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(The role of the University in a search for values)

Editorial

Upon receipt of the June 1966 *EXtra,* one minister and UH alumnus preached a provocative Sunday sermon denouncing liberalized sex education on our campuses. A priest by contrast requested 70 additional copies to use as source material for religious seminars in his parish. While such a wide variety of comments and letters were coming in, *EXtra's* editor became more and more absorbed in the question of the role of the University in supporting or denouncing the values prevalent in the culture and society in which it exists. This issue is the result.

It is axiomatic that academic freedom is the professor's right. It is equally understandable that parents and donors demand that certain social values be upheld and advocated. An increasing number of students seem determined to investigate and often renounce the traditional values of our "established" institutions, from family to foreign policy. What should the University do, if anything, about passing on to its students values traditionally held most dear by our society?

To answer this question, *EXtra's* editor talked with a variety of faculty, students, administrators, and alumni. In all these areas, a lively interest was evident. It soon became apparent this was one of the hottest questions going at UH. Provoked in part by a student personnel staff that insists that its primary function is to cause students to raise questions, in part by the new breed of intelligentsia among UH students and faculty, and in part by the raging dialogue about moral issues on U. S. campuses across the country, there is widespread discussion of values and of the University's responsibility to define its own values, support societal values, or attempt an analytical objectivity.

There is difficulty inherent in each of these alternatives. How is the University to select appropriate values to inculcate? Who is to be the final authority? How shall it suppress contrary values? On the other hand, how can faculty possibly be totally objective? When faculty attempt to force a valueless objectivity upon their subject matter, won't the student be deceived into believing that faculty have no values of their own? Isn't it important to have faculty be examples of the educated man —one who continues to investigate and to weigh each new fact and development in the light of past experience, but who has an integrated personality based in part upon a viable set of values?

Beginning with Berkeley, this traditional question has been brought into sharp focus as one of the most pressing problems of our age. Finding a conclusive and practical answer is probably not possible, and perhaps may not even be desirable. As one UH faculty member insists in this issue, consensus is always structured around compromise—a compromise which fades out sharp distinctions and blurs the vivid and colorful to a dull and dishonest grey.

Every individual on the University campus has his own perspective, his own distortion, his own piece of truth. The student is fortunate indeed to be exposed to as many opinions and values as possible in four years. In the words of the June *EXtra,* the University must continue to be "a crucible in which all varieties of truth may be tested." If the University could and did decide that it would advocate certain values and disparage certain others, and if the University could and did enforce this decision by restricting lecturers and monitoring faculty, something of the nature of freedom as our society has defined it would be threatened. Upon the student falls the crucial task of studying this array of opinion and choosing his own values. That is, after all, what it means to be a free man. And surely that freedom is what our society values most.

Glenda Fuller

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The University of Houston Alumni Magazine

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Chaos, cooperation, or consensus?

Five UH faculty members and three administrators engage in a recorded no-holds-barred debate about University policy and procedure and their effect on student values.

PANEL PARTICIPANTS: **Rev. Edwin F. Bennett,** Coordinator of Religious and Leadership Activities; **Dr. Archibald Henderson,** Professor of English; **Dr. Wallace I. Honeywell,** Assistant Professor of Chemical Engineering; **Gerald T. Kowitz,** Director of the Bureau of Educational Research; **Dr. John F. MacNaughton,** Professor of Psychology; **Dr. Joseph L. Nogee,** Chairman of the Department of Political Science; **Dr. Joseph P. Schnitzen,** Director of Counseling and Testing; **Sol Tannenbaum,** Instructor of Sociology and Anthropology; **Dr. William A. Yardley,** Dean of Students.

Kowitz: We talk about the professor who is effective, who reaches the students, who rattles their values, who knocks the underpinnings out. I have a feeling that most of my students are bored silly most of the time. And I think for one reason. Most of them are school administrators. They want to learn the most efficient way to train custodians to sweep the floor, and I have never learned that myself. I am interested in theory, and they couldn't care less about theory. We don't even come close to communicating.

Schnitzen: And when you tell them that good theory is the best thing they could have?

Kowitz: Their ears close.

Bennett: Where did they get their education?

Kowitz: They didn't. That's the trouble. They got a degree.

MacNaughton: This is characteristic of the culture in which the university exists. Our culture says you are not prepared for a technical or professional job unless you have a "degree." It doesn't matter what the contents of the degree are, really, but you must have a degree. Education amounts to a degree. So a kid comes to school, and what does he want? An education? No, if by that you mean learning how to think and having the fun of seeing new horizons. He wants this piece of paper which makes him eligible for some particular vocational niche.

Kowitz: Executives or industrial managers often come to campus and make speeches full of pious statements. "Get an education," they say. "Give us people that think." "Give me a man that reads." This sounds great. But when the hiring agent comes to campus he wants to know if the student can step into the accounting department tomorrow and account. Can he step into the personnel department and personnel? If the student says, "No, I have a broad liberal education," they say, "That's nice. Next."

Nogee: We operate in a situation in which we profess certain values as a kind of ritualistic expression, but there are hidden values built into this institution that are very much different from those we profess that are affecting the student and us all along the way. There are many such things. Summer terms, grades, non-major courses, degree plans, fraternities, athletic events . . .

Honeywell: By setting up admissions standards the University places value in certain places.

MacNaughton: We feel we are a better University because we have higher entrance requirements on the SAT.

Schnitzen: I convince myself of my academic standards and intellectual rigor if a large proportion of my students fail my course.

Schnitzen: Or, "If you are absent from my class three times it costs you one letter grade."

Tannenbaum: I have felt for a long time that I and people like me are very unrealistic. When we even talk about faculty we are talking about a myth. The teaching faculty is not a large part of the faculty; at Berkeley there are about 80 sociologists but only about 15 are teaching. We have an image of a college campus which doesn't exist. Students, therefore, are sometimes more right in their opposition to the strictures of the classroom situation than we are in imposing them.

Bennett: What are some of the strictures that they object to?

Tannenbaum: Essay exams. Required courses.

MacNaughton: The idea of subject matter requiring 48 clock hours.

Schnitzen: How about required attendance?

Nogee: There are certain things that every student has to do in order to graduate. He has to take a certain core curriculum. He has to fulfill a certain minimum of what we call intellectual activities. I would like to see a reinforcement of the values that are associated with that common activity.

Tannenbaum: I think the value that dominates that activity is something called compromise among conflicting interest groups. Take this five-week summer course. What kind of concessions do we make there? If you took a list of all the statements of a guy that teaches in this five weeks—"Generally I

believe . . . but here I do something else." You can't say that you're carrying out something called education in five weeks. Take another example, English. Many of the kids we are failing in social and political science we are failing because of English. They can't write. They can't articulate. How many kids have you had come up and say, "I'm really a very good student, but I can't write. That's the one thing that I haven't been able to learn." You wonder what he's talking about.

Kowitz: We require English because students should be able to communicate in their language. But if we look rather hard we realize that they have had at least ten years of English. We give them another two or three, and they still can't communicate. What's wrong? If the job can't be done let's quit wasting their time and ours.

Nogee: That reminds me of another aspect that interests me. Students go through this institution without even becoming familiar with the various cultural possibilities that they might enjoy. Literature,

"Nobody has actually conceptualized the kind of university structures we are going to have to have to educate all these people."

for example, is a tremendous source of pleasure and understanding and enjoyment, quite aside from requirements or exams. I don't listen to music to study it for any reason but because it is a source of personal enrichment. I sometimes have the feeling that in this respect we neglect the students badly.

Tannenbaum: This is because of the textbook, too. With the textbook you don't have to read. There's even a digest of the textbook called a study guide. That takes care of that. They may have someone's notes anyway. Let's face it. I get up in the classroom and I want to use references. I don't want to use something I don't expect them to know. I expect them to know Faulkner or Sinclair Lewis. I try it. Forget it. Nothing. No reaction.

Honeywell: Engineering and science students often don't see the purpose of taking these non-vocation courses. We've included these courses in the curriculum, however, because of the beneficial effect in imparting values that we hold and which we hope that society holds. The curriculum in science and engineering more and more tries to prepare the student for adaptability. But I don't know how to convince engineers and scientists of the value of liberal arts courses without forcing them to take them. And when they take them I don't have any control over what they learn.

Nogee: But we should at least make the option available for those who have the interest.

Kowitz: I want to talk about the difference between creating options and establishing requirements. Part of the reason that we have students collecting old examinations and lecture notes is that we have said, "You Must," not "You May." We are always doing that. We started off saying that an education must be made available to everybody. That was so good we passed compulsory education laws. This puts a different frosting on the cake. We say college should provide an opportunity to explore many things. Then we say, "You must explore these things to get a degree."

Nogee: I don't agree with that at all. What is the good of having electives instead of required courses

if this merely becomes an avenue for taking mickey-mouse courses?

Bennett: But why do we have mickey-mouse courses at all?

Nogee: That is part of the whole problem. But I definitely favor a high degree of required courses.

Kowitz: I have no objection to required courses. What I am objecting to is talking about making these things available and then saying that they must take them.

Tannenbaum: There is a kind of rigid authoritarianism. I play the same game. I get real angry when a student opts for *Personality and Poise* as an elective. It's not just the formally structured goof-off courses. We are all aware of the informally structured ones as well. *Marriage and Family* taught to 1100 students in an auditorium. And that is a college education? When I see them opting for these courses, my own F scale goes up.

Kowitz: I have a girl I hired for the summer whose comment is, "Why do we have to take all this garbage when we know what we want to study?" This is a common complaint. They know what they want to do, and they say, "Why do I have to do all these other things?" Or they don't know what they want to do, and they resent being told they have to put in so many hours of math, so many hours of English, so many hours of history. What would happen if we went to a European style system where a professor had two series of lectures that he designed and delivered? If it were an open-door thing? The students wouldn't have to be registered or have IBM cards to get in. Perhaps they wouldn't have to take an examination to get out. I'm thinking of the impact it would have on the faculty. Suppose each faculty member had to prepare these lectures instead of teaching Whatever-It-Is 320. How many students would show up to hear some of the teachers who are currently on the teaching faculty? What impact would it have on the teaching faculty if the students weren't required to show up?

MacNaughton: The question you are raising is the degree to which students should influence the nature of the curriculum.

Kowitz: Or the faculty for that matter. In the College of Education if a person wants to be certified as a principal he has to have so many credits in certain things. Austin says so. Thereby we let Austin write our curriculum and dictate to our students what they will take.

MacNaughton: There are a lot of things about which we don't ask questions at all. We impose them upon students because we are imposed upon. Take, for example, the idea that a course should consist of 40 hours of classwork. We might raise a question about this, but we can't do anything about it because

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the Southern Association of Colleges and Universities will scream. Here the University's policy is influenced by the Southern Association, which probably does what it does because of larger groups to which it belongs. There are a number of things about the educational process about which we don't ask questions. We just accept them blandly and foist them upon the student.

Honeywell: This is exactly the question a student asked the other day. He said, "I just don't give a rot for this business of saying 8 hours of this plus 14 of this plus 2 of this will give me an education." I hear students say that everywhere.

Tannenbaum: I raised the question in last spring's core curriculum arguments of making language courses which are required for a degree non-credit courses, to let students who aren't prepared by their high schools in languages prepare themselves. The answer is that the state doesn't permit it. Paying taxpayers money for non-credit courses. Here then is a decision faculty don't make, but it governs the whole core curriculum.

Nogee: Part of the problem is that society—our taxpayers—would actually be opposed to many of the faculty's "academic" values. They want training for utility. They want training for social performance.

Bennett: And that's where our budget comes from.

Nogee: So we try to satisfy them and at the same time meet our own needs. Getting teaching loads reduced to nine hours . . .

Tannenbaum: The continuous process of swapping out. We are meeting their values and our own values and finding a point somewhere between to both our advantages. We teach more students for less hours.

So we both win. It is a whole chain of defaults that we can't possibly backtrack on. It is the notion of mass education and mass procedures which we can't go back on now. Austin is following the general trend in which a college education has become a right. But nobody has actually conceptualized as yet the kind of universities or university structures that we must have to educate all these people.

Kowitz: Consider this. A student comes in who wants to end up with an elementary education major. She's suddenly made aware of all the current popular evils of middle-class culture. Now at this point in her career she is introduced to broad intellectual sweep, is told to hold nothing sacred and to ask questions. Then she hits student teaching. The first thing she is told? Heels and hose, a modest dress, deportment. She is now the primary instrument for conveying this middle-class culture. And if she wants to get a job, she had better hew to the line. She will not question authority because she is a part of the organization. I would like to suggest that this is not only true in education. It is true in every discipline that has heavy vocational emphasis. One of the things I plead guilty to is trying to prepare these people to fit into the establishment and at the same time trying to get them to think about what they are doing. I say on the one hand, "Fit in," and on the other, "Don't you dare fit in."

Tannenbaum: Well, our job is not to say that the world is not the way it is. Our job is to allow them to recognize the options they have and then they make their own commitment. Aren't we fooling ourselves when we say that we can inculcate values? Don't most studies show that in large state universities teachers don't have much impact anyway? Isn't

it only in the small campuses where change is induced not by the teacher but by the total culture? The fact of the matter is that in a large university like Houston there really isn't much impact.

Henderson: I like to give students my own orientation. And it isn't a neutral orientation either. I think there is a value in presenting them with your own outlook.

Bennett: Well, we are standing for some values, aren't we, if only to reinforce what society will expect of these students when they get out?

Kowitz: You are suggesting that there is an eventual ultimate toward which all our disciplines would converge? If you try to teach values from many directions without an ultimate you are simply begging for chaos.

Bennett: Yes, there is an assumption on my part that there is a wholeness to the thing somewhere. But I guess it's inevitable that there's chaos when there are so many individuals. All I'm saying is that whatever values are determinative should be lifted up and looked at, and if they are not the values we feel are important in higher education we had better do something about it.

Nogee: You are grasping for a kind of general consensus on a hierarchy of values here at the University, a kind of agreement on the predominance of academic values. And I think the difficulty here

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
at the University of Houston is that this agreement may not be forthcoming. The problem for us would be to define this hierarchy or see if we really do have a university here or whether we have a conglomeration of many things.

Tannenbaum: You say that there are many different kinds of structures within the whole University —many universities. And you imply that we ought to find a kind of consensus. My feeling, from some knowledge of conflict among groups, is that consensus is always imposed. Perhaps the greatest value is chaos. As long as we are in a phase in which we don't know where we are going, I think that structured consensus would be bad. As long as there really is doubt about what we are supposed to be doing— and I think that is a fair description of this university. We are only beginning. At this stage, I feel that it is probably best to be as we are so that we can at least convey the kinds of values we feel are important without any strictures.

Schnitzen: Won't you produce more change from turmoil and conflict than you will by consensus?

Bennett: And will the students end up as completely integrated persons?

Tannenbaum: What do you mean?

Bennett: In the college catalogue it lists five objectives, one of which contains the phrase, "to influence the student so that he will become a completely integrated person." What does that mean? Do we have any responsibility as faculty and administration to define what is meant by "completely integrated person"? How do we influence an engineer or political scientist or education major so that he obtains an integrated personality?

Nogee: That is a term that has very little operational meaning.

Bennett: Then why is it in the catalogue if it is meaningless?

Kowitz: That is the way catalogues are made up. You have to have a statement of objectives.

Bennett: But why have something meaningless? What does this say to a student?

Kowitz: Parents read it and they say, "That's what I want for my child." They don't think in terms of a "completely integrated educated person" being a ginger-bread man stamped out cookie-cutter style.

Bennett: It's that *completely* integrated that bothers me. Not just well integrated. And this is a document that theoretically speaks for the entire University.

Tannenbaum: Well, I'd like to know who wrote it. This is one of the things that gets me. I feel that the consensus that they come up with is a structured consensus. It is a way of saying nice things that have very little meaning. It is also a way of committing all of us to many things, some of which we like and some we don't like. Whenever you have consensus you are going to have to accept things.

Yardley: One thing I do not believe is that we unilaterally establish the University position on anything. I think that what we do should represent the institution's values. We should have our own values but they should not conflict. The value we in student personnel subscribe to is being question-raisers for college students. The problem comes when we have to take a stand with a given student about what he is engaged in. At that point we are no longer question-raisers; we are imposing University policy. So we are in a bit of a dilemma. I value being a question-raiser rather than a finger-shaker, but at times I have to do the latter.

Tannenbaum: I'll go on fighting. I know I'm losing, but as long as I can prevent this structured consensus then I can hope to get realignments eventually.

Nogee: And you are allowed to do that here. I will say this for the University of Houston. I think it is a fine place to teach.

Bennett: Because there's elbowroom.

Nogee: At better schools this isn't always true. At schools where the academic values that we are inclined to identify with are more universally accepted among faculty, administration, and students, there are pressures on how and what to teach which don't exist here.

Tannenbaum: There is a kind of hope with every new school that all the tragedies of the older universities are not to be repeated. One of the tragedies, for example, is an extremely rigid curriculum. Many departments become dominated by old men who create situations where the young men move out every two or three years leaving only the old men to determine policy. Many departments have executive committees which are made up only of the old men. Things like this. When you have this it is difficult even to teach what you want to teach. It is difficult to open up programs because you are stepping on someone's toes. Many times the university is the last place on earth for real freedom. And a lot of people see that in Houston we have the freedom to explore almost any avenue we want. We are probably more democratic than is good for us to be. We are in a real tortuous kind of decision about where we are going, and it is fascinating. This is the charm of Houston.

Bennett: I like this. I would hope that there would never come a time that there would be a structured consensus, if by that you mean somebody imposing something that is not constantly open to change and variation.

Kowitz: I'm reminded of a school board meeting I attended recently in a small town some distance from here. They were talking about the program for the coming year. They all agreed that they ought to start teaching critical thinking. Then they also decided that in view of the world situation they should not introduce controversial material. How are you going to teach critical thinking without introducing controversial material?

MacNaughton: Let me raise the question of grading here insofar as it affects values. There is the possibility that grades are a necessary evil. One can point to lots of reasons why there have to be grades. A transcript is a desirable thing. You need some kind of an evaluation of performace on the basis of which you can predict future performance in graduate school or occupation. But there are a lot of unfortunate consequences. The idea is widespread that students work for grades instead of learning. A student of mine recently wrote on a final exam, "Gee, I need a B in this course very badly to stay in school." This seems to me to be a very unfortunate attitude to develop in students. Because grades tell him whether or not he is allowed to continue as a student, he engages in a fawning process in order to get a better grade.

Honeywell: It is just a matter of tradition that we even have grades.

MacNaughton: It would be interesting to speculate about the possibility of doing away with grades altogether.

Honeywell: Grades seem to be necessary to get most students to work. I don't like that. And students seem to work harder and have a more favorable response to teachers who grade harder.

MacNaughton: This may reflect our lack of skill in involving students on the basis of more important or sounder rewards. We have gotten into this rut of mid-semester grades; therefore, we must have a mid-

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semester exam. Final grade—final exam. It's a Frankenstein, a monster of our own making, and we can't control it.

Schnitzen: I am reminded of a statement by Dave Gardner that if we didn't have any laws we wouldn't have any criminals.

Tannenbaum: We seem to assume in our exams that persons are all capable of playing the same role equally. I have been bothered by that.

Kowitz: And it's partly these tests and required grades that cause cheating.

Nogee: But this is where I think there has to be agreement within the University to suppress this sort of thing. I don't think we can just accept it. We've got to fight it all the time.

Bennett: But how do you fight it? By harder and harder penalties for cheating or by worrying about the physicial structures?

Nogee: There isn't just one answer to it. The point is, the moment this becomes acceptable, I think we've lost something.

Tannenbaum: Are you going to give essay exams to 124 students?

Kowitz: And have them graded by next Friday?

Nogee: I would like to answer your question about what we do about all this. Two things. Recognize it and not be cynical.

Bennett: The second one is hardest.

Nogee: I think it is important to recognize the im-

perfections of our system but not to become overcome by them and be so cynical that we are paralyzed and do nothing.

Tannenbaum: But you can't help being cynical. Think of all the expressions you hear among faculty about student behavior on exams. All of the ways you laugh off what is really a tragedy. Cynicism is a mechanism by which you handle a whole variety of experience which you can't control.

Bennett: Now that's what bothers me more than anything else. The thought that we can't control them. It's tragic. I'm not saying you're wrong. I tend to think you're right. But is it true that there is nothing we can do about it? Does it mean that we cannot be effective in correcting the things such as we have identified? Are we saying that these things are important but not so important that anybody wants to get his head lopped off for them?

Nogee: There's been some progress. We've eliminated extension courses, the downtown school, television courses.

Tannenbaum: The state did that.

Nogee: There's been progress. We have really agreed that there is a pluralism of values at work in our University. And indeed so much so that there may be some question whether there is any true integration as a university.

Bennett: And we aren't saying that this is bad?

Tannenbaum: We haven't resolved that one. ◭

For the sake of society

By John B. Neibel. The dean of the College of Law discusses social implications of modern specialized education.

A recent news announcement told of plans for a new Canadian medical school costing $30 million and embodying a novel concept in medical education. There the young doctor will be taught not only the technical skills heretofore associated with the practice of medicine, but also an appreciation and some knowledge of the skills of others who treat human illness, mental and physical. He will be placed in a team of professionals, including social workers, ministers, nurses, dentists, and pharmacists. The attempt is to give him an appreciation of the relationship that his particular skill bears towards the skills of many other disciplines involved in treating the whole human being. It should also enable him to evaluate his own skills and results in terms of the outlook and values of others.

It seems to me that this philosophy of medical education holds the germ of an idea of significance applicable to all of higher education. It represents a reaction to a development in our colleges and universities whereby we have produced areas of disciplinary knowledge, arbitrarily bounded by artificial subject matter labels, such as *internal medicine* or *corporate tax law*. These boundaries have enabled us to educate in a particular subject in great depth. But for this depth our students have usually forfeited perspective and appreciation for other disciplines.

In a word, we are growing accustomed to the unpleasant phenomenon of specialists, pursuing their own particular brand of knowledge, but unable to see where the development in their discipline is leading society as a whole and unable to perceive effects of their work in any terms except those known to that particular specialty.

There is, therefore, a need for thinking members of specialized groups to engage in analysis of their endeavors in societal terms, not just professional terms. The University, as the modern home of such specialized training, has a challenge to meet the urgent need for a societal viewpoint. After all, above and beyond the sets of values, rules, and skills inherent within a specialty lie the broader societal values, morals, ethics, and esthetics having importance and relevance to every human activity.

Unfortunate as it is, we realize that in the context of the usual course offerings of the modern university it is impossible or at least very difficult to give students the generalized knowledge and broadened viewpoint that characterize the liberally educated person.

Some educators are concerned that universities have so compartmentalized the spectrum of human knowledge and accomplishment in hundreds of academic departments, divided among a dozen colleges, that any given student in his four-year program can sample only a relatively small and fragmented part of the spectrum. The student even in the liberal arts college of any major university is faced with the choice of dozens of majors and minors, from which he can take only one major and perhaps two minors. Survey courses have been instituted in the first two years designed to give broad background knowledge, but, in fact, the danger persists that each student in any given subject area will be taught by a specialist who by reasons of his own limited set of values dictated by the precepts of his specialty is unable or unwilling to teach his subject except in terms relevant to his own field.

Unfortunately, even subject areas once the domain of the generalist have become the province of the specialist. Even in the philosophy department, for example, the vice of specialization has crept in. Those who worry with the meaning and the vagaries of verbal formulations can no longer talk with those concerned with ethics, for the latter are concerned with what the "good" is while the former are concerned with what the word "good" means.

A further phenomenon must be noted. As these persons focus on their specialty, they tend to study other writers and thinkers in their own field. Soon the outsider encounters the absolutely bewildering problem of reading Russell's interpretation of Des Cartes' "Principle of Doubt" as the reaction to Kant's categorical imperative which resulted from his consideration of etc., etc., etc.

This phenomenon is not isolated. It pervades every discipline, and for those who specialize it seems impossible to avoid and perhaps even desirable. But the verbal barrier it creates guarantees that without knowledgeable generalists able to interpret the esoteric language of the specialist, no person outside the discipline can understand it.

And there is a more disturbing aspect to the characteristic inward turning of the specialist. As he becomes more and more conversant with the concepts, vocabulary, and syntax of his specialty, the less likely he becomes concerned with the effect or results that these formulations have on persons outside his discipline.

Within each particular specialty there exists to a more or less greater degree a hierarchy of rules governing that discipline. Much of the professional's time is spent in the mastery of these rules. Some of the rules are very abstract and generalized, some very practical and technical. So it is that some of the specialists are generalists or abstract thinkers within the discipline, while many others are technicians. It has been thought enough to assure that a student have some knowledge of these various levels of learning in his field and a thorough knowledge of at least one level so as to earn a living. The law teacher and judge, for example, tend to work in the fairly abstract aspects of law, while the practicing lawyer may spend his life at the skill level. There are a few generalists who practice and who move with expertise from abstractions to techniques within their specialty with ease. But the point is that they move vertically within the confines of their specialty and within that vertical order the issue is only one of internal consistency of the specialized rules and techniques without any consideration of the relevance of the results produced to societal interests as such.

Thus each subject area convolutes inward, regressing deeper and deeper into refinements of disciplinary skill and sophistication and quite unconsciously burying the individual in a rather narrow and deep hole of specialized concern. Gradually this individual sinks out of the sight and hearing of all, save those gathered with him in the confining walls of limited but intense particularized knowledge. Perhaps a generation later the mature doctor, or physicist, or lawyer may emerge a bit shaken, to realize that he owes some explanation to the rest of society for the direction taken by his profession, and in particular for his responsibility for the results then manifesting themselves in that society as a result of his professional

> *"We are growing accustomed to the unpleasant phenomenon of specialists, pursuing their own particular brand of knowledge, but unable to see where the development in their discipline is leading society as a whole."*

gathered with him in the confining walls of limited but intense particularized knowledge. Perhaps a generation later the mature doctor, or physicist, or lawyer may emerge a bit shaken, to realize that he owes some explanation to the rest of society for the direction taken by his profession, and in particular for his responsibility for the results then manifesting themselves in that society as a result of his professional activity, but of which he had theretofore been unaware and unconcerned. Each application of specialized knowledge produces results that to a smaller or greater degree affect the whole of society, and this should be taken into account in our universities.

For some specialties it is assumed by everyone, or almost everyone, that the effects produced are to be accepted without question. I think of medicine, for example. There specialized knowledge is assumed to be directed at the preservation of life without much question as to whose life and for what purpose. Yet as that profession has succeeded in their goal in particular cases one can ask, as some are now doing, whether or not the preservation of life is always "good." The victim dying of some incurable disease, in a coma for six months, hanging on to life by reason of hollow needles pumping and feeding nutrients and liquids into the faltering human machine, aided by artificial lungs and hearts, sustained by massive infusions of money from relatives or insurance companies, presents a picture that some might say is grotesque and abysmally sad. Admittedly it is due only recently to the heroic life-sustaining techniques that these kinds of moral questions have had much significance for medicine. Yet we will have more of them in the future.

The lawyer and the minister and others have long held this responsibility of making decisions and recommending concrete alternatives that will affect the lives and fortunes of other people. And they make decisions many times without the benefit of clearcut guidelines. It would be normal for the attending physician to ask his lawyer or minister about the legality or morality of withdrawing the life sustaining paraphernalia. Or the family might ask the same question. Teachers and philosophers can discuss these matters, but they do not run the risk that their speculations will be put into immediate practice, producing immediate effects that are irrevocable.

It is this quality of applied professionalism that gives us in legal education the challenge and at the same time the opportunity to broaden the concern of the student beyond the confining limits of his body of specialized knowledge. To a greater extent than has heretofore been done, I suggest that the law school examine the societal effects that are achieved as a result of the application of legal skills. We have, it seems to me, the opportunity to do this in a manner that is broader perhaps than that which is available to most other disciplines. Yet, I would suggest that a similar technique could be adopted there also.

The role of a lawyer as a specialist is one that has many facets and many contacts with society. As a community decision-maker he relates with many persons and institutions. He operates basically in two ways. One is judicial, that is, in resolving conflicts that have arisen from human activities. The other is legislative, meaning that he acts prospectively setting guidelines for future acts by others. Within the broad area of his judicial function the lawyer settles conflicts by counsel to his clients, by negotiation of disputes that have reached a very serious stage, and by resorting to the ultimate judicial solution, a law suit. But it is as a legislator that the lawyer's acts have the greatest impact upon society. Whether he is giving advice and making plans for a private or cor-

porate client, or guiding a civic club, or serving as a county judge, or as a city councilman, or as a member of the governing board of his church, or serving in an administrative post in government, or advising presidents, he is applying legal skill and precepts to varied problems that produce solutions and decisions whose effects on society are pronounced and meaningful. Even within the narrowest and most clearly specialized areas of his work, as a private lawyer aiding a client, the attorney must make decisions that produce profound effect on our society.

As the legal abstractions, rules, and skills are taught and learned, I suggest that it is imperative that the law schools also take into consideration the societal effect produced by the application of those skills. This gives us the opportunity to raise meaningful questions of morality, ethics, and esthetics as we consider the effects of the skillful application of legal norms to a particular human problem.

For the most part, it seems to me, law and medicine, engineering, and the graduate schools are and have been primarily concerned with the practical and technical subject matter of their disciplines rather than generalizations or values. I know that in most law schools much of the attention of the school is focused upon the rules of the profession.

Take, for example, the traditional law school approach to teaching the law of real property. This approach treats law as a set of rules and maxims, which must be systematized and learned, analyzed, and applied. We try very carefully to expose our students to all the rules. We focus upon and analyze the doctrine of title and possession. We teach rules that supposedly govern a court in the resolution of a conflict between two claimants to a piece of ground. Law students and lawyers must know these rules, their content, and their application. Some of these are fairly abstract, but the actual transfer of land ownership is done relatively easily.

I am sure that the really important questions facing urban America in the area of land law are questions of urban renewal, land use planning, and control. Here societal values are obviously directly involved. Our property law up to now has been the outgrowth of the natural law philosophy of John Locke who justified the theory of land ownership on the basis that such property belongs to the man who by his labor improves it so that it becomes an extension of his personality and imbued with the natural virtues of the man himself. Today in our cities we need to be able to control the use of land, to beautify the city, to eliminate billboards, to destroy fire traps, to kill rats, and to plan on a large scale worthwhile, livable cities. This involves the values and skills not only of lawyers but also of architects, sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, and others

in what should be an integrated approach to a complex human condition.

What I am suggesting is that while it is imperative that we teach law students the skills of the title lawyer and that the legal norms governing that area be intensely analyzed, it is equally imperative that we look outside the specialty to the societal effects resulting from the application of the skills of that specialist in given situations. Since the lawyer and law student are community decision-makers, they are forced to realize that as they solve problems by the application of their legal skill, they produce results that affect society generally.

For example, the attorney who advised Mrs. Brown to sue the Topeka School Board in the early 1950's may have realized that his advice would ultimately shape the pattern of public education for an entire nation. He may not have. In any case he should have. The judges who decided the case certainly did. Surely they must have and should have considered that case not just in terms of the legal norms and values, but also in broader, societal terms, and justified their decision on the broader ground of sociology and data that indicated that segregation in public education was harmful to a minority group of Americans and hence should be declared illegal.

Law teachers can, if they will, integrate their specialty with the larger area of morals, economics, sociology, and philosophy. They should ask of their students each time they apply legal rules to reach a result, "But is it a good result?" And then demand justification not only in terms of the legal norms but also in terms of value judgments from without the confines of the body of legal knowledge. In fact, I think this is exactly what the great law teachers, lawyers, and judges do each time they are faced with applications of the legal skills to serious human problems. It may be that this constant examination of the results obtained from each application in the light of larger value judgments is necessary to elevate a technical edification to the level of the true liberal education which we desire.

Further, I would suggest that this technique can be and should be adopted by teachers in other specialized areas of the University. The specialist should trace the results produced by the application of his skill to concrete problems and then weigh those results in the light of larger social value judgments and attempt thereby to determine whether the results of his specialized work are worthwhile and if so why and to what extent. This approach could restore general perspective to the intense specialized training now being offered in most disciplines within the University and make of each of them a contributing force to the general mission of the University to contribute to man's search for the good. △

A search for universal values

By Ted R. Brannen. The dean of the College of Business Administration pleads for universal application of a scientific method in distinguishing good from evil, right from wrong, just from brutal.

What is the proper relationship between profits and consumer safety that should be established by the manager of a tobacco, automobile, or pharmaceutical firm?

How do the managers of business enterprise decide that voluntary corporate action is called for in response to public concern over such problems as water and air pollution?

Where does truthful advertising stop and misleading advertising begin?

When should management decide to alter the distribution of revenue among reinvested earnings, dividends, consumer savings, or employee incomes?

Managers are largely responsible for the efficiency of society's productive process, and they usually control the profits that contribute to its enlargement. But managers seldom face decisions that are simple questions of efficiency and profits; most situations have dimensions that involve many other values. Corporate managers must be prepared to make choices that often determine the direction of society itself.

Because the values underlying managerial decisions are so complex and so extremely important to the advancement of civilization, the University of Houston College of Business Administration has integrated value theory into both its undergraduate and graduate curricula.

The purpose of including value theory in the study of business administration is to help the student to identify and to justify the decision criteria he characteristically applies. Few individuals analyze their own values or recognize them for what they are—choices from among various alternatives; the individual merely learns to accept the values of those persons with whom he lives and works. If, however,

a student can participate in a critical analysis of the value systems underlying the decision-making process of business managers, he inevitably will consider the organization of his own values. From this awareness may come a refinement and improvement of his own value structure, and hence of his potential as a manager. For this reason, value theory is an important new addition to the curricula. The following brief discussion of one aspect of value theory indicates the scope of the challenge now posed for business students.

What are Values?

Values are concepts of the desirable. They influence the individual each time he selects from among alternative goals and responses. Judgments of value distinguish right from wrong, desirable from undesirable, just from unjust, and good from bad.

Value differences can be seen when patterns of behavior are contrasted. The artist and the meteorologist see different things in a colorful sunset. The loyal supporters of two combatants react quite differently to the decision of a referee to penalize the tactics of one of the participants. Managers, and more particularly the imitators of managers, may place property rights above human rights, while other groups in society may reverse the order of these important values. An individual's value judgments may not always appear consistent because every individual employs different sets of value premises at different times. These frames of reference may be designated the individual, the social system, and the universal.

The individual frame of reference is that in which the individual sees himself as the center of the uni-

verse and his goal is to satisfy his own needs. The social system frame of reference is one in which the individual sees himself as a member, or would-be member, of some group, and his goal is to satisfy the needs of the group. The universal frame of reference is objective reality, reality as it would appear to one not committed to preconceptions that prejudice his evaluation of the situation.

Few persons differentiate between individual values, the values of the social system, or universal values. This is unfortunate because problem definitions and solutions differ depending on one's frame of reference.

Lack of distinction between the three frames of reference is unfortunate, too, because conflicts within and between them result in conflicts between individuals, between social systems, and between individuals and social systems.

Among the conflicts caused by value differences are some of the most perplexing problems facing civilization; yet they must be solved to permit continued advancement in man's way of life. The front pages of our newspapers attest to the importance of some of these, such as capitalism vs. communism, birth control vs. religous beliefs, states rights vs. federal authority, and individual autonomy vs. control by systems.

When men and societies disagree, they usually attempt to gain acceptance for their own values by means of persuasion; if this fails they frequently turn to force and power to determine which set of values shall prevail. For example, labor negotiations sometimes degenerate into work stoppages and international discussions into war. There is little assurance that the consequences of relying on force and power to settle value conflicts will benefit anyone in the long run. While some conflict may lead to fruitful reevaluation and change, other conflict may be dangerous. It seems apparent that some superior method is needed.

The paragraphs that follow describe the nature and sources of values in the three frames of reference. Perhaps such an understanding will help in the discovery of a superior procedure for resolving dangerous value conflicts.

Individual Frame of Reference

Man's way of life is less predetermined by biological inheritance than that of any other form of life on earth. The human infant does not enter the world with a fixed way of thinking or behaving. He has a flexibility that permits him to learn new behavior and thought patterns from the moment of his birth. This leads to the development of highly individualistic preceptions and responses.

Individuals do share certain needs, however, such as needs to assert self-identity, to give meaning to the perceived world, to preserve biological homeostasis, to maintain self-acceptance through finding acceptability in the eyes of other persons, and to achieve self-adequacy and self-actualization through competence in living. These common needs produce similarities in the process of responding to the world.

In efforts to deal with the situations he encounters, the individual strives to bring about some kind of order. He cannot successfully deal with a world that is perceived as chaotic, undifferentiated, and disorganzied. He therefore assigns meanings to the impressions he receives. He also assigns relationships between them. In his early efforts to give order and meaning to the disorganized and confusing world in which he finds himself, for example, the human infant first begins to isolate and identify himself. We say the baby "discovers" his hand, then his foot. Later he identifies "me" and differentiates "me" from the rest of the universe.

From his experience with the world, the individual identifies two sets of categories of persons, situations, ideas, things, attitudes, and behavior patterns. One set is associated with successful efforts to achieve need satisfaction; the other with failures. He, of course, seeks those that satisfy and ignores or avoids those that do not.

Each individual thus develops a group of attitudes, beliefs, concepts, and habits that determine his pre-dispositions to the persons, the situations, the ideas, and the

things he encounters. Because these dispositions cannot be observed directly, but must be inferred from manifest behavior, they are referred to as "latent" characteristics. The total organization of these latent dispositions in the individual is termed his "latent structure." The individual's latent structure determines what he can perceive, his attitudes toward it, and his responses to it. The latent structure tends to be stable but not static. It is the product of past experiences and as the individual adds to his past experiences he may be forced to revise some of his latent dispositions.

This, then, is the basis for value judgments at the individual frame of reference. Individuals make judgments of good and bad, right and wrong, or beautiful and repellant in terms of a latent structure that is the product of past efforts to achieve need satisfaction. The individual may not consider that others perceive, evaluate, or respond in ways that are different from his own. He may assume his way is the only reality, that it is the natural way of things. He may judge any view that contrasts with his own to be wrong or irrational.

One of the products of education, of course, is to make the individual aware of the source of his own feelings and tolerant of other logical perceptions, interpretations, and responses. A further, hoped-for product of education is the development of a means for determining the superiority of one value, perception, or response over a competing alternative.

Social System Frame of Reference

A social system involves a group of persons acting together toward common goals. The term applies to such varied systems as families, clubs, business organizations, and nations.

The group is important to its members for two reasons. On the one hand, groups permit the accomplishment of some ends that are impossible of achievement by individuals acting alone. Secondly, mere association in groups helps satisfy one of the basic needs of human beings—the need for social acceptability involving love, affection, mutual respect, and reciprocal concern.

Social systems almost invariably seek distinction

"The goal at the universal frame of reference is the survival and enrichment of the life-process of mankind."

and survival. Certain values are identified as contributing to these goals. Standards of behavior are devised to protect the values that provide identity, prestige, and continuity. Members, and would-be members, of the group are expected to conform, within certain limits, to these group norms. Conformity is the price of membership, and failure to conform may result in exclusion or expulsion.

Group norms are transmitted through the process of socialization. Individuals are taught accepted ways of behaving in an attempt to embed in their latent structures the categories, attitudes, values, and predetermined responses that are found acceptable by members of the social system. One is socialized when he is able to interact with others on the basis of generally accepted ways of thinking and acting. After he becomes sensitized to approval and disapproval and identifies himself with the group and its conventional norms, he internalizes the values of others. Conformity to group expectations may then become requisite for self-approval. In this case, he must conform, even in the absence of others, if he is to avoid feelings of guilt.

Each individual, of course, is exposed to varying norms, not all of which are consistent. When there are alternatives, choices are made on the basis of expediency. If the results are not satisfying, that response will be avoided in the future. If the results are satisfying, the response will be repeated.

If an individual follows inclinations of his own that are inconsistent with social norms, he may be subjected to the forces of social control. He may suffer various punishments inflicted by the group, from coolness in interaction patterns to physical abuse. On the other hand, various rewards will be forthcoming as a result of conformity, from a smile to a substantial status elevation.

Standardization of behavior through conformity to group norms is necessary to permit effective collaboration among individuals. Yet the very values that permit collaboration and organized interaction may contribute to the decline, even extinction of social systems. This is the result, for example, when man's innate ability to adapt to rapid change is inhibited by socialization to static values. Thus the histories of great civilizations such as ancient Egypt and classical Greece and Rome are not totally different from that of the dinosaur.

There are other ways in which social norms may be detrimental. For example, some norms protect and maintain a social system, but at the expense of another social system that may be of equal or greater value to mankind. This can sometimes be observed in the instance of certain property rights, such as the right to withhold production, that jeopardize the total productive process of society. A critical issue here is the determination of which system or value should be allowed to take precedence.

One hoped-for product of education is the determination of a means for distinguishing social norms that do in fact contribute to the survival of beneficial social systems from those that do not.

Universal Frame of Reference

There is conflict within and between the two preceding decision-making frames of reference. For example, one individual may be able to satisfy his wants only at the expense of the satisfaction of someone else's wants. Similarly, for one system to maintain itself another may suffer, as in the instance of competing political ideologies. Finally, for the individual to satisfy his needs, the authority of a social system to protect and maintain itself may be jeopardized, as in the case of workers' rights vs. managers' prerogatives. Or for the system to main-

tain itself, the individual may be forced to forego his own inclinations, as in the case of individual welfare vs. systems profits.

There is a need for a universal value frame of reference, one in which it is possible to resolve value conflicts on some basis other than naked power and authority in the form of war, government coercion, or survival of the strongest or most ruthless. Advancing technology, and the increasingly intricate economic system associated with it, make reliance on old techniques of value ascendancy increasingly unsatisfactory.

It would be spurious idealism to propose that all societies discard their patriotic urges to protect the customs, habits, and traditions of their pasts in order to adopt a new set of rules for resolving value conflicts. The solution must be one of expanding knowledge, disseminating that knowledge, and defining clearly the concept of universal values.

Any value may contribute to some individual or group goal in a given time and place, but is there a basis for judging some individual and group values universally good and others bad? Is there some means of identifying the direction of progress for mankind, as differentiated from a limited advantage for the individual or social system?

Perhaps there is. The fundamental goal of both the individual and the social system is survival. Neither can realize its objective unless the human species survives. Thus the goal at the universal frame of reference may be taken to be the survival and enrichment of the life-process of mankind. The problem, then, is to discover a means of distinguishing values that contribute to the life-process from those that jeopardize or inhibit the life-process.

Change is inevitable. Man's proclivity to discover new technology and to apply it in the productive process probably will continue to improve his potential for the good life. Whether or not an improving way of life is in fact realized will depend on the extent to which human behavior and values are adaptive to the ever-changing conditions. Here, then, is another indication of the direction in which to seek universal values. Those values that contribute to the process of adapting to perpetual change support the life-process; those that inhibit adaptation to change jeopardize it.

Some values are verifiable. That is to say, their ability to contribute to the goals they purport to advance can be tested by objective, cause-and-effect methods. Other values are not verifiable. They are the vestiges of the past and rest on tradition. They are not to be questioned, merely accepted. Thus rain can be induced by dancing or by seeding clouds with dry ice. Both of these behavior patterns purport to achieve the same end. One is verifiable (testable) in terms of the experiential referent, the other must be accepted on the basis of faith and cannot be subjected to proof or disproof. Hence, one can be tested, altered, adapted, and tested again and again as conditions change; the other cannot. This then is a further clue to universal values. To be adaptive, rather than rigid, they will have to be verifiable.

The difficulty lies in the fact that the socialization process does not distinguish values that are verifiable and adaptive from those that are non-verifiable an inhibitive. The individual is induced to accept the values of his social system without subjecting them to verification. Even to suggest doing so might be sufficient grounds to exclude him from membership in the group and equal status with the faithful.

Here, then, is a final and perhaps most important clue indicating the method by which universal values can be established. Efforts should be made as rapidly as possible and as universally as possible to induce individuals to internalize, along with whatever other values society maintains, the values involved in scientific inquiry.

The value system involved in the universal frame of reference is a function of the experimental method. It involves proposing and testing hypotheses in the continuing search for objective reality. It embodies a willingness to give up old ideas and accept new ones when experience proves one to be more adaptive than another.

Conclusion

If business leaders are aware of the problem of value conflicts, and if they can apply decision criteria that provide a means for determining value ascendency on some basis other than power and force, they can contribute much toward a better way of life for mankind. In the absence of such understanding, business leaders inadvertently may seek to maintain values that are not adaptive to change, that are not verifiable, that are not consistent with objective reality, and that do not support the life-process of man. The alternatives to flexibility, adaptability, and verifiability in values are personal and social prejudices. Values of the latter sort are not amenable to the scientific process of proposing and testing hypotheses; instead they lead to methods of value ascendancy that may contribute to war, brutality, revolution, and ultimately to the extinction or decline of individuals, social systems, and even of the human species itself. ◬

Hawaiian
Carnival

*More than a hundred UH alumni
followed the sun last summer
on the Alumni Federation tour
to Las Vegas, San Francisco,
and Hawaii.*

*Many alumni who went
island hopping report that
the scenery was magnificent.*

1.

2.

1. *UH President Philip Hoffman and Mrs. Hoffman board the chartered plane in Houston along with other excited UH'ers. Dr. Hoffman was honored at a birthday party by the alumni during the trip.*

2. *Mr. H. H. Hedges, former president of the Alumni Federation, and Mrs. Hedges relax at poolside in Las Vegas.*

3. *Alumni pose for the traditional group picture upon arrival in Hawaii.*

4. *Pauline Oliver, M.Ed. '60, and her husband Dr. Victor Oliver give a big smile as they enjoy the sun on the patio of the San Francisco Hilton.*

5. *Lynn Bratten, UH junior whose parents are alumni, enjoys the view of Las Vegas.*

3.

4.

5.

The symbol illustrated above has been adopted by the Alumni Federation. Its message is subtle but eloquent.

- **Nine elements** symbolize the nine colleges of the University.
- **Three sides** represent the facets of the University—students, faculty, alumni.
- **Three sides** move and flow into each other to illustrate the interdependence of each facet on the whole.
- **The pyramid shape** signifies strength.
- **The stylized A** represents Alumni.

The symbol is the work of UH Alumnus Cliff Gillock, art director with Baxter & Korge Studio Inc., which contributed its services to achieve this striking new symbol.