

UNITED STATES  
FOOD ADMINISTRATION

Bulletin No. 7

THE PRESENT CAMPAIGN

Food Administration  
The World's Food Shortage  
The American Way



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## “Food Administration”

Address delivered by Herbert Hoover at the National Chamber of Commerce Convention, Atlantic City, September 19, 1917

Food has gradually, since the war began, assumed a larger place in the economics, the statesmanship, and the strategy of the war until it is my belief that food will win this war—starvation or sufficiency will in the end mark the victor.

The Allies are blockading the food from Germany; and the surrounding neutrals are under pressure to export their surplus both ways and to reduce their imports. The Germans are endeavoring to starve the Allies by sinking the food ships. Short production and limitation of markets cumulate to under supply, and all governments are faced with reduction of consumption, stimulation of production, control of prices and readjustment of wages. The winning of the war is largely a problem of who can organize this weapon.

As to our more intimate problems, to effect this end, it must be obvious that the diversion of millions of men to war reduces the productive labor of the Allies, and in sequence, the food production. But beyond this the destruction of food at sea, and of still more importance, the continuous destruction of shipping, have necessitated the gradual retreat in area from which overseas food supplies can be obtained for any given country. There has grown from this not only a limitation of supplies, but an accumulation in inaccessible markets. The result of these cumulative forces is that North America is called upon, by both Allies and neutrals, for quantities of food far beyond its normal export ability.

### THE DRAIN ON OUR RESERVES.

What this tax on our resources amounts to is evident enough from the fact that during the past fiscal year we have increased our

grain exports from 120,000,000 bushels, the three-year pre-war average, to 405,000,000 bushels. This year the Allied production is reduced by 300,000,000 bushels over last year, and we must therefore meet a much larger demand. Our exports of meat and fat products have increased from pre-war average of 500,000,000 lbs. to 1,500,000,000 lbs. for the last fiscal year. And owing to the decrease in their animal herds, the Allies will require still more next year.

If the extremely high prices thundering at every door were not a sufficient demonstration, it is possible, by actual figures, to prove that we have been exporting in many commodities actually beyond our capacity to produce. Taking the three-year pre-war period as 100, we find in pork, for instance, the number of animals on hand at the 30th of June this year is variously estimated at from 92 to 98. The slaughter of animals during the year was at the rate of 179; the exports were at the rate of 215, and the natural consequence is that the price is at 250.

During the past year, we have exported every last ounce of which the country during this period was capable of producing, and our national stock of cereals and animal products, proportionate to our population, was, at the beginning of this harvest, the lowest in our history, and many of us have been under the keenest anxiety lest we would face absolute shortage. This anxious period is now happily passed.

#### WE MUST MEET THE DEMAND.

The demand in many commodities during the coming year is beyond our capacity to furnish if we consume our normal amounts. The necessity of maintenance of the Allies on our first line of defense, and our duty to humanity in feeding the neutrals demands of us that we reduce our every unnecessary consumption and every waste to the last degree—and even then the world dependent on us must face privation.

Owing to the limitation of shipping we must confine our exports to the most concentrated foodstuffs, grain, beef, pork, dairy products and sugar.

We must control exports in such a manner as to protect the supplies of our own people. Happily we have an excess of some other commodities which cannot be shipped, particularly corn and perishables, and we can do much to increase our various exports if we can secure substitutions of these in the diet of our people, but above all we must eliminate our waste.

Our first duty lies to our Allies, and if they are to sacrifice a share of our food to neutrals and if this is also the result of our own savings and our own productive labor, these neutrals should expect to furnish equivalent service in other directions to the common pool against Germany.

#### FOOD SHORTAGE MAKES PANIC PRICES.

Populations short of food hesitate at no price, and in those commodities where there is demand beyond the supply, whether food or otherwise, the old law of price fixing by "supply and demand" is broken.

Such an over demand gives opportunity for vicious speculation and presents an instability to trade which necessitates widening margins in distributing profits and great damage to the consumer. It results in marking up the prices of millions of articles upon the shelves and engages the whole of the distributing trades in inherent speculation.

It is upon this question of price that I wish to dwell for a moment.

#### PRICE CONTROL THE LESSER EVIL.

We have all listened to the specious arguments of the siren of high prices—it is heralded as the mark of prosperity and to possess economic advantages. It is advocated as a conservation measure. It is true high prices reduce consumption, but they reduce it through the methods of famine, for the burden is thrown on to the class of the most limited means, and thus the class least able to bear it. There is no national conservation in robbing our working classes of the ability to buy food. High prices are conservative by reducing the standard of living of the majority. It works no hardship on the rich and discriminates against the poor. Real conservation lies in the equitable distribution of the least necessary amount, and in this country we can only hope to obtain it as a voluntary service, voluntary self-denial, and voluntary reduction of waste, by each and every man, woman and child according to his own abilities; not alone a contribution of food to our Allies but a contribution to lower prices. We have and will retain sufficient food for all our people. There is no economic reason why there should be exorbitant prices. We are not in famine.

It is obvious that our people must have quantities of food and must have them at prices which they can pay from their wage. If we are to have ascending prices, we must have ascending wages. But as the wage level rises with inequality, it is the door leading to strikes, disorder, to riots and defeat of our national efficiency. We are thus between two fires—to control prices or to readjust the income of the whole community. The verdict of the whole of the world's experience is in favor of price control as the lesser evil.

#### SPECULATION NOT TO BE TOLERATED.

There are few who will dispute the advantage of such regulation as will eliminate speculation and extortionate profits. This is

difficult to disassociate from fixing of prices, yet a great deal may be done by simple regulation and the organization of trades to police themselves under government patronage—to put such regulation into force as will protect the legitimate and patriotic trader—for no one will deny that speculation against the consumer is a vicious crime in our present state.

The large question of the hour is price fixing, for the suspension of the law of demand and supply as an equitable, economic law, is forcing our hand in every direction.

#### LESSONS FROM EUROPE.

The total experience of Europe has demonstrated that many methods of price control such as maximums and minimums are a fallacy, and in themselves stimulate evasions and generate economic currents, which, while they may be a temporary palliative to a situation, ultimately wash away the very foundations of production and distribution. Of European experience in price fixing practically but one formula has remained, and that is the fixed specified price for every stage of a given commodity, from its raw to its finished delivered state, based as nearly as may be on the cost of production and reasonable return on capital.

#### GUIDED BY DEVELOPMENTS.

We shall find as we go on with the war and its increasing economic disruption, that first one commodity after another will need be taken into control. We will, however, profit by experience if we lay down no hard and fast rules, but if we deal with every situation on its merits. So long as demand and supply have free play in a commodity, we had best leave it alone. Our repairs to the break in normal economic control in other commodities must be designed to repair the break, not with a view to setting up new economic systems or theories.

#### THE PROBLEMS CLASSIFIED.

It appears to me we can divide our commodities roughly into four classes:

*First*—Those commodities of which we produce our own supply and for which there is no export or import business of such consequence as to influence the whole, such as corn, potatoes, onions, apples and many others. Here the law of demand and supply still reigns, and we can well leave them alone, provided no person or persons attempt to upset the normal flow of barter, and then we can best deal with the person.

*Second*—Those commodities the export demand for which dominates the price. Here it is possible as a first step to regulate the export price. In such a class I may mention wheat and flour. Nor have we much choice as to the matter of these commodities, for under the agreements between our Government and the Allies our Government must purchase or direct the purchase of Allied supplies in this country, and as these purchases in many commodities dominate the price we are face to face with price determination whether we will or not.

*Third*—Commodities where internal demand exceeds the supply and where direct exports alone do not sufficiently influence the price—and here we are driven to price fixing at once. Coal has already fallen in this category.

*Fourth*—Commodities where our imports control the price. We can in some instances control the volume and price of imports so as to regulate price, and it is obviously in our interest to export as little of our money as we can.

#### PRODUCTION THE MAIN FACTOR.

In all control of price there is one dominant factor. The very need of price control is proof of insufficient production, and in war the necessity itself transcends the cost. Therefore, the constant dominant thought in connection with price must be the stimulation of production. There is, however, a point at which stimulation is attained. To get 90% of volume of production costs one price, and the need of the commodity to secure each advancing unit of production toward 100% becomes a problem of balance in the necessity for the commodity against the burden to the consumer.

We have in the Food Administration put into action a form of price control through purchase of the exports of wheat and flour. The Government must buy or contract the buying of wheat for export and the export volume controls the price. We were immediately confronted with price determination.

#### ILLUSTRATIONS OF METHOD.

To determine it we called in the farmer himself and gave him the majority of the commission to determine a fair price. We gave him the national balance and prayed him to weigh carefully and justly. For the first time in history he had a voice in his own price and unanimously determined \$2.20 per bushel, with certain differentials on locality and grade.

We then created a voluntary engine of our best commercial men to carry it into effect and to eliminate all speculation, and to reduce the cost of distribution in hopes of finding relief to the consumer.

We can now measure the results. The farmer will receive about 60c per bushel more for his wheat than his average last year. Sixty cents per bushel is equal to about \$3 per barrel in flour. The price of wholesale flour is today \$3 per barrel less than the last four months' average. So here is the measure of reduced speculation and distribution charges—\$3 per barrel increase to the farmer and \$3 decrease to the consumer.

The Food Administration has no powers to fix prices except through the export buying, the power to buy and sell certain commodities, and the further power to enter voluntary agreements with producers. A case of the latter lies in sugar where we agree with 95% of the beet producers that they shall fix the price at a certain figure, and we propose to reinforce this by the control of imports, and if necessary to enforce other measures against the 5% if they fail to fall in with the majority.

Each and every commodity has its own situation; each must be handled on its merits and with the least interference by government that will effect purely war ends, and each by co-operation with the industry itself.

#### WHERE REGULATION ENDS

One illusion in the mind of the public I am anxious to get clear. The Food Administration, through its own authority and the co-operation of other government agencies, can accomplish a great deal, but it is limited absolutely to that area of commerce between the producer and the retailer. We are stopped in law within this area; we can only use influence on both the retailer and producer, and depend upon their patriotism. In this area we can only regulate the flow of trade and hold it to moderate profits and excise speculation. This is an economic step short of price control—except where we can accomplish it by indirect means I have quoted above.

In the Food Administration we intend to confine ourselves to 10 or 12 fundamental staples—those food commodities that make up the basis of life—we take no interest in the luxuries or even semi-luxuries. We have laid down certain principles of co-operation with the business community, and if we are to succeed on these lines we must have their support. We are asking the various trades in these particular staples to co-operate with us in organization of the trades to the end that all transactions shall be direct in the normal flow of distribution; that speculation shall be excised; that goods shall be sold both by producer and distributor at least at a reasonable and normal charge over cost, or even without profit.

It appears to us that no right minded man in this community wants extra profit from the war. If he does he should be branded with the brand of Judas for selling the blood of our sons for profit. I have read among the proceedings of this important body a de-

mand for larger participation in the government by the business community.

#### BY VOLUNTARY COUNCILS.

The Food Administration today is directed by a body of 250 volunteer representative business men, producers and experts, and up to date it has held over 200 conferences with representatives of trades and producers. We have asked them to help in formulating plans to conserve, to stimulate production, and above all to regulate distribution. Most have been helpful and in instances where organization has been completed the devotion of the business men has been above all praise; in some cases we have so far failed to secure this co-operation in a discouraging way; but I am not, in view of the success in some lines, prepared to say that the experiment is either a success or a failure.

But let no one be under the illusion that selfishness or greed has disappeared from this great republic. There passes over my desk daily a sickening mass of evidence of individual, sectional and class avarice and self interest, backed by demand and threat, that is illuminated by rarer instances of real support in the gigantic task of government in this crisis.

#### CO-OPERATION OR COLLAPSE.

We wish for co-operation in service from our Commercial Community. We wish to stamp it with the stamp of service in public interest. Compared with the sacrifice of our sons and brothers, it is but little to ask. And it is a service which, if given now, will not be without interest returns for the future. This interest in a thousand fold will come in two directions. If we receive this support, we will have demonstrated the falsity of radical claims as to the necessity of overturning our industries. If we fail we will have given impulse to these demands and ground for their complaints.

One looming shadow of this war is its drift toward social disruption for with the gigantic sacrifice of life the world is demanding a sacrifice of property, and we shall surely drift to that rocky coast unless we can prove the economic soundness and willingness to public service of our commercial institutions.

It is worth while examining the developments in Russia from this point of view. Here no practical or effective form of commercial regulation or distribution was undertaken. In consequence of speculation, profiteering and failure in commerce to serve public interest, the condition of the industrial classes became so intolerable as to steam the hotbed of revolution.

Justifiable as this revolution may have been and as great a cause of liberty as it may result, no one can deny that the whole trend has been to destroy industry, subvert government, tear down society

in an exasperated effort to correct their abuses; the latest phases are little short of sheer anarchy. This temper in the revolution, I am convinced from much experience in Russia, was the reaction from failure of the government and the commercial classes to meet their public duty.

#### THE TEST OF DEMOCRACY.

The other end to be attained is of profound importance. The alternative to failure of our commercial system to maintain its place and at the same time serve public interest is rigid autocratic governmental organization of industry of the German type. Such organization is autocracy itself—it breeds bureaucracy and stifles initiative, thus democracy, at its birth. We must organize—we must mobilize—our every national energy, if we are to win this war against the organization perfected by autocracy. Either we must organize from the top down or from the bottom up. One is autocracy itself—the other, democracy. If democracy cannot organize to accomplish its economic, as well as its military defense, it is a false faith and need be abandoned.

The Food Administration has appealed to the commercial community to march with it to an organization, democratic in its inspiration and vital to our defense.

If we succeed, we shall have assisted our commercial institutions to their own stability in after years, and beyond this they will have proved that democracy is a faith worthy of defense.

September 18, 1917.

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## The World's Food Shortage

Address delivered by Herbert Hoover at the Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D. C.,  
August 28, 1917

I have been asked to review the reasons why we are pleading with the American people for stimulation of our food production, for care, thought and economy in consumption and elimination of waste. Further, I wish to review the methods by which these things may be accomplished.

Briefly the reasons are simple. Our Allies are dependent upon us for food and for quantities larger than we have ever before exported. They are the first line of our defense, and our money, or ships, or life blood, and, not least, our food supply, must be of a

common stock. If we cannot maintain our Allies in their necessities, we cannot expect them to remain constant in war. If their food fails, we shall be left alone in the fight, and the Western line will move to the Atlantic seaboard. It is thus a matter of our own safety and self-interest. It is more than this—it is a matter of humanity that we give of our abundance that we relieve suffering.

It is not difficult to demonstrate their needs, the volume of our obligation, and the necessity of great effort on our part. In normal pre-war times, England, Ireland, France, Italy and Belgium were to a large degree dependent upon imports for their food supplies. They yearly imported over 750,000,000 bushels of grain together with vast quantities of animal and fat products. Belligerent lines have cut off their supplies from Russia, Bulgaria, and Roumania, and the demands of Germany on surrounding neutrals have reduced the supplies from those quarters. Of more importance, however, is that the submarine destruction of shipping has necessitated that the farthest distant markets should be wholly or partially abandoned. The great markets of Australia and the Indies are now only partially accessible, and gradually the more remote markets will be more and more restricted until a year from now when our own new ships will be in numbers to help. The last harvest in the Argentine was a failure, and until the next harvest, even that contribution to their supplies is cut off. Beyond this again, much food is lost at sea—perhaps ten per cent of the actual shipments are sunk enroute.

Therefore, the load of even normal imports is thrown upon North America—the nearest and safest route.

Of no less concern than the dislocation of markets and the losses at sea is the decrease in production among the Allies. If forty million men are taken out of productive labor and put into war and war work, there can only be one result, and that is diminution in production of food. Further contributing causes to this diminution are the lessening in the amount of fertilizer which is available, through shortage of shipping and losses at sea, and the consequent reduction in the productivity of the soil itself. This year the decrease in production stands out in more vivid silhouette than ever before.

#### TALE OF THE INVENTORY.

We have had a stock-taking by the various food administrators and departments of agriculture in Europe, and they find that the production of cereals this year has diminished about 525,000,000 bushels of grain below normal. This shortage in production, added to normal imports, gives 1,250,000,000 bushels of grain that must be imported by the Allies during the next twelve months, if consumption is kept normal. Their cattle, sheep and hogs have diminished by over 30,000,000 animals, and these reductions are bound

to go on with increasing velocity, because short supplies have necessitated eating into the herd.

How great the burden upon the United States is may be made clear by a few figures: During the last three-year pre-war period, we averaged an annual export of 120,000,000 bushels of grain and 500,000,000 pounds of animal products and fats. During the last fiscal year, we exported over 400,000,000 bushels of grain and 1,500,000,000 pounds of animal products and fats. During this period we really over-exported—we, ourselves, are selling our animals faster than we grow them, and our stock of foodstuffs just prior to harvest was relatively the lowest in our history.

As the causes of Europe's shortage grow in intensity, our load this next year must be of much greater weight.

As our and our Allies' harvests are now measurable we now know the size of the world's larder for the coming winter, and it will measure insufficient unless we can reduce our consumption and waste.

#### OUR ALLIES SUFFER PRIVATION.

Our Allies are making every possible effort to reduce consumption and eliminate waste. Most of the principal staples are dealt out to the public under one kind or another of a restriction. Fines up to \$500 are levied on persons who throw away stale bread. But despite all these efforts, there is not such a reduction in national consumption as one might expect. Besides the men in the trenches and the men working ten to eleven hours daily in the shops, millions of women have been drawn into physical labor, and all of these require more food than they required under normal conditions in pre-war times. The result is that while the saving in food is appreciable, it is not as much as one would expect. There is one feature of all these efforts toward conservation in Europe that stands out vividly—the non-working population is in large part composed of the old, the women and the children; they are the class upon which the incidence of reduction largely falls. The people in war work are in national defense, and they must have the first call on all supplies. Therefore, any failure on our part in supplying food will fall upon the class to whom our natural sympathies must be the greatest—and there is a point below which it cannot fall and tranquility be maintained.

#### PHYSICAL FACTORS INVOLVED.

We have a general limitation on our food supplies to the Allies, and that is that the condition of shipping requires that all the food stuffs sent shall be of the most concentrated sort. Therefore, the commodities which we have to send are most advantageously limited to wheat, corn, beef, pork products, dairy products and sugar.

If we consider our own supplies, we find that we have enough of corn. We have great surplus of potatoes, vegetables, fish and poultry. These latter commodities do not lend themselves to shipment either from bulk or other reasons. We cannot increase or even maintain our present exports of wheat, beef, pork, dairy products and sugar, without reducing our consumption.

The logical and sensible first step in adapting our supplies to Allied needs is to substitute corn, potatoes, vegetables, fish and poultry for those staples we wish to export. The proportion of our national diet in vegetables is very low and it will not only do no harm to increase it but in fact will contribute to public health.

Time does not permit that I should give you the position here of each staple in the national and international situation. I may, however, describe shortly one or two of them. We of the United States normally raise for export about 80,000,000 bushels of wheat. Canada produces something like 100,000,000 bushels of wheat for export. Europe must import this year 525,000,000 bushels of wheat if they are to maintain their normal bread supply. With our normal export of 80,000,000 bushels, we can go but a short distance toward accomplishing that end. If, however, by conservation we increase our export to 200,000,000 bushels and Canada increased hers to 125,000,000 we shall then come within 200,000,000 bushels of the solution of the problem. By conservation and by substituting 20 to 25 per cent of other cereals in her war bread, and by some imports from far distant markets, the problem may be solved, but the margin is so narrow that any failure on our part to provide an extra 120,000,000 bushels of wheat risks disaster to the whole cause.

For us to increase exports of wheat from 80,000,000 bushels to 200,000,000 bushels means that we must make a saving of about 20 per cent in our wheat consumption. That is not a great burden for our people to bear. This means an average saving of one pound of flour per person per week out of their five pounds consumption, and it is not asking much of our people that they should substitute other cereals to that extent.

#### THEY CAN DO NO MORE.

Now a number of inquiries arise with reference to different phases of this question, and one is why Europe does not take the corn instead of the wheat. For a hundred years the wheat loaf has been the basis of life in Europe, with the exception of Italy. The art of household baking has long since been lost. Most of the bread is baked by bakers. For this reason alone it is almost impossible for them to substitute corn bread, which cannot be distributed by bakers. Furthermore, the actual household machinery of baking—ovens, etc.—has long since been out of existence in most European

homes. Beyond that, if we were to ship corn we must ship it in the form of the grain itself, for cornmeal is not a stable product, and European countries have but little facilities for milling the corn. They are mixing corn meal in the wheat flour, but there is a limit beyond which cereals cannot be mixed in the wheat loaf and have the bread rise, and that limit is somewhere about 25 or 30 per cent. They are using higher milled wheat than we for economy's sake, and mixing it with other cereals. It makes war bread far less palatable than our corn bread. Another case in point of sugar. We import between one-half and two-thirds of our sugar from the West Indies. The Allies formerly drew sugar from Russia, Germany, Austria and Java. They are now compelled to bring their demands to our market, and, therefore, we must reduce our consumption if we leave enough for them. We consume from 85 to 90 pounds per person per annum. The Allies have placed their population on a sugar ration of from 21 to 25 pounds per person. Even this cannot be supplied without reduction on our part, and France has asked us to export them 100,000 tons of our supplies at once, otherwise they must stop the ration altogether. That we should refuse France is unthinkable.

Besides substitution the other great need is to save waste—the gospel of less buying, serving smaller portions, the clean plate, to use our food wisely in economy. There are a hundred avenues of saving—if we inspect the garbage can.

Again, there are commodities in which we must reduce consumption. If we are to supply the Allies and ourselves both with sugar and fats over the next winter, we simply must reduce the consumption. By fats we mean lard, bacon, butter, cream, lard substitutes and soap. We consume nearly double the amount of fats that we need, and we waste a fabulous amount.

#### THRIFT FOR WAR SAVINGS.

There are other features of food conservation of national importance. One of them lies in the whole problem of national saving. Wars are paid for out of the savings of a people. Whether we meet that expenditure now or after the war, we will have to pay it some day from our savings. The savings of a people lie in the conservation of commodities and the savings of productive labor. If we can reduce the consumption of the necessary commodities in this country to a point where our laborers can turn to the production of war materials; if we can secure that balance and get to the point where we can free our men for the Army, we shall have solved one of the most important economic problems of the war. If we are to carry on this war and carry it on without economic danger, we must carry a major portion of its expense now during the war from the savings which we make at the present time. If we reduce the waste and the unnecessary consumption of food

by a matter of only six cents a day, we shall have saved two billion per year.

Conservation has other bearings as well. There are the great moral questions of temperance, self-denial and self-sacrifice. We have been a most extravagant and wasteful people, and it is as truly intemperance to waste food as it is to take unnecessary drink.

#### MORAL AND MATERIAL ENDS.

Next year, in order to maintain our Allies in war, we must make even further efforts to increase the export over last year, and it is obvious that we not only cannot do so without conservation, but that unless we do have conservation, we must expect higher prices.

It is often said that high prices are themselves a conservation measure, but they are a conservation measure of the nature of famine. It is conservation in favor of the rich and against the poor. The rich will have all the food and variety they need, but the poor must, under this form of conservation, shorten their food allowance and diminish their standard of living. The only real conservation is one by which the whole population, rich and poor alike, take their part in the provision of these necessary supplies. This can only come about either by forced measures from the Government, by which all are placed on ration and the available food-stuffs equally divided, or alternatively, by a great voluntary effort of self-denial by which the added supply can be obtained without vicious action or conservation through price.

Another bearing of the problem lies in that we have had growing in this country a class of the population given over to more or less idleness, and a great deal of extravagance. There grows out of this a certain amount of class-feeling, in a country where there should be no class division. There is now an opportunity for that class, by a reduction in its scale of living, to demonstrate its fidelity to the national cause and its willingness to share its full portion of the national burden. In so doing, that section of our people will have demonstrated something more than mere saving—it will have demonstrated a willingness to serve in our national necessity, even to the matter of personal sacrifice.

#### THE SPIRIT OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE.

There is a phase of this entire work which has appealed greatly to us here, and that is the whole question of national service. Here is an opportunity for every man, woman and child in this country to contribute immediately and directly to the winning of the war. It should be possible to show to the entire population that there is at least one point in which all may serve in this struggle. There should result not only saving, but the sense of service, a sense of

contribution to the war itself, and a proof of loyalty and support in each and every individual.

There is no force by which conservation could be imposed upon the American people. Conservation can be accomplished in some countries by iron-clad law, or by forcing legal limitations on every individual in the country, but in our country that is not only unfeasible from the governmental point of view, but it is against the instincts of the people. On the other hand, we may accomplish the same result voluntarily if we can give the people a stimulus in the knowledge that every individual has here a definite service to perform. We have therefore never considered this problem from the viewpoint of force—we have considered it always from the viewpoint of voluntary effort. We have asked all to join us as voluntary workers, as we are to effect by a democratic movement the results which autocracy has only been able to effect by law and organization. Indeed, we feel there is a service here greater than the actual saving and the actual practical result. There is the possibility of demonstrating that democracy can organize itself without the necessity of autocratic direction and control. If it should be proved that we cannot secure a saving in our foodstuffs by voluntary effort, and that as a result of our failure to our country we are jeopardizing the success of the whole civilized world in this war, it might be necessary for us to adopt such measures as would force this issue, but if we come to that unhappy measure, we shall be compelled to acknowledge that democracy cannot defend itself without compulsion—that is autocracy and is a confession of failure of our political faith.

If we can secure allegiance to this national service in our 20,000,000 kitchens, our 20,000,000 breakfast, lunch and dinner tables; if we can multiply an ounce of sugar, or fats or what not per day by 100,000,000 people, we have saved 180,000,000 pounds in a month. If we save a pound of flour per week, we save 125,000,000 bushels of wheat per annum. It is this multiplication of minute quantities—teaspoons full—slices, scraps—by 100,000,000 and 360 days that will save the world. Is there anyone in this land who cannot deny himself or herself something? Who cannot save some waste? Is not your right to life and freedom worth this service?

## The American Way

A Willing Duty—"I am glad to join in the service of Food Conservation."—*Pledge Card*.

A Universal Service—"A service which every man, woman and child may enter."—*Food Administration Bulletin No. 6*.

Our Undertaking—"We must voluntarily and intelligently assume the responsibility . . . everyone has a direct and inescapable interest."—*Bulletin No. 6*.

The Iron Law or the Golden Rule—"Autocracy finds its strength in its ability to impose organization from the top; the essence of democracy consists in the application of the initiative in its own people. If democracy cannot be so organized as to defend itself, then democracy is a faith which cannot stand."

"The call of patriotism, of humanity and of duty rings clear and insistent. We must heed it if we are to defend our ideals, maintain our form of government and safeguard our future welfare."