . . . After unity had been established concerning the necessity of acting, Nekrassov proposed that each of those present should start work in his department and try to draw the employees of the department into the organisation. Nekrassov's proposal was adopted and the session came to an end." (Statement of Petunin on January 31st, 1931.)

In this way a sabotage group was organised in Centrosoyus. The further development of sabotage work of this group aimed at winning new members and at extending the methods of the sabotage work and its objects.

The distribution of sabotage activity was carried out according to the work performed by the departments and in such a way that the most important departments operating under the Centrosoyus were embraced by the sabotage work.

Petunin declared :

"In the beginning I, Petunin, Nekrassov, Bassov and Schweizer belonged to the group. The work was

divided amongst us as follows: Nekrassov directed the work in the department for industrial goods; I was in charge of the work in the finance department; Schweizer in the food department (fish, butter, cheese), of which he was the leader; and Bassov in the shipbuilding and rationalisation departments. Gradually others were drawn into our work. Gladyshev and Senenko were won over by me in the finance department. Nekrassov won Bossyatsky, Lapin, Lutheransky and Mordkovitch in the department for industrial goods. . . ."

Schweizer, who was examined on January 24th, 1931, confirmed essentially Petunin's statements, and declared:

"At the beginning of 1928 a report of Petunin was heard in the home of Nekrassov concerning his journey abroad and his meeting with Dan, and concerning the instructions of the foreign group of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) on the measures to be taken to disorganise the economic system of the Soviet Union. Present at this meeting were: K. G. Petunin, N. W. Nekrassov, myself, and P. S. Bassov, who, so I understood, sympathised with the policy of the R.S.D.L.P. although formally he was not a member of the illegal group.

"At this meeting the basis for the disorganizational work in Centrosoyus was laid. I am aware that money was received from abroad for this work which was distributed by K. G. Petunin and Nekrassov." (Statement of January 24th, 1931.)

The sabotage work of the Menshevik group in Centrosoyus was directed towards:

1. Reducing deliberately the existing resources and possibilities by setting out false computations;
 2. Hindering capital investments (in building and in the fishing industry);
 3. Falsifying the principles of commodity distribution;
- and
4. Direct sabotage of the mobilisation of internal resources, of the development of the food supply work, and of the work for the drawing up of a review of the movement of demand, and the remaining supplies of commodities, etc.

The accused Petunin declared:

"As the chief factor in the carrying out of sabotage work, the organisation chose the planning, particularly at the time when the quarterly plans were dealt with.

"The essence of the work consisted in adopting such a tempo that no exertion was necessary. To this end

reduced possibilities were calculated with regard to the material and financial resources. . . .

“ The aim of sabotage work with regard to the food supply was to reduce supplies. This was done particularly with regard to the Astrakhan fisheries of Centrosoyus. The development of these fisheries was hindered on the pretext that they were not profitable. Schweizer was directly in charge of this work. With regard to the price policy in respect of foodstuffs, the aim of the work was to cause an increase of prices, which would lead to the non-fulfilment of the instructions of the government for the increase of real wages. This was done practically with regard to eggs and butter. In the fisheries department the Mensheviks refused for a long time to accept delivery of the so-called half-salted fish from the State industry on the ground that the trade apparatus did not know how to deal with this form of fish. The result was that this sort of fish appeared on the private market.

“ With regard to the supply of industrial commodities, the aim of sabotage work was to cause a wrong distribution of these goods according to districts. Without violating the general distributive norms laid down by the Board of Directors, the members were to organise the distribution in such a fashion that seasonal demands of various districts were not taken into consideration in the distribution plans. The essence of this formal tactic was to send the articles of seasonal use (exclusively winter goods or exclusively summer goods) simultaneously to the northern and southern districts, although the demand occurs at different times. The work with regard to the assortment according to average norms was to be carried out in the same fashion without regard to the special composition of population. On the basis of this practice, felt shoes for children were despatched to the wood supply centre.

“ The tasks of the sabotage work with regard to the supply of industrial goods were to be carried out by the members of the organisation, each in his department and for the commodity in question. As a result of the carrying out of the tasks mentioned in regard to the supply of industrial commodities, there resulted a shortage of commodities in one district at an urgent moment and a surplus of commodities in other districts.

“ All this led to the formation of commodity stores (for instance, in northern Caucasia in the spring of this year) to the reduction of the manœuvring capacity on the commodity front, and to a general hindrance to commodity circulation as a whole and the means of this

circulation. The incorrect distribution of commodities was accompanied by the lack of any control over the demand according to districts and seasons, and this made it difficult to liquidate quickly the stores of commodities which accumulated in this or that district.

“With regard to financial work, the aims of the sabotage work were to reduce the resources of the apparatus, and in particular to reduce the extent of the current accumulation. . . . This was done by recording a reduced sum of current income for the apparatus in the quarterly plans with the aim of causing an increased demand for credit and thus reducing the issue of means by the credit system to other branches of the economic system.

“With regard to the mobilisation of internal resources, the sabotage work aimed at giving general directions to the apparatus without concrete figures regarding the individual districts. These figures were to be delayed. The pursuit of this aim brought this field of work into an uncontrolled situation and this hindered the mobilisation of the internal resources.

“With regard to credit reform, the aim of the sabotage work was to separate the finance system of the co-operatives from the general economic system of the country, as this would have reduced the systematic influence of the State on the co-operatives. This work was carried out by Gladyshev and myself.

“With regard to capital investments, the general aim was to conduct the work “at a steady pace.” As a result there was a minimal achievement in the building of oil repositories and a delay in setting up the building projects.”

The methods and the essence of the sabotage work of the Mensheviks in Centrosoyus described in the statement of Petunin are confirmed in the statements of another member of the sabotage organisation in Centrosoyus, Schweizer. He declares :

“Up to June, 1928, I was in charge of the Fish, Egg and Butter Departments of Centrosoyus, and afterwards in charge of the Egg and Butter Departments only.

“My disorganising work in these departments consisted in the following :

“(a) In the Fishery Department I worked to limit the fish supply of Centrosoyus in Astrakhan and to stop it altogether. This naturally strengthened the private trader;

“(b) I neglected to deal effectively with the problem of the preparation of the co-operative apparatus for the

supply of the market with all sorts of fish products (half-salted and smoked products);

“(c) In the Egg and Butter Department I deliberately put forward supply plans with too low figures, although Centrosoyus and the co-operatives had large possibilities in this respect. I carried out this disorganising activity at the instructions of the representative of the All-Union Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., K. G. Petunin.” (Statement of January 24th, 1931.)

IN THE TRADE COMMISSARIAT (SUPPLY DEPT.).

The All-Union Bureau attached great importance to sabotage work in the People's Commissariat for Trade, the organ which carried out the grain and raw material purchases and regulated supplies. In this respect the accused Sokolovsky declared :

“In accordance with the instructions mentioned, particularly great attention was to be paid to sabotage work with regard to the planning of commodity circulation, to the most important forms for obtaining grain, timber and various raw materials, and also to the distribution of industrial and agricultural commodities. In Gromann's opinion the Mensheviks in the Trade Commissariat and in Centrosoyus, which organised the obtaining of grain and raw materials and the distribution of the same, as well as the distribution of industrial commodities, should work in such a way that the supply of agricultural products to the planned funds should be limited, and that a certain part of these products should remain in the private economic sector; they should distribute the industrial commodities in such a fashion that the growth of the centralised State supplies of grain and raw materials would be hindered. This tactic was to lead both to the intensification of the shortage of industrial commodities, and to the increase of the difficulties in the supply of foodstuffs to the towns and the supply of raw materials for industry. Gromann was of the opinion that in this way a favourable basis for the dissatisfaction of large sections of the population could be created which would then facilitate political agitation and the struggle against the Bolshevik dictatorship.” (Statement of February 22nd.)

The accused Yakubovitch, a member of the All-Union Bureau and one of the organisers of the Menshevik sabotage group in the Trade Commissariat, describes the field of sabotage which was entrusted to him in the Trade Commissariat and at the same time confirms the statements of Sokolovsky :

" I conducted concrete sabotage activity in the Trade Commissariat in the second half of 1927 and at the beginning of 1928 with regard to the distribution of industrial commodities of which there was a shortage at the time, and later, during the course of 1928 and 1929 with regard to the organisation of trade. . . . The plans included textile goods (cotton, wool, finished clothing), leather, boots and shoes and metal goods (lead roofing, zinc-iron, etc.). According to the plans for the last quarter of the economic year 1926/27, and the first and second quarters of the year 1927/28, I distributed the above-mentioned industrial commodities in such a fashion that much too little was available for the use of the urban working population in comparison with what the industrial centres could have supplied from the existing stores. Further, the despatch of the goods to the various districts was not carried out in accordance with the tempo of the supply of agricultural products, above all, grain, as provided for. Further difficulties in the way of the carrying out of the plans were to be created by supplying the co-operatives with goods not in accordance with their needs, and by causing a lack of proportion between their stores and the finances granted to them, and their actual needs. The aim of this sabotage was to cause considerable discontent amongst the working masses, but this aim was not successful. Similarly, the expected effects on the Soviet government also did not materialise. In February 1928 I left the post of director of the distribution of industrial products in the Trade Commissariat of the Soviet Union. However, sabotage work in this field was continued with the same methods which I had adopted. The only difference was that it was now adapted to the new tasks which the All-Union Bureau had set, i.e., the preparation of a counter-revolutionary coup d'état. In my new position as Vice-Chairman of the Economic Administration of the People's Commissariat for Trade, I worked to delay the economic investigations into the state of private trade in the villages and to prevent the drawing-up of statistical material which resulted from the investigations. In this way I rendered it more difficult to work out concrete measures for the systematic elbowing-out of private trading in the villages by the Socialist sector. (Statement of February 20th, 1931.)

In his statement of December 17th 1930, Yakubovitch describes a few of the methods of the sabotage work :

" In the textile industry, sabotage work was carried out in the following forms and set itself the following tasks :

" 1. A great quantity of commodities far in excess of the needs of the grain purchase operations, was sent into the most important grain districts;

" 2. In one grain district, large quantities of goods were sent which caused an accumulation, whilst at other points too few goods were sent. In other words, whilst certain districts were flooded with goods, an impression of shortage was created;

" 3. The choice of the goods sent was never in accordance with the character of the needs of the districts in question;

" 4. Long before the opening of the grain purchase operations, goods were held up on the pretext of creating a reserve fund of goods to satisfy the demand at the beginning of the grain purchase campaign, although these goods were never held in those districts where the grain purchase campaign was to be chiefly carried out;

" 5. The financing of the co-operatives was not carried out in accordance with their needs. The organisations in the grain districts, which were given no credits, were unable in such a short space of time to purchase large quantities of such expensive goods as textiles, whilst the co-operatives in other districts which were given no textiles received large credits. This led to a disorganisation of supplies to the consumers and to the slowing-down of commodity circulation. It also led to supplementary credits for the co-operative organisations from the means of the State Bank, i.e., by raising the emission;

" 6. The goods which were left over after the supply plans had been drawn up for the grain areas were not in general sent to the industrial centres, and when this was done the commodities were not in accord with the seasonal demands and were not calculated to satisfy the needs of the masses of the workers. The character of the sabotage work with regard to leather goods consisted in drawing-up plans which demanded a maximum transfer of leather goods from one district to another. Further, incomplete collections were sent out and collections not in accordance with the needs of the working population in the respective district. The districts are used to leather goods and footwear from a certain area, or even from a certain factory, and they do not willingly take articles from other centres or other factories.

" The main principle of the sabotage work in any given case—in drawing-up the distributive plans on the basis of the transfer of goods from one district to another, by replacing the production of local industry by the pro-

duction of other centres—was that in practice there was an utter lack of system. With regard to the supply of leather goods such chaos was produced that it was difficult to discover what the real situation was at all, and it was difficult to ascertain whether the adopted plans were actually carried out.

“The simplest sabotage work of all was with regard to metal goods, because here there was a very considerable shortage and industry was unable to satisfy the market. In this case, sabotage work was chiefly directed to arranging distribution in such a fashion that it was not in accordance with the interests of the grain purchase campaign and of the campaign to obtain other agricultural products. The goods were sent into this or that area without consideration of the grain purchase campaign and of the figures laid down in the plans for the respective districts.” (Statement of December 17th.)

One of the leading saboteurs in the Trade Commissariat, the accused Salkind, describes the situation of the sabotage work in a similar fashion :

“Sabotage work must be divided into two parts: Sabotage in economic questions of planned commodity circulation, and sabotage on the field of the distribution of industrial commodities. Because in my position I had to do with the planning of commodity circulation, my immediate participation in the leadership of the sabotage work took place in this field. With regard to the distribution of industrial commodities, my participation was only partial, because this sabotage work was carried out by the Menshevist groups in the Trade Commissariat as their occupations were connected with this field of work (Yakubovitch, Rabinovitch and Shuster).

“With regard to the concrete results of the sabotage work in the connection mentioned, I must mention the following facts :

“During the course of a number of years (particularly in the years 1926/27 and 1927/28) I insisted when the control figures for commodity circulation were being drawn up on the necessity of a supplementary extension of the programme of light industry, allegedly in order to maintain a balance on the market, to stimulate agricultural purchases and to guarantee a sufficient supply of industrial products for the working class. I deliberately concealed other ways of overcoming the shortage of industrial commodities which resulted from the conditions of the class character and systematised structure of the State and

which afterwards (in 1929 and 1930) began to be carried out, namely: the class distribution of industrial goods in town and country; the limitation of the consumption of the better-situated sections of the population; the obtaining of supplementary finances from these same social groups. . . . On one occasion, I think it was in 1926/27, a supplementary import of raw materials for various branches of light industry was carried out. This inevitably resulted in a slowing down of the development of heavy industry. In 1928/29, according to the Five Year Plan, a price drop was to be carried out with regard to industrial products for mass consumption. Basing my arguments on the fact of the industrial commodity shortage I tried in my speech on the control figures of this year to secure a stabilisation of the prices of industrial commodities, and as a supplementary factor I pointed out that the prices for agricultural products had risen considerably. I deliberately refrained from mentioning those class measures which were adopted in this field in 1930, namely, to limit the drop in prices to goods sold through the workers' co-operatives. With regard to the prices for agricultural commodities, I insisted both in my economic reports and my speeches on the control figures that there should be a rise in prices as a basic factor to stimulate production and to strengthen the peasant market relations, whereby I ignored or objected to the Socialist methods of influencing agriculture, i.e., supply according to contracts, the collectivisation of the small and middle farms and the strengthening of the State and class influence against the kulak elements in the villages. With the excuse that it was necessary to supply the grain areas to a greater extent, insufficient supplies were sent to the raw-material and cattle-breeding areas, and the result of this was that the plans for the supply of the respective agricultural products were not carried out, and this also increased the difficulties both in the supply of industry with raw materials and in the supply of foodstuffs to the towns. The hindering and retarding of the class distribution of industrial commodities in the town and in the country which resulted from our sabotage work meant that the workers and the poor peasants were insufficiently supplied with these goods. This was the general character of the sabotage work." (Statement of February 20th, 1931.)

SABOTAGE IN THE SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL.

The work of sabotage in the Supreme Economic Council was carried out by four members of the All-Union Bureau: Ginsburg, Stern (who has since died), Volkov and Sokolovsky.

The "official" of the Industrial Party, S. D. Schein, also took part in the work of the sabotage organisation in the Supreme Economic Council. Concerning the development of this organisation, its composition, its methods of work and its concrete forms, the accused Ginsburg (former adviser of the Supreme Economic Council and Professor at the Plekhanov Institute) declares :

"The sabotage organisation in the Supreme Economic Council was formed approximately in 1926. The following persons were members of its leadership : I (Ginsburg), S. D. Schein, W. A. Byelozvetov, A. B. Stern, and A. L. Sokolovsky. The following persons were members of the organisation : I (Ginsburg), M. Grinzer, K. I. Rabinovitch, A. I. Rabinovitch, S. D. Abramovitch, V. I. Lavrov, F. G. Dubovikov, S. A. Kukel-Krayevsky, N. G. Chernobayev, J. S. Arkus, M. B. Olitsky and M. B. Galperin. Of these, the following were Mensheviks : Grinzer, the two Rabinovitchs, Sokolovsky, Stern and myself.

"The persons mentioned formed my department of the sabotage organisation. Other members of the organisation whose names I do not know, were in connection with other leading persons. This organisation was formed on the basis of permanent, joint relations, and during the course of its existence a certain attitude to a number of questions developed. The contact in the sabotage work was established by conversations with the individual members of the organisation. Stern, Sokolovsky and I worked according to the direction of the Menshevik party, whilst, as far as I know, Schein and Byelozvetov maintained connections with the Industrial Party and its leaders.

"Sabotage work was conducted along the following lines : I dealt with general economic questions (Five Year Plan, economic situation, scientific investigation work); Stern dealt with finance and food problems; Sokolovsky with raw materials, productive costs and commodity balance; Schein with scientific-technical questions; Byelozvtov with power supply problems. All the members of the organisation, who acted on their own initiative in their own fields of work, were jointly striving to discredit the tempo of development proposed for industry by the Soviet authorities and to hinder the development of the Socialist offensive." (Statement of February 20th, 1930.)

Ginsburg declares the following concerning his own concrete sabotage :

"For my own sabotage I chose the latter of two methods of sabotage (an exaggerated, overstrained tempo

of development or a reduced and very limited tempo). My sabotage work took place in the following directions :

“ 1. With regard to the setting up of the Five Year Plan projects. The sabotage work consisted in finding a common denominator for the growth of all branches of production for the period of the Five Year Plan (1927/28 to 1931/32) and to set it considerably lower than necessary and possible, and lower than it afterwards appeared in reality despite our sabotage. For instance, the growth of production for 1927/28 as compared with the previous year was set roundly at 16.3 per cent. lower than the real level possible. In fact, despite our sabotage work it reached from 23 to 24 per cent. The growth of production in 1928/29 as compared with the previous year was set considerably lower than necessary, i.e., at 13 per cent. whereas in reality it reached 22 per cent., despite our sabotage. The increase of production for 1929/30 was also set considerably lower than it should have been, i.e., at 13.7 per cent., whereas in reality, despite our sabotage, it reached approximately 24 per cent. The increases we proposed would have led to an intensification of the commodity shortage and to the undermining of the defensive capacities of the Soviet Union. The final figures for the growth of production were deliberately and harmfully planned so that it should be reduced almost every year. For instance, the growth of production in the various years was to have been as follows : 1927/28, 16.3 per cent. ; 1928/29, 13.1 per cent. ; 1929/30, 13.7 per cent. ; 1930/31, 10.5 per cent. ; 1931/32, 10 per cent. This plan would have led to an intensification of the commodity shortage in accordance with the growth of the Soviet economic system, although the development of industrial production from 1927/28 to 1931/32 according to the figures of the Five Year Plan and according to the balance in practice was to have reduced the commodity shortage towards the end of the Five Year Plan period.

“ Very obvious sabotage is seen in the projects which I worked out with the assistance of the sabotage organisation for the most important branches of the economic system (metal, coal, oil, chemicals, electricity), branches of production which are of first-rate importance for the material supply of the Soviet Union.

“ For instance, in the case of coal, production at the end of the Five Year Plan (1931/32) was deliberately fixed at 57,000,000 tons, although a considerably higher figure could and should have been set. This can be seen alone from the fact that production in the year 1929/30 was

almost 47,000,000 tons, and that the control figures for the year 1930/31, which were set up in the autumn of 1930, were 75,000,000 tons.

“With regard to oil production, for the last year of the Five Year Plan (1931/32) the sum of 19,700,000 tons was deliberately set, although a much high figure could and should have been set. This can be seen from the fact that in 1929/30 the actual production was from 16 to 17,000,000 tons, and that the new control figures for 1930/31 which were set up in the autumn of 1930 provide for a production of 25,000,000 tons.

“The production of Martin Steel for the last year of the Five Year Plan (1931/32) was deliberately set at 5,800,000, although the figures could and should have been much higher. This can be seen, for instance, from the fact that this quantity was produced in 1929/30, and that the new control figures which were drawn up in the autumn of 1930 for the year 1930/31 provide for a production of 7,500,000 tons.

“The same sort of sabotage was conducted in those branches of industry which supply agriculture and further its Socialist forms (production of agricultural machinery and artificial fertilisers). For instance, the production of agricultural machinery for the last year of the Five Year Plan (1931/32) was deliberately set at 200,000,000 roubles, although this figure could and should have been much higher. This can be seen from the fact that the production of agricultural machinery in 1929/30 was almost double the amount laid down for the last year of the Five Year Plan.

“The same sort of sabotage was also carried on with regard to the production of building materials, and in particular of cement. The production of cement for the final year of the Five Year Plan (1931/32) was deliberately fixed as low as 23,000,000 barrels, although the actual figure could and should have been much higher. This can be seen from the fact that the production of cement in 1929/30 reached the figures laid down for the final year of the Five Year Plan.”

SABOTAGE IN THE STATE BANK.

The accused Sher, one of the chief organisers of the All-Union Bureau, was at the same time the organiser and leader of the sabotage group in the State Bank. He declares :

“The task of the disorganising activity of the group in the State Bank was to undermine the currency circulation. The work was carried out by distributing credits

to various branches of the economic system in a fashion which was not in accord with the interests of the branches in question. . . .

“ The supply of credit to the co-operatives was carried out with regard to the distribution of credit amongst the lower co-operative organisations in such a fashion that in reality the State Bank was not in control of its branches, but the administration of Centrosoyus in control of its finance departments. The State Bank fixed credit for a year or for a quarter. This sum was then confirmed by leading Soviet organs. The distribution of this sum to the districts according to the various terms was then left to Centrosoyus. A formal order of the latter sanctioned the respective instructions of the State Bank to its local branches. When the latter protested against the extremely low credits granted, I had my answer ready : Why do you bother about the matter more than the co-operatives do themselves? The figures have been confirmed by Centrosoyus itself. In practice, therefore, the distribution of these credits was carried out by the leader of the Menshevik organisation in Centrosoyus, Petunin, who, with the assistance of the State Bank, was able to bring any particular branch of the co-operative movement into acute financial difficulties.

“ However, the chief methods of the disorganising work were those which created a series of difficulties in the carrying out of the credit reforms. The lack of the necessary preparations for the carrying out of this reform caused a considerable credit emission, and the result was that a danger of inflation cropped up. In the carrying out of the credit reform with regard to the trade co-operatives, extremely complicated instructions to the branches were sent by telegram. The totally unintelligible circular produced a flood of telegrams from the provinces asking for explanations. Great confusion was caused in those places where the first steps towards credit reform were undertaken. For instance, when the trade co-operatives presented their proposals, which had not been examined by the State Bank, they were given the possibility of utilising extraordinary credits for their activities . . .” (Statement of February 20th, 1931.)

In a statement made on December 7th, 1930, the accused Sher described the nature of the sabotage as follows :

“ The decisive factors of the work of sabotage were : incorrect distribution of credit, cutting down of credits for one branch of the economic system and the granting of exaggerated sums to the other. This was done by means

of incorrectly drawn-up plans, with the assistance of complicated plan methods, and by withholding credits for the urgent demands of industry, behind the pretext of this or that formal excuse. The main part of the work of sabotage began with the discussions for the preparation of the credit reform."

The same evidence was given by the accused Berlatsky :

"The carrying out of the instructions of the All-Union Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. for passive resistance, inactivity, and in particular the instructions for disorganising activity, resulted in a state of affairs in the State Bank in which the statistical department was not sufficiently provided with material and this made it difficult to observe accurately the economic organs and the state of their work. This also made it difficult for the bank to maintain its elasticity and its struggle against those who disturbed the plans. The beginning of this state of affairs goes back to 1928. Leshnev, Kassatzky, Mescheriakov, and others, were directly engaged in this work of sabotage. . . . The instructions of the All-Union Bureau regarding passive resistance affected the Accounts Department in such a fashion that instructions concerning the settlement of accounts and the drawing-up of the balance were sent to the local branches too late, and no measures were taken for a timely revision of the state of affairs in accounting and balance work. The result was that the balances were published too late and instructions were not sent out in time to the operative departments. Taken as a whole, this sabotage work decreased the elasticity of the State Bank and lowered its efficiency as the centre of accounting for the economic system of the Soviet Union.

"In the second half of the year 1929/30, Sher put forward in the State Bank the question of a credit reform for the trades co-operatives. At that time these co-operatives were very weak, both with regard to their financial state and their planned work.

"Sher informed me that they estimated that the artisan and trades sector would be particularly favourable in consequence of its special conditions, and that a series of prospects would open up for the All-Union Bureau from this work.

"Preparations in the Bank were made in all haste and the result was that the artisan and trades co-operatives received from the State Bank within three or four months about 30 or 40,000,000 roubles more credit than originally laid down in the plans of the State Bank."

SABOTAGE WORK IN THE GOSPLAN.*

The leading member of the All-Union Bureau, the accused Gromann, was the organiser and leader of sabotage group in the Gosplan. The following statement made by Gromann gives a characteristic description of the methods of sabotage work put into operation in the Gosplan :

“ The sabotage work of the Mensheviks in the Gosplan of the Soviet Union with regard to the control of the economic situation and the perspectives in its latter stage dating from 1928 was carried out by myself (Gromann), Bassarov, and also by those former Mensheviks who were allied with us : Selinger, Gutchmann, Shub, Pistrak, Brotmann and Vishnevsky, who was not a member of any party. These persons formed a counter-revolutionary sabotage group in the Gosplan of the Soviet Union. The counter-revolutionary group, led by Bassarov and I, began in 1928 to carry out the instructions given by the foreign centre of the R.S.D.L.P. for the new sabotage tactics, and by the All-Union Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., which was formed within the Soviet Union. Our work consisted in the following : In carrying through control figures and reports on the economic situation with plan constructions in opposition to the general line of the Communist Party, and obviously distorted economic appraisals (distortion of the tempo of Socialist construction, distortion of the class line, exaggeration of the difficulties, under-estimation of the existing resources); in announcing signs of a coming economic catastrophe (Gromann), or, similarly, in the announcement that the chances for carrying out the Party line and the development of the Socialist offensive were small (Bassarov and Gutchmann); in working out the perspective plans placing the genetic standpoint before the teleological standpoint (Gromann) or equalising them (Bassarov), instead of stressing the active aim of Socialist transformation in the historically given environment; in such a treatment of those agricultural problems which are regarded as the weak spots of the economic system that the basis for the two year plan with an agricultural deviation was given, which in essence was in contradiction to the plans of Socialist transformation of the productive relations in the Soviet Union.” (Statement of December 31st, 1930.)

Gromann declared further :

“ Since 1928, I and my group, Selinger, Gutchmann, Brotmann, Shub, Pistrak (a former Menshevik with whom

* Gosplan.—State Planning Commission.

Bassarov had connections) and Vishnevsky (not belonging to any party), put our plans deliberately in contradiction to the plans of the government and the general line of the Party, with the aim of distorting the class line and the economic policy. This was done by tendencious reports on the economic situation, an exaggeration of the difficulties . . . and by pessimistic prognostications. The aim was to detract the Soviet power from its path. What we did not succeed in achieving when setting up the plans was achieved in carrying them out, whereby we utilised our positions as responsible workers in order to create conditions for the disorganisation of supplies and to cause political dissatisfaction amongst the masses of the population." (Statement made on February 20th, 1931.)



V.

THE FINANCING OF THE "ALL-UNION BUREAU."

THE Menshevik counter-revolutionary organisation was financed from two sources : from the means of the foreign centre of the R.S.D.L.P. and from the means of the "Industrial Party."

Petunin came to an understanding with Dan, with regard to supplies of money from the foreign centre on the occasion of his journey in 1927. Petunin states :

"Dan told me that he could supply the necessary sums, and that Shurygin should be applied to in the matter. Later on, after the sabotage organisation had been formed and was at work, in the summer of 1928, I wrote Shurygin a letter, which was sent along with other papers of the Central Federation of the Co-operatives, by diplomatic post, to Berlin. In this letter I pointed out that 'something is being done of which you know from our conversation.' By this I referred to the consultation with Dan.

"One-and-a-half months after I wrote this letter, I received a visit in my workroom at the Centrosoyus from the head of the Riga office of the Centrosoyus (died autumn of this year), who, in addition to small matters and pamphlets, gave me a packet from Shurygin, with the word, 'Regards,' and a letter from Shurygin. I opened the package, and found in it 20,000 roubles in chervonetz, and a letter from Shurygin stating that 'the money comes from the source known to you.'

"This money I divided among the following members of the organisation : Lapin, 6,000 roubles ; Seneiko, 2,000 roubles ; Bossyatsky, 6,000 roubles ; and Lyuteransky, 4,000 roubles. For my personal needs I used 400 roubles. With respect to the remainder, I shall try to recollect to whom I gave it." (Statement made 20th February, 1931.)

The defendant Sher, member and secretary of the "All-Union Bureau," and at the same time member of the finance commission of this Bureau, has made a more detailed statement on the financial resources of the "All-Union Bureau," and on the methods and principles employed in distributing the sums received (Statement made 20th February, 1931) :

“The financing of the ‘All-Union Bureau’ was so organised that sums of money were remitted for the disorganisation work. In comparison with this item of expenditure, the money required for the purely organisational expenses and requirements of the ‘All-Union Bureau’ was so insignificant in amount that it may be asserted, without falling into any error, that the whole of the financing of the ‘All-Union Bureau’ consisted of means for its disorganisation work. And yet not only the members of the ‘All-Union Bureau’ received no money for the performance of sabotage work, not even the ordinary members of the Menshevik nuclei received any part of it for participation in disorganising sabotage. The money was intended for non-partisans who were to be won over for the work of disorganisation, and who were of course not actuated by any political motive.

“The approximate sum remitted to the ‘All-Union Bureau’ during the term of its existence amounted to 500,000 roubles, or, so far as I can remember the balance sheet of the finance commission, of which I was a member, to 480,000 roubles. The sums varied as follows in the different years :

“ 1928 : 120,000 roubles
 1929 : 200,000 ”
 1930 : 160,000 ” ”

Sher’s later statements show the manner in which these sums were distributed among the sabotage nuclei in the outlying districts (Statement made 20th February, 1931) :—

“In so far as I can recollect the final figures, the following was the amount reached. The sums received were as follows :

“ Trade Commissariat nucleus	80,000 roubles
Centrosoyuz nucleus	80,000 ”
Supreme Economic Council of the Soviet Union nucleus	70,000 ”
State Bank nucleus	90,000 ”
State Planning Commission of the Soviet Union and the R.S.F.S.R., and the State Central Administra- tion nucleus	120,000 ”
Periphery nucleus of the ‘All-Union Bureau’	40,000 ” ”

In this same statement Sher refers to the sources of the sums flowing into the “All-Union Bureau” :

“All the sums adduced came in part from the ‘Industrial Party’ (200,000 roubles) and in part from abroad

(280,000 roubles). Gromann received the money from abroad through Finn-Yenotayevsky. I myself received the money from Gromann only. The source from which the money came was the foreign organisation, which (as I was told by Gromann, and also by Abramovitch and Braunstein), received it, to a considerable extent, from circles in sympathy with German social democracy and the II. International. I learnt from the information thus received from members of the foreign centre that the source of financial supply was some individual and exceedingly wealthy persons, who were in communication with the organisations mentioned and informed as to the object for which the money was intended." (Statement made 20th February, 1931.)

Another member of the financial commission, the defendant Gromann, the chief money intermediary, describes the financial sources as follows, in his statement of January 11th, 1931 :

"The financing of the 'All-Union Bureau' of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. was effected by the foreign centre of the R.S.D.L.P., which in turn was subsidised by German Social Democracy, by the II International, and by the 'Trade and Industrial Committee.' In order to preserve secrecy, the financing was carried out in instalments, and the manner of remittance was only known to those immediately concerned. I personally received the sums allotted to me by the foreign centre through Finn-Yenotayevsky, who received them, so far as I could learn from his words, from a foreign consulate in Leningrad. The total sum which he remitted to me amounted to 200,000 roubles, which I passed on to Sher (approximately 150,000 roubles) and Salkind (50,000 roubles). The 'Industrial Party' remitted me 200,000 roubles through Laritchev's agency, of which I gave 180,000 to Vindogradsky and 20,000 to Nekrasov, at which time Laritchev informed me that this was in accordance with an understanding between the 'Trade and Industrial Committee' and the organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. abroad.

"The periphery was financed through the Menshevik nuclei in the administrative bodies. Sher was the treasurer of the 'All-Union Bureau,' and I did not interfere in details." (Statement made 11th January, 1931.)

The defendant Finn-Yenotayevsky, in his statement of 24th December, 1930, confirms Gromann's statements, and declares that he, Finn-Yenotayevsky, took the leading place in money matters :

"In the spring of 1928, during my sojourn in Moscow, V. Gromann informed me in the course of a consultation

in his apartments, that in 1925 and 1927, when he was abroad, he had met Dan and Abramovitch of the foreign central committee (Mensheviks), and had discussed with them in detail the situation in the Soviet Union. He told me that he, as representative of the C.C. (of the Mensheviks) in the Soviet Union, had received money and instructions from them. At the same time he requested me to undertake the communication between him, Gromann, and the foreign centre, in the matter of financing and correspondence. In order to establish this communication, I drew Gromann's attention to the fact that money and letters could be conveniently forwarded through the intermediation of the head manager of the mixed joint stock company 'Export-Import,' Friedland, whom I had known since 1906 as a member of the military organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., and who still maintained contact with the Mensheviks, although engaged since 1907 in commercial pursuits. Friedland, who had extensive means at his disposal, financed the Menshevik press abroad, and supplied leading Mensheviks in the Soviet Union with money after the October revolution. This proved that Friedland was worthy of full confidence."

It will be seen from Finn-Yenotayevsky's further statements that it was found possible to establish the connection with Friedland :

" . . . In the autumn of 1928 (during his stay in Leningrad) I received 50,000 roubles for the first time from Friedland . . . In April, 1929, when I was in Moscow, I received a similar packet from Friedland containing the same amount (50,000 roubles). These amounts and letters I again passed on to Gromann personally. This time, Gromann replied to my question as to who was financing Dan and Abramovitch, saying that the money coming from Dan and Abramovitch was furnished them by German Social Democracy through the agency of Hilferding . . . In the summer of 1929 I travelled on a scientific commission to Siberia, and was not able to be in Moscow that year, as I was kept by my work at the high school, and therefore I agreed with Friedland and Gromann that all money and letters from Friedland to me, for remittance to Gromann, should now be given to Gromann personally by Friedland, in order to avoid delay.

" In this manner the total amount remitted by Friedland and myself to Gromann on the instructions of the foreign centre (of the Mensheviks) was 300,000 roubles." (Statement made 24th December, 1930.)

The defendant Salkind, who confirms the above statements made by his co-defendants on the financial sources, states :

“The financing of the activities of the ‘All-Union Bureau’ of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. depended in the main on the means remitted by the foreign centre of the R.S.D.L.P. Immediately after I joined the ‘All-Union Bureau’ of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., I was told by V. G. Gromann of this financial resource. Abramovitch, too, informed me on this subject when I met him in Moscow at the end of the summer of 1928. Both explained to me that the foreign centre was receiving the money required for financing the ‘All-Union Bureau’ from foreign Social Democratic parties. All the large West European Social Democratic parties, as well as the IInd International, were taking part in this financing, but the greatest participant was the German Social Democratic Party, which had declared itself ready to finance to a far-reaching extent the party work and especially the sabotage work, of the R.S.D.L.P. Besides this main source of financial aid for the ‘All-Union Bureau,’ as I was informed by Sher, the Kondratiev group and the ‘Industrial Party’ had also declared their readiness to help. Negotiations on the matter were carried on for the Kondratiev group by Yurovsky, and for the ‘Industrial Party’ by Laritchev. The Kondratiev group declared itself prepared to provide money in connection with the understanding on the contact with respect to military work, and with respect to the delegating of Sher, as representative of the ‘All-Union Bureau,’ to the military commission of the Kondratiev group.” (Statement made 4th December, 1930.)

And finally, Yakubovitch, member of the “All-Union Bureau,” whose statements on the financial resources do not deviate from those of the others, reports on cases of subsidisation on the part of the “Industrial Party” of concrete disorganising work carried out by the Menshevik sabotage nucleus in the Trade Commissariat :

“When the new tactical methods of the R.S.D.L.P. were first put into practice at the end of 1927 . . . and the financing of the sabotage work was not yet properly arranged . . . A. B. Stern negotiated with the leader of the sabotage centre, the engineer S. D. Schein, with respect to a loan. As a result of the agreement arrived at I received about 15,000 roubles in several instalments from S. D. Schein, and this money I distributed among the participants in the first acts of sabotage. . . .”

VI.

CONCERNING THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE "ALL-UNION BUREAU" OF THE MENSHEVIKS WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN DELEGATION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. FROM 1928 TO 1930.

THE counter-revolutionary organisation of the Mensheviks carried out its criminal activity against the people on the basis of direct instructions from the foreign delegation of the Social Democratic Mensheviks. It was previously shown that the formation of the "All-Union Bureau" itself was the result of the organisational influence of this foreign centre. It has also been previously shown that the direct instructions of this foreign centre played the decisive rôle in the adoption of decisions and the giving of instructions by the "All-Union Bureau" for the sabotage work, and also in the decision to form a bloc with the Industrial Party and with the "Party of the Working Peasants." The affair was, however, not limited to this. During the activity of the "All-Union Bureau" from February 1928 to 1930, a series of meetings took place between individual members of the "All-Union Bureau" and leading persons of the foreign central committee of the Mensheviks. A permanent and systematic correspondence was also maintained, and finally even illegal journeys of two members of the foreign central committee of the Mensheviks, Abramovitch and Braunstein, to the Soviet Union took place. Both these persons took up direct connections with members of the "All-Union Bureau," as revealed by the investigation. Abramovitch took part in sessions of the "All-Union Bureau" in the Soviet Union. The result of the investigation into this question is the following :

Apart from the journeys carried out by Berlatsky and Petunin, which have been dealt with previously, Gromann, Ginsburg and Stern maintained personal connections abroad both before and after the formation of the "All-Union Bureau." Yurovsky, Gombarg, Gallop and Kauffmann carried out certain tasks with a view to maintaining connections. Further, as already mentioned, Finn-Yenotayevsky maintained systematic connections with abroad in order to finance the

Menshevik organisation in the Soviet Union. He was, however, not only intermediary in financial matters.

Finn-Yenotayevsky declares :

“ On two occasions (in the spring of 1928 and in the spring of 1929), Gromann gave me two packets, to be forwarded to the foreign C.C. of the Mensheviks. This was carried out by me through Friedland. . . . Further, I received a sealed packet from the foreign C.C. at my address to be handed over to Gromann. This was done by myself during my journey via Moscow to Odessa to visit my sick mother. . . .” (Statement on the 24th December, 1930.)

Up to the year 1929, Gromann and Ginsburg maintained personal connections with abroad. Gromann declares :

“ My connections with the Menshevik emigrants began in 1923, when I was staying in Bad Nauheim for my health and visited Berlin, where I met the Mensheviks Bienstock and Denick.

“ In 1925, I met Dan, Abramovitch, Dalin and Yugov. In the same year, I met Braunstein, Vienstock and Denick, one after the other. In 1927, I met Denick, who was at that time engaged in the information bureau of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin. . . .” (Statement of the 22nd December, 1930.)

Ginsburg declares concerning his connections :

“ My journey abroad, which took place in the second half of 1927, was one of those journeys which were utilised by the organisers of the ‘ All-Union Bureau ’ in order to establish connections with the foreign delegation of the R.S.D.L.P. On my way through Berlin I met A. B. Stern, who gave me Dan’s telephone number. I rang up Dan and asked him to arrange a meeting for me with him and his wife, L. O. Kanzel-Tsederbaum (at the end of August or the beginning of September). During the meeting I informed Dan, Kanzel and Garvy of my work in the Soviet Union. Both Dan and Garvy were completely in agreement with our efforts to form an organisation, and both of them laid great stress on the fact that such an organisation must consist of persons having responsible positions in the Soviet apparatus. . . . Both Dan and Garvy expressed the wish that the organisation should be extended on a national scale, and they expressed the opinion that if the leaders of this organisation were known to the foreign delegation, then the latter would recognise this leading group as the ‘ All-Union Bureau ’ of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. On my way back

from the United States, I had no more than a telephone talk with Dan, who informed me that he had met Stern before the latter's journey to the Soviet Union in November, and that he, Dan, had given Stern the necessary instructions in the matter of the 'All-Union Bureau,' and that these instructions were essentially the same as what he had said to me at our meeting." (Statement of the 25th January, 1931.)

The journey of Stern falls in the 1928 period and is therefore considerably more important. Yakubovitch makes the following statement in this respect :

"Every year, A. B. Stern journeyed to Bad Neuheim in Germany to take the waters there, and remained two or three months abroad. If I am not mistaken, these journeys began in 1925. If he failed to make this journey one year, then it was certainly not more than one year. Each time, he stayed for a while in Berlin and met the members of the foreign C.C. of the Mensheviks there and took part in their sessions. Further, he visited the most prominent leaders of the German Social Democratic Party. I am aware of visits paid by him to Karl Kautsky, Eduard Bernstein and Rudolf Hilferding. On behalf of the organisation in the Soviet Union, Stern gave detailed information to the foreign C.C. and received information and instructions from it. . . ." (Statement of the 18th January, 1931.)

With regard to the nature of this information and these instructions, this has already been dealt with, as far as it referred to concrete questions of the counter-revolutionary activity of the "All-Union Bureau," in the analysis of the resolution of the "All-Union Bureau." Supplementing this, the following can be said :

Petunin declares :

"I remember very well the content of the instructions of the foreign C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. concerning the differences in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. These instructions were contained in a letter of which I received a copy through Gromann in the summer of 1929. This letter, which was signed by Dan and Abramovitch, contained an estimate of the Right-wing deviation in the C.P.S.U. The letter pointed out that as a result of their struggle against the C.C. of the C.P.S.U., the Trotskyists had arrived at the position of Social Democracy, and that on the basis of this example and as a result of the logic of the struggle, it must be assumed that the Right-wingers would arrive at the same position during the course of the struggle. The more bitter the struggle, the

clearer will this be seen, according to the letter. Therefore, 'oil must be poured into the fire in order that the flame of the struggle should burn more fiercely,' as the authors of the letter recommended. The letter put the differences in the C.P.S.U. into the centre of attention for the R.S.D.L.P. In conclusion, the letter called on us not to let our courage sink, but to work energetically because, 'with you is the whole of international Social Democracy.'" (Statement of the 12th December, 1930.)

According to the evidence of Gromann in the development of the instructions concerning the intervention, which Petunin brought in a letter which Sher received in the spring of 1928, the interventionist tactic :

"Was based outwardly on contradictory arguments. Namely, the letter pointed out the insecurity of the Soviet régime as the result of the deep discontent of the peasantry (but not the upper Kulak section) in connection with the extraordinary measures adopted in the grain purchase campaign, and pointed out the necessity of disorganising work for the support of the intervention. This was done, I repeat, in veiled forms such as, 'the inevitability of the growth of a disproportion, historical necessity of the intervention,' etc. The letter also declared it to be the duty of the R.S.D.L.P. to lead politically and give form to the incipient movement of the masses of the people against the Soviet State. Thanks to the previous personal discussions between Petunin and Dan, the author of the letter, the foreign delegation was quite sure that its veiled directions for the carrying on of active sabotage work and for an active support of the intervention would be understood by the recipient of the letter—the 'All-Union Bureau' of the R.S.D.L.P.

"In November, 1928, I received a letter through Finn-Yenotayevsky from the foreign delegation of the R.S.D.L.P., containing directions and confirming the analysis of the situation made by Abramovitch, and stressing that the situation was urgent, that intervention was drawing nearer and that it was necessary to force the disorganizational work because a Governmental crisis was undoubtedly approaching in view of the growing dissatisfaction in the village and in the town as a result of the fact that the supply and demand of agricultural and industrial products were not balanced. This letter was written with a typewriter, and according to an agreement with Abramovitch it bore the signature, 'Yours, F.' I read this letter in a session with Salkind, Petunin and

Yakubovitch, which took place, if I remember rightly, in my office in the Gosplan. We decided to strengthen the sabotage work against the alliance between town and country and against the supply of industrial commodities. I showed this letter to Finn-Yenotayevsky and to Sher. I kept the letter until June, 1930, when I was afraid I might be arrested in connection with the arrest of Kondratiev, at whose house I was when the search was made. I then destroyed the letter."

The arrival of two members of the foreign C.C. of the Mensheviks in the Soviet Union, Abramovitch in the summer of 1928 and Braunstein in the spring of 1929, was of decisive importance for the direction of the activity of the "All-Union Bureau."

Statements of all the accused on this point have been made.

Sher declares the following concerning Abramovitch's journey :

"In the year 1928, Abramovitch came from abroad. We members of the 'All-Union Bureau' were previously informed of his journey.

"Gromann informed me of the matter. On the day of his arrival, Finn-Yenotayevsky telephoned me from Leningrad and informed me that 'the Director of the North-West Timber Trust,' I think that that was the expression he used, would arrive in Moscow the next morning. That meant Abramovitch.

"The next day I stayed at home in order to wait for Abramovitch. Abramovitch telephoned to me from the October Railway Station and then drove to my rooms. The meeting in my rooms presented no difficulty, because I live quite alone and have only a servant girl. In my rooms, Abramovitch declared that the foreign C.C. was very much interested in our work, and that he was instructed to confirm our appointment in the name of the foreign C.C. He also expressed a wish to meet certain comrades, Gromann, Ginsburg, Salkind and Petunin. I then gave him the office addresses and the telephone numbers of these comrades, and informed him how he could get there. We then agreed that after he had met these comrades, or got into touch with them, he should meet me at the end of the day at the Briansk Railway Station and go from there to my country house near the station Alabino. I informed the Briansk comrades that Abramovitch had arrived, by telling them that 'the representative of the Timber Export Association had arrived from abroad and wanted to do business with them.' Towards the end of the day, at about 5 o'clock,

I met Abramovitch at the railway station as arranged, and we then journeyed to my country house in Alabino. In my house, Abramovitch declared that our desire to call ourselves Russian Central Committee was wrong, because our competence was limited to a too small circle of organisations, and that at the moment there was no chance of organising a great conference or a congress, but that there was no reason why we should not call ourselves 'the All-Union Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.' I doubted this, because I did not believe that the foreign C.C. could hand over a part of its functions and rights to a group which had been formed more or less by accident.

"At the same time, Abramovitch pointed out the necessity of concentrating the main weight of the work on the groups of responsible Soviet employees. He also pointed out that these groups must be united and begin a more decisive tempo of disorganising activity.

"He further pointed out the desirability of establishing closer connections with the groups active amongst the peasantry, whereby he had in mind the Party of the Working Peasants. Abramovitch also told me that, with the help of the addresses I had given him, he had met Gromann, Salkind and, apparently, also Petunin, and that a conference of our group was to be arranged, but before that he wanted to journey to a number of other towns where he still maintained his old connections. In particular, he wanted to go to White Russia and to Minsk, where, as he was well-known there, he intended to disguise himself. After this talk, Abramovitch went back to Moscow, and for safety's sake he travelled by a different line (the Alexandrov line). I placed my horse and trap at his disposal to take him to the station Golizino. The citizen Parfenov, who is the watchman at the house, drove him to the station. I went on foot to the station Alabino and journeyed back to Moscow on the Briansk line. Abramovitch intended to spend the night in Moscow with one of his acquaintances. He did not tell me with which one. Before his departure, Abramovitch promised to come again to my place in Moscow, because he had left his travelling necessities at my rooms. A few days later, Salkind telephoned me and told me that he would be at my house at a certain time. I understood from what he said that he would come together with Abramovitch. On the evening of the same day, both Abramovitch and Salkind came to my house, but separately.

"The discussion which took place dealt with the same objects as the discussion at my country house.

Abramovitch declared categorically that he considered it necessary to hold a conference of all the members of the Russian C.C. in order to deal with these questions. This conference was to take place after Abramovitch's return from his journey to the provinces. He promised to send a telegram to me to an address I gave him: Post Office, Polnovo, in the Province of Novgorod, where I intended to go hunting, in order to inform me of his return to Moscow. This was to be done a few days before his return. He also promised to inform Salkind. The next day Abramovitch left Moscow. Towards the end of July I travelled to Polnovo. I did not receive the promised telegram from Abramovitch and I returned to Moscow towards the end of August, where I learned from Salkind that Abramovitch had returned to Moscow in the meantime and that the conference had already taken place. He also informed me that the conference had come to a decision concerning the questions mentioned above, and that this decision was identical with the proposals made by Abramovitch.

“ I did not ask where this conference had taken place nor whether the comrades of the C.C. in Moscow at the time had taken part in it. After the adoption of the decision to call ourselves the ‘All-Union Bureau’ of the C.C., we still occasionally referred in private conversation to it as the Russian C.C. According to Salkind, Abramovitch reported at this conference concerning his impressions from a visit to the more distant organisations. He pointed out that in the provinces the work was being conducted on the old basis and that the comrades were still trying to work amongst the workers and were ignoring the employees. He declared that the comrades in the provinces must be given the necessary instructions. . . .” (Statement of Sher on the 5th December, 1930.)

According to the Statement of Salkind, Abramovitch's visit :

“ Aimed at securing final clarity in all organisational, and tactical questions and in all questions of principle in the activity of the ‘All-Union Bureau,’ and further to bring the whole activity of the ‘All-Union Bureau’ into agreement with the aims of the foreign C.C. During Abramovitch's stay in Moscow, various members of the ‘All-Union Bureau,’ including myself, had detailed individual discussions with him, and further, Abramovitch delivered a speech at the session of the ‘All-Union Bureau’ on our programme. Both in the private con-

versations and in this speech, Abramovitch made perfectly clear the attitude adopted by the foreign delegation of the R.S.D.L.P. in all fundamental questions of the activity and tactics of the R.S.D.L.P. As Abramovitch pointed out, the chief basis of the activity and the tactics of the 'All-Union Bureau' in the future was to be the work for the overthrow of the Soviet power. The fact that the attitude of the C.P.S.U. had now become absolutely clear in all questions concerning the economic and social constructive work in the Soviet Union, had caused the foreign delegation to come to the conclusion that on the field of the struggle for Socialism there could be no conciliation between the Social Democratic methods for the transformation of capitalist society and the policy of the C.P.S.U., and that only the destruction of the bulwark of international Communism in the shape of the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet power could save the international Social Democratic movement from bankruptcy and the final loss of its influence on the working masses.

"From this, Abramovitch drew the conclusion that it was necessary to begin with active sabotage methods in the various branches of the Soviet economic system, to disorganise the Soviet economic system and to discredit the Soviet economic policy in the eyes of the working class and peasant masses. The second basis of the struggle against the Soviet power was military intervention, declared Abramovitch. The foreign delegation of the R.S.D.L.P. was of the opinion that intervention must be supported as the only serious and practical weapon for the overthrow of the Soviet power. In view of this fundamental importance of intervention, the economic sabotage work—apart from its direct aim of disorganising the Soviet economic system—should also serve as a preparatory stage for the creation of favourable economic conditions in the Soviet Union for the carrying out of intervention. Abramovitch further declared that this attitude of the foreign delegation of the R.S.D.L.P. was not based solely on its own estimation of the situation in the Soviet Union, but that this standpoint was shared by the IInd International and by the most important Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe, and in particular by the leading organs of the Social Democratic Party in Germany. Of course, in the future also the IInd International and the S.D.P. of Germany would have to maintain officially their negative attitude to the intervention on account of a series of international and inner-party considerations (the opposition of the masses of the workers to intervention), but fundamentally their

position in this question was the same as that of the R.S.D.L.P. The foreign delegation of the R.S.D.L.P. had received a promise from the IIInd International and from the German S.D.P. to finance the organisation and the sabotage work of the R.S.D.L.P. for the preparation of intervention. The programme developed by Abramovitch and the instructions which he gave, formed the basis of the activity of the 'All-Union Bureau' during the course of the whole period which followed." (Statement of Salkind on the 19th February, 1931.)

Gromann makes the following statement concerning Abramovitch's visit :

" Abramovitch, a member of the foreign C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., came illegally to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1928. His journey was carried out on the decision of the foreign C.C. in connection with the final constitution of the organisation formed by the Mensheviks in the Soviet Union and in order to secure a change of tactics. At the time of his arrival, I was seriously ill and had to remain in bed. Immediately afterwards, I went to a sanatorium in Kislovodsk at the instructions of the Professors of the Kreml hospital, who treated me. Therefore, I was able to see Abramovitch only for a short time. He spoke in greater detail with other members of the central organisation, particularly with Sher, who was already at that time the representative of the foreign C.C. My impressions of my conversations with Abramovitch and of Sher's reports of his conversations with Abramovitch, may be summed up as follows : Abramovitch gave an estimate of the political situation and the tasks put forward by the foreign C.C., and the functions to be performed by the Menshevik organisation in the Soviet Union. He also described the characteristic basis of the new tactic. The new element in the situation he considered to be the intensification of the struggle between the IIIrd and IIInd Internationals, and secondly, in the new policy of the C.P.S.U., the policy of the decisive Socialist offensive. Therefore, he considered the struggle against the new policy of the C.P.S.U. as necessary also from the standpoint of the Social Democratic Parties of other countries, and expressed the opinion that this would improve the situation of the foreign C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. amongst the parties of the IIInd International. Interest in Russian Social Democracy was growing and increased assistance from the IIInd International, including financial assistance, had been promised.

" In Germany a decisive struggle between the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party is imminent,

and therefore the S.D.P. of Germany is unreservedly prepared to assist Russian Social Democracy in its struggle against the C.P.S.U., because the successes of the latter considerably strengthen the C.P. of Germany. The wish of the German S.D.P. to support Russian Social Democracy was therefore absolutely understandable.

"In this struggle, Russian Social Democracy had powerful allies: the formal or practical coalition of the Social Democratic Parties of the IInd International with the bourgeoisie outside the Soviet Union, and the dissatisfaction of the peasantry, the intellectuals and perhaps even a large part of the proletariat inside the Soviet Union. Both of these forces should be utilised, and the foreign C.C. had therefore come to the conclusion that the tactics must be changed: (1) with regard to intervention, which must be regarded not only as permissible, but even as desirable; and (2) that disorganising work must be carried out in the Soviet institutions, in the factories and in the Communist Party itself by supporting as far as possible the Right-wing opposition and the development of its tendencies towards 'Social Democracy.' . . ."

(Statement of the 17th December, 1930.)

Referring to the visit of the representative of the foreign C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., Braunstein, to the Soviet Union, Sher declares:

"I learned of the journey of Mikhail Adamovitch Braunstein to Moscow from a relative of his, A. I. Leshnev, a member of the Menshevik group in the State Bank. If my memory serves me rightly, Leshnev informed me in the spring of 1929 that Braunstein was in Moscow, that he had brought certain instructions from the foreign C.C., and that he wished to speak with me. I declared myself perfectly willing to meet him in my rooms, and he then came there after a telephonic arrangement with Leshnev. . . ."

"In our talk, we dealt in detail with the questions to be discussed at the coming plenary session of the 'All-Union Bureau,' and in particular with the question of joint work with the 'Party of the Working Peasants.' . . ."

"Like other members of the 'All-Union Bureau,' I was inclined to raise the question of intervention very energetically and to demand that this question be forced.

"Braunstein informed us that the foreign delegation was in agreement with our estimation of the joint work with the 'Party of the Working Peasants.' He declared that he was of the opinion that this party represented a

serious and real counter-revolutionary force in the Soviet Union.

“ With regard to intervention, Braunstein declared that he was a member of the Left-wing of the foreign delegation and that for a long time he had been opposed to intervention, so long in fact as he had not finally convinced himself that the red imperialism of the Soviet Union was more dangerous to the interests of international Socialism than any possible complications which might arise out of intervention by Great Britain and France against the Soviet Union. . . .

“ On the other hand, Braunstein persistently drew my attention to the fact that even in the case of joint work with the ‘ Party of the Working Peasants,’ and even in case of a positive solution in the question of the intervention, the ‘ All-Union Bureau ’ would commit a great mistake if it completely ignored the work amongst the masses of the workers. The new principles of Menshevism did not exclude propaganda and agitation among the working class, and this could be seen clearly from the activity of the foreign delegation.

“ Braunstein pointed out that he was to take part as the representative of the foreign delegation in the activity of the ‘ All-Union Bureau ’ as a member with equal rights in order to accelerate this part of the work of the ‘ All-Union Bureau,’ to utilise his old connections with the working class, which had not yet been dealt with, and to establish connections between the ‘ All-Union Bureau ’ and the Mensheviks in exile, in order in this fashion to build a bridge from the old Menshevism to the new.”

In this fashion the foreign delegation of the R.S.D.L.P. supported and directed the “ All-Union Bureau ” of the Mensheviks in the Soviet Union by direct personal journeys to the Soviet Union, by oral and written instructions, and finally by financial support, until quite recently.

Further, the close connection between the two organisations can be seen from a series of documentary evidences which are now in the hands of the judge conducting the inquiry. Amongst these are :

(a) The correspondence found during the search of Ikov’s rooms which refers to the connections between the foreign centre and members of the “ All-Union Bureau ”;

(b) The direct collaboration admitted by the accused in the “ Socialist Messenger ” with regard to the sabotage work in general and the trial of the members of the Industrial Party in particular;

(c) The attitude of the "Socialist Messenger" to the sabotage work in general and to the trial of the members of the Industrial Party in particular;

(d) The attitude of the "Socialist Messenger" to the arrest of Gromann, Sukhanov, etc.;

(e) The ambiguous attitude of the "Socialist Messenger" towards the fundamental problems of the intervention, and in particular its accusation of red imperialism against the Soviet Union. This accusation is one of the favourite accusations raised against the Soviet Union by the imperialist bourgeoisie.

Amongst the letters found during the search of Ikov's rooms, which came from abroad and which have been decoded, we find the following:

In a letter dated the 25th August, 1930, from the foreign Menshevist centre:

"Dear Siegfried, did you receive our first letter (after the interruption)? We wrote as usual to the old address. We will continue to write to both addresses in the usual fashion. Acknowledge the receipt and the coincidence of the key."

The letter concludes as follows:

"We are waiting the correspondence. After receiving a detailed letter from you we will send you a detailed answer."

"Best greetings, O."

In a letter of the 4th October, No. 4:

"We have received letter No. 2. A great campaign has been begun in connection with the arrests. We have addressed a special letter to all Social Democratic Parties and editors, pointing out the significance of the recent arrests."

"In the matter of Gromann and Kondratiev we have set democratic circles in Europe in movement. We are collecting the signatures of scholars and professors for a protest. A number of articles about the arrested and about the real criminals have been placed. Abramovitch is writing an article for the 'Vorwaerts.' Dan is writing a similar article for the Austrian newspaper, whilst Yugov is writing for a number of provincial newspapers."

The letter closes with a cypher.

A third letter, No. 6, dated the 23rd October:

"Inform us everything you know about M. A. Braunstein, in what prison he is and in what state his health is. We have done everything for the despatch of the 'Messenger.' We are waiting for the address. Ten copies will be sent to Moscow."

"Best greetings, OLYA."

Referring to these letters, Ikov declares :

“ The three letters from abroad presented to me (dated the 25th August, the 4th October, and the 23rd October) which were found during the search of my rooms, represent a part of the correspondence with the foreign delegation of the R.S.D.L.P., which was accidentally preserved. They were sent to me in code, written on the wrappers of German newspapers and journals which were sent to me under my name to the address of the office in which I worked. They were sent to me after the arrests in the matter of the ‘All-Union Bureau.’ The signature represents that of O. Demanevskaya, who was in correspondence with me almost the whole time.”

The examining judges have also a copy of the “ Pravda ” of 9th January, which was stopped at the Moscow General Post Office. It was addressed to Berlin and inside its leaves were two sheets of paper and a letter containing the following paragraphs :

“ We must prepare for the worst. Krylenko together with the G.P.U. and relying obviously on the information of some secret agency, and combining voluntary statements with the notices of madmen, is brewing an affair which will not be less important than the Shakhty or Ramzin process. . . .

“ We shall deal this perfidious phantasy the first blow and expose the Cheka conspiracy to public opinion. We give the matter into your hands and are confident of victory.

“ Signed : Moscow Bureau of the R.S.D.L.P.”

The letter is dated the 9th January, 1931, and begins with the words :

“ Dear Friends, a series of facts and information which comes from various quarters leave no room for doubt that a perfidious campaign is being planned against our party by the G.P.U. . . . The new slanderous process is monstrous. It will obviously be a process against the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.”

Referring to this document, which was placed before him, the accused Ikov declares :

“ The letter placed before me, written through a blue sheet on two sides of cigarette paper, dated the 9th January, 1931, signed the ‘ Moscow Bureau of the R.S.D.L.P.,’ beginning with the words, ‘ Dear Friends,’ placed in the leaves of a copy of the ‘ Pravda ’ and addressed to Berlin, was written and posted by me. . . .”

These documents prove conclusively once again the direct connections between the accused and the foreign Menshevist centre.

With regard to the "Socialist Messenger" and the collaboration in this journal by the accused, the accused Yakubovsky declares :

"The preparation of material for the 'Socialist Messenger' and the writing of articles for it, was never, as far as I know, made the special task of anyone in the Russian C.C., however, it was mostly N. I. Sukhanov and A. B. Stern who attended to this matter. Further, as far as I know, I. I. Rubin, A. M. Ginsberg, N. B. Salkind, V. A. Bassarov, W. W. Sher, V. G. Gromann, and of those who were not members of the Russian C.C., F. A. Cherevanin and P. P. Maslov, wrote regularly for the 'Socialist Messenger.' I have never written anything for this journal, but once or twice I drew up a report on commodity and currency questions at the request of W. W. Sher to be published in the 'Socialist Messenger' without any considerable editorial changes, or perhaps worked up, supplemented and used for a leading article. I drew up such material five or six times throughout the whole period. Once or twice it was published almost without alteration and without a signature, or with initials put in by the editor. This was probably in the second half of 1929 or in the beginning of 1930. I no longer remember exactly what was in this material. Similar instructions or requests were made from time to time by W. W. Sher and by other members of the All-Union Bureau who were regular contributors to the 'Socialist Messenger,' to other members of the Bureau or to members of the organisation who were not members of the Bureau. These requests generally referred to special articles on questions with which those requested to write them were familiar. The whole work was done at the personal initiative of those who were connected with the editorial work of the 'Socialist Messenger.'" (Statement of the 13th February, 1930.)

Amongst the numbers of the "Socialist Messenger" placed before him, Yakubovitch recognised the following as the material prepared by him :

"1. In number 22 of the 'Socialist Messenger' of the 21st November, 1929, is an article entitled, 'Concerning Russia.' This article consists almost exclusively of the information I sent. The first paragraph was written by the editor, and one or two remarks inserted in the text ;

" 2. In number 11 of the 14th June, 1930, a quotation from material sent by me is published under the same title. The quotation begins, 'It must be pointed out that recently there have been signs in the villages of a certain change of temper.'

" 3. In number 9 of the 4th May, 1929, the second and third paragraphs of the article under the same title beginning, 'The bread situation is very difficult' and ending with the words, 'seized with a panic,' are also taken from my information" (Statement of the 15th December, 1930.)

During the course of the preliminary examination, charges were made against the following by the Public Prosecutor of the Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republics under Article 58, Paragraphs 4, 7 and 11 of the Penal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. :

1. Gromann, Vladimir Gustavovitch ;
2. Sher, Vassily Vladimirovitch ;
3. Sukhanov, Nikolai Nikolaiyevitch ;
4. Ginsburg, Abram Moisseyevitch ;
5. Yakubovitch, Mikhail Petrovitch ;
6. Sokolovsky, Aron Lvovitch ;
7. Salkind, Lazar Borissovitch ;
8. Volkov, Ivan Grigorevitch ;
9. Petunin, Kiril Gavrilovitch ;
10. Finn-Yenotayevsky, Alexander Yulevitch ;
11. Berlatsky, Boris Markovitch ;
12. Ikov, Vladimir Konstantinovitch ;
13. Teitelbaum, Moissei Issayevitch ; and
14. Rubin, Isaak Ilyitch.

The first ten of the above accused are charged as members of the counter-revolutionary organisation known as the All-Union Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Mensheviks). The accused Berlatsky, Ikov and Teitelbaum, whilst not being members of the said organisation, are charged as persons who took an active part in the work of this counter-revolutionary organisation, maintained direct connections with this organisation, and maintained connections with the foreign Central Committee of the Mensheviks. The accused Rubin is charged as a member of a counter-revolutionary organisation with having maintained direct connection with the All-Union Bureau and with having kept conspirative documents and assisted in maintaining the correspondence between the All-Union Bureau and the foreign Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks).

With regard to the other members of the counter-revolutionary Menshevist organisation who have been called to

account in this matter by the organs of the State Political Administration, the process against them will be carried out separately.

In the same way the proceedings against Braunstein have been conducted separately. Braunstein has already been tried and convicted by the Collegium of the State Political Administration.

The persons mentioned in the above list have all made detailed statements concerning the matters in question and they have all pleaded guilty to the charges made against them.

On the basis of this indictment, the following are therefore handed over to the Special Senate of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union for trial :

1. Gromann, Vladimir Gustavovitch, 56 years old, son of a private tutor, high school education, not previously convicted, economist by profession, former member of the Presidium of the State Planning Commission, member of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) since its foundation up to the year 1922, with interruptions, and again from 1926 to 1930 ;

2. Sher, Vassili Vladimirovitch, 47 years old, high school education, not previously convicted, former member of the Directorial Board of the State Bank of the Soviet Union, a member of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) from 1923 to 1930 ;

3. Sukhanov, Nikolai Nikolaiyevitch, 48 years old, son of a commercial employee, high school education, not previously convicted, publicist by profession, a member of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) from 1917 to 1920 (Martov group) and since 1929 a member of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) ;

4. Ginsburg, Abram Moisseyevitch, 52 years old, son of a merchant, high school education, not previously convicted, economist by profession, a member of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) from 1897 to 1921 and again from 1926 to 1930 ;

5. Yakubovitch, Mikhail Petrovitch, 39 years old, of aristocratic origin, not previously convicted, high school education, former Vice-Chairman of the Supply Department of the Trade Commissariat of the Soviet Union, a member of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) from 1908 to 1921 and again from 1927 to 1930 ;

6. Sokolovsky, Aron Lvovitch, 47 years old, of petty-bourgeois origin, not previously convicted, high school education, economist by profession, a member of the Central Committee of the United Jewish Socialist Party from 1906 to 1920, a member of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) from 1927 to 1930 ;

7. Salkind, Lazar Borissovitch, 45 years old, son of a commercial employee, not previously convicted, high school education, economist by profession, a member of the R.S.D.L.P.

(Bolsheviks) from 1903 to 1907, a member of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) from 1917 to 1921 and again from 1924 to 1930;

8. Volkov, Ivan Grigorevitch, 47 years old, son of a peasant, former worker, not previously convicted, worked as an economist in the Supreme Economic Council of the Soviet Union, a member of the Social-Revolutionary Party from 1902 to 1905, a member of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) from 1905 to 1920 and again from 1928 to 1930;

9. Petunin, Kiril Gavrilovitch, 46 years old, son of a village tailor, not previously convicted, accountant by profession, a member of the Directorial Board of Centrosoyus since 1922, a member of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) from 1905 to 1918 and again from 1925 to 1930;

10. Finn-Yenotayevsky, Alexander Yulevitch, 58 years old, son of a commercial employee, high school education, not previously convicted, Professor of Political Economy, a member of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) from 1903 to 1915, a member of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) from 1928 to 1930;

11. Berlatsky, Boris Markovitch, 41 years old, of petty-bourgeois extraction, not previously convicted, incomplete high school education, former member of the Directorial Board of the State Bank, a member of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) from 1904 to 1930 with interruptions;

12. Ikov, Vladimir Konstantinovitch, 49 years old, of aristocratic extraction, not previously convicted, incomplete high school education, publicist by profession, a member of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) since 1901;

13. Teitelbaum, Moissei Issayevitch, 54 years old, of petty-bourgeois extraction, not previously convicted, incomplete high school and legal training, former President of the Department of the Trade Commissariat of the Soviet Union for the Standardisation of Exports, a member of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) from 1900 to 1907, a member of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) from 1925 to 1930; and

14. Rubin, Isaak Ilyitch, 45 years old, Professor of Political Economy, a member of the Jewish Bund from 1904 to 1920, a member of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) from 1920 to 1923, and again from 1929 to 1930.

I. The first ten of the above accused are charged with having aimed at overthrowing the Soviet power in the Soviet Union in order to restore the capitalist system:

1. At the beginning of 1928 they formed a counter-revolutionary organisation led by the All-Union Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Mensheviks). They united under the leadership of this

Bureau the organisations which had sprung up at different times, and also the counter-revolutionary Menshevist groups which were formed by them in the various institutions and People's Commissariats of the Soviet Union. They continued to form such groups whose activity they directed towards the same aim, i.e., the overthrow of the Soviet power;

2. By sending individuals from amongst their ranks on journeys outside the Soviet Union, and by giving instructions to other persons who maintain relations with the Menshevist counter-revolutionary organisations abroad, and with the foreign delegation of the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, they agreed with the latter body concerning their activity, received from this body written instructions and financial support, and took part in joint sessions with members of this body who had journeyed illegally to the Soviet Union for counter-revolutionary purposes, namely, with Abramovitch, a member of the C.C. of the foreign Menshevist organisation, with Braunstein and with other persons;

3. With the same aim in view they came to agreements of a tactical and programmatic character with other counter-revolutionary organisations at work on the territory of the Soviet Union, namely, with the Central Committee of the Industrial Party, and with the Central Committee of the Party of the Working Peasants. They negotiated with these organisations concerning a division of the counter-revolutionary work, and received from these organisations and through them from the Trade and Industrial Committee in Paris, material and financial support;

4. Inside the organisation, they directed the work, both their own and that of the groups led by them in the institutions and Trade Commissariats of the Soviet Union, towards the carrying out of sabotage in the various branches of the Soviet economic system, and in particular in the State Planning Commission, in the planning work, in the Supreme Economic Council, in the administration of industry, in the Trade Commissariat and in the Centrosoyus, the Central Co-operative Association, in the purchase and distribution of commodities and in the State Bank with regard to the granting of credits, whereby they aimed at retarding the development of the economic life of the Soviet Union as far as possible, at producing a crisis, and at undermining the government plans for the development of the socialist construction of the Soviet economic system;

5. The accused carried on the whole of the counter-revolutionary activity mentioned above in order to create the most favourable conditions possible for an armed intervention against the Soviet Union which they expected to be carried out by the imperialist capitalist States, whereby they co-ordinated their activity with, on the one hand, the Industrial Party and

the Party of the Working Peasants, which on their part maintained direct connections with the Trade and Industrial Committee in Paris which worked for the preparation of the intervention and maintained direct connections with imperialist circles of the bourgeoisie of Western Europe, and on the other hand, with the foreign Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) which also worked for the preparation of the intervention together with leading circles of the Second (Labour and Socialist) International, which considered the intervention to be a necessity;

6. They distributed agitational matter of a counter-revolutionary character, both that which they received from abroad and that which they themselves prepared from their own resources.

The criminal actions set out above represent violations of Article 58, Paragraphs 4, 7 and 11, of the Penal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

II. Ikoy, Vladimir Konstantinovitch, is charged with having been an active member of the counter-revolutionary organisation of the Mensheviks, and with having maintained connections with the central counter-revolutionary Menshevik organisation in the Soviet Union, the All-Union Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) which consisted of the above mentioned persons. He agreed with these persons concerning his own counter-revolutionary activity and carried out such counter-revolutionary activity on the territory of the Soviet Union under the leadership of the foreign Menshevik organisation from 1928 up to the day of his arrest with the aim of overthrowing the Soviet power. He maintained a systematic correspondence with this organisation, received money from it and distributed the same. He directed the work of the local Menshevik organisations. After the arrest of the members of the All-Union Bureau he took steps to form a new central organisation of the counter-revolutionary Mensheviks, and directed his whole activity, in accordance with the instructions he received, towards preparing conditions calculated to facilitate an armed intervention.

The criminal actions set out above represent violations of Article 58, Paragraphs 4 and 11, of the Penal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

III .Teitelbaum, Moissei Issayevitch, is charged with having been a member of the counter-revolutionary organisation of the Mensheviks and with having misused his position as an employee of the foreign trade delegations of the Soviet Union in various towns in Western Europe to establish connections with the foreign central committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks). He received instructions from this latter body and forwarded such instructions to the counter-revolutionary Men-

shivist organisation in the Soviet Union, to the All-Union Bureau. After his return to the Soviet Union he maintained connections with the latter organisation, and continued his counter-revolutionary activity under the leadership of this organisation.

The criminal actions set out above represent violations of Article 58, Paragraphs 4 and 11, of the Penal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

IV. Berlatsky, Boris Markovitch, is charged with having joined, in agreement with V. V. Sher, the counter-revolutionary Menshevist organisation in the State Bank of the Soviet Union. Under the directions of the All-Union Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) he led the counter-revolutionary sabotage work in the State Bank. He formed sabotage groups in the organisations under his charge, and carried out sabotage work with the aim of creating difficulties in the reorganisation of the financial system of the Soviet Union. At the proposal of Sher he undertook to establish connections between the counter-revolutionary Menshevist organisation in the Soviet Union and the foreign Menshevist central organisation by personally meeting the leader of this latter organisation, Dan, and by forwarding the oral and written instructions of the latter to the All-Union Bureau in the Soviet Union. He carried out this work.

The criminal actions set out above represent violations of Article 58, Paragraphs 4, 7 and 11, of the Penal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

V. Rubin, Isaak Ilyitch, is charged with having been a member of the counter-revolutionary organisation of the Social Democratic Mensheviks and with having approved unreservedly of their tactical and programmatic principles. He took part in the counter-revolutionary activity of the All-Union Bureau of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., attended the sessions of this latter body and took part in the working out of the necessary instructions to the more distant Menshevist organisations. In particular, he agreed to carry on correspondence with the foreign central Menshevist organisation. Further, he took charge of and hid documents from this foreign central Menshevist organisation.


The criminal actions set out above represent violations of Article 58, Paragraphs 4, 10 and 11, of the Penal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

The above Indictment was confirmed in agreement with the Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union by

KRYLENKO,

Public Prosecutor of the R.S.F.S.R.

Moscow, 23rd February, 1931.



The Truth About Russia

**REPORT TO THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS OF
THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY**

J. STALIN

BUILDING COLLECTIVE FARMS **J. STALIN**

LIFE OF STALIN - **BY HIS COMRADES**

Each, 1/6 paper; 2/6 cloth

IN SOVIET RUSSIA:

AUTUMN. 1930 - **MAURICE DOBB**

Illustrated. Sixpence

**THE FIVE YEAR PLAN OF THE SOVIET
UNION** - - **G. T. GRINKO**

Five Shillings

**THE FIVE YEAR PLAN AND THE
CULTURAL REVOLUTION**

Twopence

THE WRECKERS EXPOSED - **HOLMES**

Twopence

MODERN FARMING—SOVIET STYLE **STRONG**

Threepence

TEN DAYS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD **REED**

Two Shillings

RUSSIA TO-DAY (MONTHLY)

Twopence

**THE DEVELOPING CRISIS OF WORLD
CAPITALISM** - - **MOLOTOV**

Sixpence

IMMEDIATE TASKS - **PIATNITSKY**

WORKING WOMEN—WAR IS COMING

One Penny

MODERN BOOKS, LTD.,

16, King Street, London W.C.2., England